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This dissertation is a case study of Better Work, a program run by the International Labor 
Organization and the International Finance Corporation.  It aims to improve working 
conditions and productivity in the apparel industry.  The purpose of this case study is to 
examine the role that international organizations can play in global governance.  The 
research presented here comes from interviews, document analysis, and an examination 
of quantitative data on factories’ working conditions.  In-person interviews were 
conducted in the United States, Switzerland, Vietnam, and Indonesia; many phone 
interviews took place with individuals in other countries.  Both publicly available 
documents and internal reports provided by Better Work were analyzed.  Publicly-
available quantitative data on changes to working conditions are also examined. 
Four conclusions from this research stand out.  First, Better Work is able to satisfy 
its many stakeholders by focusing on “win-win” solutions; these are solutions that benefit 
multiple stakeholders.  This focus has led to significant, sustainable improvements on 
some issues.  The program has been less effective in promoting “zero-sum” solutions 
wherein improvements to working conditions impose a cost on other actors in the 
industry.  Second, the key to Better Work’s success has been training factories in 
management systems and specific topics.  Most international labor rights initiatives have 
focused almost exclusively on monitoring - and these initiatives have achieved very little.  
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The experience of Better Work shows that monitoring must be complemented with 
training to be effective.  Third, the International Labor Organization has acted as an 
“anchor” for Better Work, allowing the program to remain impartial amongst the 
competing demands of its stakeholders.  Fourth, the research emphasizes the importance 
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Everyone recognizes that the global problems confronting humanity are not being met by existing 
international institutional arrangements.  The post-war hegemony of the west is giving way to a 
diffusion of power across states from every continent.  Furthermore, states themselves are 
becoming less and less able to control their populations, territories, economies, and natural 
environments.  Non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations have moved into 
the vacuum left by states, but their effect on world order has hardly been coherent. 
 As a result of the twentieth-century’s two world wars, many idealists as well as some 
realists have placed their hopes in international organizations to address global problems, but time 
and again these institutions have disappointed.  The world’s major international organizations, the 
United Nations and Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), were created over 70 years ago for a 
different world and a different set of problems.  Current problems like climate change, tax 
evasion, drug trafficking, genocide, and refugee flows have all confounded existing international 
organizations. 
 Despite this failure, there is no political will for a wholesale reform of international 
institutional arrangements.  Human beings are going to have to confront global problems using 
the system as it is.  And in order to do that effectively, people need to ask fundamental questions 
about the nature of international organizations.  What exactly can international organizations do?  
How can they work with states, civil society, and the private sector?  And, more importantly, 
what could and should international organizations be doing to address the myriad problems facing 
humanity?   
This dissertation addresses these questions through a detailed case study of a rare success 
story: the Better Work program.  The program improves labor standards and productivity in the 
garment industry and currently operates in eight countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.   
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 Better Work’s political arrangement embodies the contemporary chaos of world order.  It 
jointly run by two international organizations with very different cultures and missions, the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).  
Moreover, it receives input from developed and developing country governments, international 
labor unions, multinational corporations, domestic labor unions, and employers’ associations.  
Astonishingly, the program has been able to satisfy the demands of these stakeholders and keep 
them talking at the same table. 
 But Better Work is not just an exercise in international dialogue – its practical 
implementation has also been exemplary.  Its efforts have led to significant, sustained 
improvements in working conditions.  These improvements include child labor, fire safety, 
contracting procedures, overtime, worker harassment, gender discrimination, and freedom of 
association.   
All this has happened in the face of enormous pressures that run against labor rights in 
the garment industry.  Consumers and investors demand cheap clothing and high returns from 
multinationals; multinationals push factory owners for cheaper and faster production; factory 
owners pressure workers; and governments in developing countries are often unwilling to protect 
their workers for fear that production will move to countries with more compliant work forces. 
 The fact that Better Work corrals a host of actors and successfully addresses a global 
problem in a challenging industry makes it a valuable case study for students of world politics.  
This case study shows how international organizations can work with states, civil society, and the 
private sector without being overwhelmed.  It also provides practical lessons for how 
international organizations can implement programs that will truly have an effect on the ground. 
Research Methods and Dissertation Outline 
The most valuable source of information about Better Work came from interviews with staff, 
stakeholders, and observers of the program.  51 formal interviews were conducted with people all 
over the world, including: representatives of the private sector in New York City, IFC and US 
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government officials in Washington D.C., ILO staff in Geneva, Switzerland, and Better Work 
staff in Indonesia and Vietnam. 
 A host of publicly available documents about Better Work constituted a building block, 
including articles written by independent scholars.  Privileged access to many internal documents 
at Better Work’s headquarters in Geneva helped frame the argument although they are not cited 
directly because of the confidentiality governing access to institutional archives. 
 The research here is mainly qualitative, although chapter 8 presents quantitative data.   
This chapter looks at changes to compliance rates among factories that are monitored by Better 
Work in order to determine which issues have had the most improvement.  This is the one use of 
quantitative data found in this dissertation, but even this analysis is heavily influenced by 
interviews because the data is not a perfect representation of reality.  Making sense of the data 
requires understanding the complex challenges to monitoring labor standards, all of which 
requires qualitative information. 
 A major downside to conducting a detailed case study of a complex, dynamic program is 
that there is always some ambiguity to one’s conclusions.  No one is completely sure what 
stakeholders want or do not want; no one knows exactly why a policy worked or did not work; 
and no one can predict exactly what the future holds.   Given that the facts themselves are 
sometimes in question, the conclusions are supported by multiple sources of information (in the 
language of qualitative research, this is called “triangulation”).   
Chapter one of this dissertation discusses the academic literature on international 
organizations and summarizes the questions that are currently of central importance.  Two 
specific literatures are addressed in detail: that of constructivism and of global governance.  The 
constructivist literature has gone the farthest in theorizing about how international organizations 
exercise authority in the world, and a case study of Better Work serves to test these theories.  The 
global governance literature also theorizes about how and why power is used, but it also makes 
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prescriptions about how power should be used.  The lessons from Better Work speak very directly 
to prescriptive questions in world order.   
Chapter two analyzes the global apparel industry.  It begins by looking at the supply 
chains that connect seamstresses on factory floors in developing countries with consumers in 
developed countries.  The central insight of this chapter is that each link in the supply chain is 
connected to other links through a “buyer’s market” in which buyers have extraordinary power 
over sellers.  This long chain of buyers’ markets creates enormous pressure against good working 
conditions.  The chapter also discusses the political aspects of apparel and shows how politics, as 
much as market forces, have shape the industry. 
Chapter three provides a history of different international attempts to promote labor 
rights.  It focuses on three different strategies to create international labor standards: international 
law, embedding labor clauses in trade treaties, and private compliance initiatives.  As the chapter 
discusses, all three of these strategies have proven ineffective. 
 The next five chapters cover crucial aspects of the Better Work program.  Chapter four 
discusses the program’s activities.  These activities can be divided into two categories: “core 
operations” that improve working conditions with factories and “stakeholder engagement” in 
which Better Work creates partnerships to improve working conditions beyond factory gates. 
Chapter five describes the perspectives of each of Better Work’s different stakeholders.  
The major stakeholders at the international level include donor governments from developed 
countries, the international labor movements, multinational corporations, and international 
employers’ associations.  At the domestic level, major stakeholders include government agencies, 
labor unions, and employers.  The relationship between Better Work and other labor rights actors 
is also discussed. 
Chapter six gives a history of the program.  The chapter begins by discussing the 
program’s inception in a 2001 agreement between the United States, Cambodia, and the 
International Labor Organization.  The chapter provides an account of how the program changed 
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direction in 2007 and began expanding to new countries.  The chapter concludes with a short 
description of each of the eight country programs. 
Chapter seven compares the Better Work programs in Indonesia and Vietnam to 
determine how domestic variables can influence the program’s implementation.  The chapter’s 
main conclusion is that domestic politics determines how influential the program has been 
beyond the participating factories, but politics have not been that deterministic in the program’s 
ability to work within factories.   
Chapter eight’s data evaluate Better Work and conclude that the program’s ability to 
address a labor rights problem is conditional upon several variables: the cost of addressing the 
problem, the benefit to owners, whether a solution requires changed to policy or changes to actual 
conditions, the degree to which a problem is driven by cultural norms, and if a solution alters the 
balance of power in a factory.  This chapter also discusses three key characteristics of the 
program: its emphasis on problems with “win-win” solutions, its reliance on multinationals, and 
the tension that exists between monitoring and solving problems. 
 Chapter nine concludes by applying empirical evidence to the theoretical questions raised 
in chapter one.  This final chapter addresses questions that are relevant to both academia and 
public policy.  One main conclusion is that international organizations can have genuine authority 
in world politics, even if they lack the enforcement power of states.  For international 
organizations, authority is derived from a combination of expertise, claims to moral authority, 
delegated authority from states and multinationals, and a history of success.  A second main 
conclusion is that international organizations should focus on global problems with “win-win” 
solutions, they should emphasize training alongside constructing incentives, they can “anchor” 
multistakeholder initiatives to ensure neutrality, and they should work with domestic actors to a 
far greater extent than is the norm. 
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Chapter One: Academic Debates on International Organizations  
This dissertation is motivated by the question of what role international organizations 
(IOs) can play in the current world economy.  This motivation was partly intellectual and 
partly personal.  Intellectually, the proliferation of IOs with universal membership is a 
unique feature of the modern era and has no precedent in previous periods of human 
history.  Understanding what, if anything, these IOs achieve is interesting and useful.  On 
a personal level, after spending some time working within an IO, I had begun to wonder 
exactly what these types of institutions are capable of doing. 
 This dissertation speaks to two related but independent literatures within 
international relations: constructivism and global governance studies.  This dissertation 
will test a constructivist theory of IOs by examining the extent to which it explains Better 
Work.  It will also contribute to global governance studies by elaborating on the lessons 
from Better Work for global governance broadly. 
This chapter’s first part will discuss the academic debates surrounding IOs in 
international relations and justify the value of the theory being tested here.  The chapter’s 
second part will discuss the global governance literature and explain how a case study of 
Better Work will contribute to this field. 
1.  The Study of International Organizations 
Rationalism and Constructivism 
The study of IOs became an important topic in political science after World War II.  In 
the two decades following the war, international relations scholars engaged in descriptive 
and normative studies of IOs.  These studies were sophisticated in their empirical 
6 
 
analysis, but scholars did not attempt to construct any grand theories of IOs or world 
order more broadly (Martin and Simmons 1998).   
 By 1970, realism and neorealism had come to dominate the study of international 
relations within American academia, which had an effect on the study of IOs 
(Katzenstein et al 1998).  Neorealism’s basic assumptions were that states are rational, 
unitary, selfish actors that compete with each other in an anarchic world; further, the only 
important difference between states is the amount of power they have.  This theory gave 
scant importance to IOs.  It argued that IOs serve the whims of powerful states and have 
no independent significance (Waltz 1979, Krasner 1976, Gilpin 1987, Mearsheimer 
1994).  Neorealism also asserted that states fear each other too much to cooperate under 
most circumstances, making IOs little more than arenas for states to compete. 
 In the 1980s, the neoliberalist school of international relations developed as a 
counterpoint to realism and neorealism.  Neoliberalism shared some of neorealism’s basic 
assumptions and treated states as rational, unitary, and selfish.  Neoliberalism, however, 
was far more optimistic about the possibility of states cooperating (Keohane 1982).  
These scholars saw international cooperation as commonplace and they saw IOs as the 
institutionalization of this cooperation (Young 1989, Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 
Keohane 1998, Maggi 1999, Koremenos 2001, Milner 1997). 
 The neoliberalist school saw IOs as important because they performed various 
services that states wanted.  IOs reduced the transaction costs associated with 
cooperation; IOs monitored states and enforced compliance with rules to discourage free 
riders, defection, and cheating; IOs resolved redistributive conflicts that resulted from 
cooperation; finally, IOs could “lock-in” specific equilibria, making it harder for rising 
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states to alter arrangements.  IOs could only perform these functions if they had some 
autonomy, and so states endowed IOs with a degree of autonomy. 
 Throughout the 1990s, neorealists and neoliberalists vied for intellectual 
dominance in international relations and one of their central debates was whether or not 
IOs really mattered. By the end of the decade, this debate had grown rather stale (Martin 
and Simmons 1998).  Both theories shared the same basic assumptions and the 
weaknesses of these assumptions became apparent.   
One weakness was theoretical: neither theory could explain how states got their 
identity and interests or why states’ interests change (Katzenstein et al 1998).  These 
theories claimed to be universally true, but they could not explain other periods in 
western history nor could they explain other cultures.  Finally, these theories vacillated 
between being descriptive and being prescriptive about state behavior.  Sometimes they 
argued that states were rational; other times they argued that states should be rational.  
They attempted to reconcile this by claiming that irrational states would be destroyed by 
other states, leading to a system where all states were rational, but this claim hardly made 
sense after World War II when states almost never went out of existence. 
Another weakness was methodological.  Neorealism and neoliberalism both 
imagined states responding rationally to incentives, leading to a methodological 
enthusiasm for game theory and formal models.   However, these scholars could not 
support their models with evidence because events in world politics cannot be reduced to 
neat data sets.  Instead, scholars would support their mathematical models with case 
studies, which is a mismatch of theory and evidence because these models need to be 
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tested with a large number of easily-quantified observations (Eichengreen 1998).  
Marshalling one or two case studies to support a formal model hardly constitutes proof. 
 Finally, events in the real world began to undermine these schools’ emphasis on 
states (March and Olsen 1998).  These theories could not adequately account for 
expanding trade, environmental treaties, international human rights, the end of apartheid, 
humanitarian interventions, the importance of non-state actors, and the effect of domestic 
politics on a country’s foreign policy.   
By the early 2000s, references to neorealism and neoliberalism had almost 
vanished from the academic literature as both schools were subsumed under the school of 
“rationalism.”  Rationalism essentially keeps the assumptions of neoliberalism in place, 
but it relaxes them by allowing for the importance of ideas and values in state behavior; 
rationalism also accepts that non-state actors have an influence. 
Constructivism is another school of international relations that developed during 
the 1990s and has become the counterpoint to rationalism in academic debates.  
Constructivism took insights from sociology (Meyer 1980, Meyer 1997) to posit world 
politics is constructed by actors’ identities, ideas, beliefs, values and norms; this was 
opposed to rationalism which assumed that military power and, occasionally, economic 
power were the only important variables.  The following quote from a sociologist neatly 
captures the insight that modern world order is not based on a priori principles of power 
and reason, but rather on socially constructed norms and values: 
Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models 
constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes… 
If an unknown society were “discovered” on a previously unknown 
island, it is clear that many changes would occur. A government would 
soon form, looking something like a modern state with many of the usual 
ministries and agencies. Official recognition by other states and admission 
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to the United Nations would ensue. The society would be analyzed as an 
economy, with standard types of data, organizations, and policies for 
domestic and international transactions. Its people would be formally 
reorganized as citizens with many familiar rights, while certain categories 
of citizens—children, the elderly, the poor—would be granted special 
protection. Standard forms of discrimination, especially ethnic and gender 
based, would be discovered and decried. The population would be counted 
and classified in ways specified by world census models. Modern 
educational, medical, scientific, and family law institutions would be 
developed.  All this would happen more rapidly, and with greater 
penetration to the level of daily life, in the present day than at any earlier 
time because world models applicable to the island society are more 
highly codified and publicized than ever before. Moreover, world-society 
organizations devoted to educating and advising the islanders about the 
models’ importance and utility are more numerous and active than ever.  
What would be unlikely to happen is also clear. Theological 
disputes about whether the newly discovered Indios had souls or were part 
of the general human moral order would be rare. There would be little by 
way of an imperial rush to colonize the island. Few would argue that the 
natives needed only modest citizenship or human rights or that they would 
best be educated by but a few years of vocational training. (Meyer 1997, 
144-146) 
 
This quote creatively shows how world politics are based on a series of mental models 
that differ markedly from other historical eras.  This contradicts the rationalist 
assumption that world politics are governed by deterministic laws that exist independent 
of human beings.* 
Constructivism has different strains, but they all share certain core assumptions 
(Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1992; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 
1995; Wendt 1999).  First, human interactions are defined by ideas, not material power.  
Second, the most important ideas are “intersubjective,” meaning that they are not 
reducible to the individuals that hold them and can be treated as an independent object of 
study.  Third, these intersubejctive ideas are responsible for creating actors’ identities and 
                                                 
* This is not an exaggeration of rationalism.  In the one and only reference to empirical reality in Kenneth 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, he claimed that the Pelopponesian War and World War I were 
subject to exactly the same deterministic laws. 
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interests.  Fourth, ideas form the “constitutive” rules of international politics.  These are 
the deep rules that form the system of world politics itself; these rules include the idea 
that states exist, that individuals have citizenship in a state, that treaties should be 
negotiated, etc. 
 It is worth noting that constructivism does not reject rationalism outright.  
Constructivists admit that states often behave in their rational self-interest and that states 
are worried about power and survival.  However, constructivists place a primacy on ideas 
and norms.  On the other hand, rationalists have also adopted constructivism’s insights 
and now admit the important of norms, albeit as second to rational self-interest.  Several 
excellent attempts have been made to integrate the two schools (Barnett and Duvall 2005; 
Simmons et al 2006), but the division remains.   
There is also a third school of international relations, “historical institutionalism,” 
that challenges both constructivism and rationalism (Fioretos 2011; Pierson and Skocpol 
2001).  This school believes that institutions shape norms (not the other way around) and 
that the inflexibility of institutions dominates the fluidity of norms.  Historical 
institutionalism also emphasizes that impact of history on the present and the powerful 
effect of random events.  This is a useful counterpoint to theories of political science that 
unconsciously assume that the world had to end up the way it has.  It is also a valuable 
reminder to constructivists that norms are constrained by institutions.   
With respect to IOs, constructivists tend to view IOs as autonomous actors within 
world politics.  Constructivists posit that IOs have the legal aspects of autonomy put forth 
by rationalists, but go beyond rationalism in discussing the importance that IOs have in 
the social realm.  This point of view has been most clearly articulated in a 1999 article by 
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two leading constructivists (Barnett and Finnemore 1999).  They point out that IOs have 
legal authority in international law; they have bureaucratic autonomy from the states that 
oversee them; they have knowledge and expertise that gives them authority; and IOs can 
claim political neutrality, giving them a certain legitimacy in international negotiations.  
IOs use their authority to define tasks, raise or lower the prominence of issues in world 
politics, and spread ideas and institutions around the world.  Finally, IOs have 
“pathologies” in that their rules can be irrational, they can succumb to bureaucratic 
univeralism, they can be insular, and they can experience internal conflict that prevents 
the IO from fulfilling its mission. 
There has been a large body of work from the constructivist school supporting the 
contention that IOs are autonomous, influential actors in world politics.  An early study 
showed that UNESCO is responsible for states creating science ministries (Finnemore 
1993). Another study argues that the European Union is “socializing” states within it to 
adopt certain norms and ideas (Checkel 2005; Zurn and Checkel 2005).  Another argues 
that the World Health Organization was influential in changing China’s policy during the 
SARS crisis (Fang and Stone 2012).  Two scholars have shown that bureaucrats within 
IOs have been able to influence the designing of new IOs even against the wishes of 
powerful states because these bureaucrats have unique expertise (Johnson and Urpelainen 
2014).  Several studies have looked at the relationship between IOs and non-state actors, 
showing that IOs are increasingly a site of contestation for non-state actors (Talberg et al 
2014).  A very insightful study showed how IOs can strategically interact with 
movements of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote their own agendas.  
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The IO being studied was able to promote an “inner circle” of key NGOs that had an 
agenda in line with the IO while excluding other NGOs (Dany 2014, 433.). 
A Constructivist Theory of International Organizations 
The upshot of all this literature is that IOs can reasonably be treated as autonomous actors 
with independent authority.  The insights gained from this body of work were synthesized 
by leading constructivists in the book Who Governs the Globe? (Avant, Finnemore, and 
Sell 2010).  This book develops a theory of IOs that explains both why IOs have power 
and authority as well as how IOs use this power. 
The book begins with the insight that authority does not rely solely on coercion – 
there are multiple avenues through which actors can generate deference from other 
actors. This insight is important when studying IOs because this type of actor has very 
limited coercive power in world politics.  According to the authors, IOs have authority 
from five sources: institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based. 
Institutional authority is the power that staff within IOs have.  This type of power 
is domain specific; for example, an inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) can raise a red flag about a country’s nuclear policies but not about the country’s 
environmental policies.  Delegated authority comes from the power that other actors give 
to an IO.  Delegated authority usually comes from states, e.g. a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Arbitration Panel, but it can come from any actor with its own 
authority.  As I will discuss later, Better Work has delegated authority from multinational 
corporations.  Expert authority is based on the special knowledge that an IO possesses, 
such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) expertise on preventing pandemics.  
Principled authority comes from an IO embodying widely accepted moral values.  The 
13 
 
United Nations General Assembly is an excellent example; the only power its resolutions 
have is that they represent the view of a majority of the world’s states.  Capacity based 
authority derives from a history of competence.  The WHO is a good example of this as 
well.  The organization not only has the knowledge of how to stop pandemics, it also has 
a successful track record of doing so.  This record is an important reason that actors defer 
to the WHO during a crisis. 
The authors of this book also discuss the ways that IOs can use their authority.  
These include: setting agendas and raising issues, making rules, implementing and 
enforcing rules, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes. The United Nations Secretary 
General, for example, can set an agenda by using his office to bring certain issues before 
the Security Council.  Similarly, the World Bank Development Report can lead to an 
issue becoming central to development discourse.  Of course, IOs can also marginalize 
issues or narrow a discussion.   
Another use of authority by IOs is making rules.  For example, the rules set by the 
United Nations have made climate negotiations relatively open to NGOs; these NGOs 
have used this access to push states beyond what they might have committed to on their 
own.  Another use of authority is implementing and enforcing rules.  The International 
Labor Organization, for example, advices countries on how to implement international 
labor conventions into domestic law.  In another example, the WTO enforces the 
agreements of its underlying treaties by sanctioning countries that do not comply.  A final 
use of authority by IOs is monitoring and judging outcomes.  The IAEA, for example, 
judges whether or not countries are complying with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons. 
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Finally, the authors posit that the authority of IOs is both dynamic and relational.  
It is dynamic in that the degree and type of authority possessed by an IO changes over 
time as the IO changes and the politics surrounding it change.  The Security Council, for 
example, has become more powerful because of outside factors: it went from a rather 
moribund talk-shop during the Cold War to a central arena for global diplomacy after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The World Bank, in another example, changed its mission 
in the 1950s from focusing on European reconstruction to focusing on the development 
of third-world countries.  IO authority is relational in that authority is always exercised in 
relationship to other actors.  As such, authority can be enhanced through cooperation, it 
can be weakened through confrontation, or can be altered through contestation from other 
actors.  The recent Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for 
example, is a challenge to the US dominated World Bank. 
 One goal of this dissertation is to use Better Work as a test case for this theory.  In 
this dissertation’s concluding chapter, Better Work will be examined through the lens of 
this theory to determine how well the theory explains the program’s reality and to see if 
the theory has gaps. 
2. Global Governance Studies 
A separate school of international relations has developed alongside the debate between 
rationalism, constructivism, and historical institutionalism; this school could be called 
Global Governance Studies (GGS).†  GGS has its origins in an edited volume from 1992 
titled Governance Without Government (Rosenau and Czempiel).  This book’s central 
claim is that all societies develop rules and institutions that are necessary to perform 
social functions; these rules and institutions constitute governance.  Modern, formal 
                                                 
† This school does not have a widely-used title; GGS is only used in this article. 
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governments are just one possible form of governance.  At the global level, there is no 
formal governance; there is, however, both a global society and set of rules that constitute 
global governance.  The authors argue that scholars of international relations should 
focus their studies on how global governance works. 
 GGS is does not attempt to formulate grand theories of how the world works, nor 
is it interested in parceling out whether rational states are more important than norms or 
institutions. Instead, GGS assumes that norms, rationality, and institutions are all equally 
important and focuses instead on how power actually works in the world.  Another 
important aspect of GGS that sets it apart is that it makes normative suggestions about 
how the world should work.  Finally, GGS focused on practical issues like human rights 
and security rather than on theoretical abstractions like norms or power (Weiss and 
Wilkinson 2014a; Weiss and Wilkinson 2014b).  To put it more succinctly, GGS asks 
three questions.  How is power exercised in the world? How did the current arrangement 
of power come about?  And where should we go from here? 
 In the GGS literature, the question of whether or not IOs have autonomy from 
states does not arise because nothing is truly autonomous.  At the same time, IOs are not 
just puppets of powerful states.  IOs are seen as actors in their own right even though IOs 
cannot be studied in isolation from the other actors that surround them.  The GGS 
literature tries to understand how IOs operate in a world where western states are 
becoming relatively less powerful, non-state actors are becoming more important, the 
world is more interconnected through technology, trade, finance, and environmental 
problems even as there is no global government that can force actors to obey rules.  The 
literature also tries to put forth ideas of what IOs should be doing and what the world can 
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reasonably expect from IOs.  The entire literature is too extensive to cover properly here, 
but three prominent examples are discussed below. 
 James Rosenau, an editor of Governance Without Governance, elaborated on his 
ideas in a 1995 article.  He argues that no global actor has the ability to issue commands; 
rather, on any given issue, multiple actors attempt to “steer” governance by influencing 
other actors.  In this context, IOs are state-sponsored steering mechanisms that try to 
influence states, NGO, multinational corporations, sub-state governments, and 
individuals.  IOs are just one actor among many and not privileged among them. 
 Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, two legal scholars, have also written 
extensively about the role that IOs can and should play in world politics.  Like Rosenau, 
they recognized that IOs lack the power to force compliance in other actors.  However, 
they believe that IOs are well positioned to play two important roles in “regulatory 
collaboration” and “orchestration.”  In regulatory collaboration, IOs involve themselves 
in the already-existing web of private, transnational regulations that have cropped up in 
industries around the world.  IOs can use persuasion to get firms to join these regulations 
and have participating firms increase their compliance.  IOs can also use their voices to 
single out firms that fail to comply with these private regulations.  In some rare cases, IOs 
can also change the material incentives for firms to participate and comply with private 
regulations (Abbott and Snidal 2013).   
The second role for IOs is that of an “orchestrator.”  In this role, IOs work with 
intermediary actors to pursue their goals.  IOs are forced into this role because they 
usually lack the power to actually implement solutions to the problems they are mandated 
to solve.  Intermediary actors, from corporations to NGOs to states, often have a greater 
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capacity to implement policies on the ground.  What they lack is the global mandate and 
legitimacy that IOs possess.  In their role as orchestrators, IOs can pursue solutions to 
global problems by overseeing the activities of disparate, localized actors (Abbott and 
Snidal 2009). 
 John Ruggie is a scholar who has been writing about the role of IOs for decades.  
He is also one of the leading architects of the United Nations Global Compact and United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.  In a recent article, he wrote 
that the “old governance model” of states signing treaties and enforcing them in a top-
down fashion is not viable in many domains, notably human rights (Ruggie 2014).  This 
model does not work because states strongly disagree about which human rights matter, 
they disagree about how to enforce these rights, businesses oppose being subjected to 
human rights laws, and human rights laws push against trade and investment laws.  
Therefore, this domain requires a new model of “polycentric” governance based on 
persuasion, informal cooperation, public-private partnerships, and multistakeholder 
approaches.  Polycentric governance also tries to integrate public law (both national and 
international), civic governance from non-state actors, and private corporate governance. 
 What these authors have in common is that they recognize that although IOs lack 
the coercive power of governments, IOs are still key actors in global governance.  For all 
these scholars, IOs are uniquely positioned to coordinate global cooperation and 
regulation.   Moreover, these authors not only make claims about what IOs are, they also 
make very specific arguments about what IOs should do.  
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 This dissertation adds to this body of literature by discussing how Better Work 
came into existence, how it exercises power, and, mostly important, what Better Work 
can teach us about how IOs should go about solving global problems. 
The Rest of this Dissertation 
This chapter has outlined the two academic debates that are addressed by this 
dissertation.  The next two chapters will discuss the apparel industry and attempts to 
promote international labor rights.  Chapters four through eight will discuss Better Work 
in detail.  Chapter nine will return to the questioned raised here and address them using 


























Chapter Two: The Modern Apparel Industry 
The apparel industry is worth examining for students of the modern global economy.  
Textiles began the Industrial Revolution in England in the early nineteenth century and 
laid the foundation for more advanced enterprises in almost every other industrialized 
country (Rivoli 2009; Staritz 2011).   
From England, the center of global apparel production shifted to the northeastern 
United States by the late 1800s, thanks largely to industrial espionage and cheap 
American cotton.  As wages rose, apparel production shifted to the south, especially the 
Carolinas; production in continental Europe and Japan also increased.  The Great 
Depression and World War II greatly reduced world trade, but by the 1950s Japan 
emerged as the world’s major producer of low-skilled apparel.  In the 1960s and 1970s, 
as Japanese firms began producing more sophisticated products, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong followed on its heels.  By the 1980s, production was rapidly moving into 
mainland China, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.  As rising wages in China today 
make apparel production expensive, a host of other countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East hope to enter the apparel industry and begin climbing the ladder of 
industrialization. 
The apparel industry is among the most globalized industries in the world.  Its 
supply chains stretch across continents and connect the world’s most privileged people 
with the world’s poorest.  A sweater designed by Manhattan fashionistas will use cotton 
picked by children in Pakistan, be sewed together in Vietnam, be packaged and shipped 
by a massive Korean intermediary, and finally placed on a shelf in a mall in London.  
And if sweater is donated to charity, it may have a second life Uganda or Macedonia.  
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 This chapter will explain how the contemporary apparel industry is organized.  
Particular attention will be paid to the pressures in the industry that work against worker 
rights; aspects of the industry that are irrelevant for worker rights will be touched on but 
not explored in detail.   
This chapter has three sections.  The first will discuss the economic conditions of 
the apparel industry.  The section’s punchline is that the apparel industry is like a totem 
pole of “buyer’s markets.”  At the top of this pole sit consumers and investors, who 
exercise a great deal of choice and control.  At the bottom of this totem pole are the 
people who sell their labor in factories; they have few choices and must take what is 
offered (and often must accept less than what has been promised). 
 The second section of this chapter discusses the politics of the industry, which are 
divided into domestic and international levels.  Domestic politics, which govern the 
relationship between workers and producers, shape a country’s competitiveness in 
international markets.  International politics, meanwhile, structure the relationships 
between producer countries and consumer countries. 
The chapter’s third section will discuss five broad trends that will shape the 
apparel industry over the coming decades.  These trends include the fading legacy of a 
world-wide quota system, rising wages in China, more durable relationships between 







1. The Economics of Apparel  
This section will elaborate on a simple “totem-pole” model of the apparel industry 
illustrated in Figure 4.1.‡  A totem-pole is a more appropriate metaphor than the common 
metaphor of a chain (i.e. a supply chain).  In chains, each unit is equal to all others.  But 
in a totem-pole, units are organized hierarchically, with the top of the pole having the 
most power. 
Figure 2.1: Apparel Industry Totem-Pole 
  
 In the apparel industry, each actor exerts enormous power over the levels beneath 
them because actors are connected through “buyer’s markets.”  In a buyer’s market, the 
                                                 
‡ This model is similar to previous scholars’ models, such as the “global commodity chain” of Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Terrence Hopkins (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1994), the apparel commodity chain of Gary 
Gereffi (Gereffi 2002), or the value-chain of Michael Porter (Porter 1998).   But it is different in two 
important ways.  First, the model focuses on firms and individuals, rather than on processes.  For our 
purposes, it makes little sense to distinguish processes that occur within the same firm.  Second, this model 
makes the political dimensions of apparel more explicit.   
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supply of a product exceeds demand, allowing buyers to demand low prices and other 
concessions.  Sellers in these markets face enormous pressure, they have low profit 
margins, and they are constantly looking for ways to cut costs. 
 Consider the relationship between consumers and brands.  A consumer can 
choose from dozens of stores, online sellers, second-hand stores, or simply choose not to 
buy new clothing.  In this market, an individual brand is mostly powerless (there are a 
few exceptions, such as Nike’s Michael Jordan sneaker, but these products are deviations 
from the norm). 
Brands are weak with respect to consumers, but they are powerful in their 
relationship with factories.  A brand can source from dozens of factories located almost 
anywhere in the world. It can demand ever-lower prices, faster production times, and can 
impose penalties for errors or late delivery.  An individual factory has little bargaining 
power in this market. 
 A similar dynamic holds between factories and the workers whom they hire.  The 
world’s villages have hundreds of millions of people who want to escape rural poverty, 
giving the factory owners power to suppress wages and other worker rights.  Moreover, 
factories are mobile between countries while workers are not – if workers in a country 
demand higher wages, factory owners can simply shut down production and move.  This 
pits workers in one country against every other worker on the planet. 
 Each level of the totem pole tries to extract as much benefit as possible from the 
level beneath them.  Consumers want cheaper clothing, investors want higher returns, 
brands want lower wholesale prices from producers, and factories want to pay their 
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workers as little as possible.  In a nutshell, every level is squeezed by the level above, 
with the workers existing at the receiving end of a long chain of pressure.  
In interviews with brand representatives and factory owners, many admit that 
workers are often underpaid and treated unfairly, but at the same time these businesses 
feel unable to do anything about it.  They are subjected to intense pressures from their 
consumers and from their competition.  While they may wish in the abstract to improve 
workers’ lives, as a practical matter they do not give it too much thought. 
 The following sections discuss the different levels of the apparel totem-pole and 
how they influence worker rights. 
Consumers 
Since the apparel sector ultimately makes money only when consumers make purchases, 
it is worth considering what it means to buy clothes at this point in human history. Most 
people in wealthy, industrialized countries live in consumer societies.  Traditional 
sources of identity (e.g. hereditary caste, religion, ethnicity, nationalism) have declined in 
importance and people increasingly find identity in what they consume.  
 This makes shopping a mentally taxing experience.  When people buy clothing, 
they not only have to think about what they want to wear, they have to think about who 
they are, who they want to be, and how society will perceive them (not to mention price, 
quality, comfort, durability, and function).  
Considering all these factors, it is no surprise that consumers are selfish.  One 
survey, conducted by a large marketing firm, found that Americans would not care if 93 
percent of brands disappeared; also, respondents though that only 9 percent of brands 
improve people’s quality of life (Havas Media 2013; The Economist 2014).  In the same 
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vein, consumers have not consistently demanded better working conditions for the people 
who make their clothing. 
To get a better sense of consumers, I conducted an online survey among Baruch 
College students.  The survey was anonymous and optional.  The survey had two rounds 
that occurred six months apart with 75 students in each round.  I asked them how much of 
their clothing they thought was made in sweatshops, and 45 percent said “most” or “all.”   
They had to imagine that they wanted to a buy a $50 shirt made with unknown 
labor standards; they could also purchase the same shirt for $60 and know it was made 
using good labor standards.   In the first round of 75 respondents, 59 percent said they 
would not be willing to pay the extra $10.  In follow-up discussions, most respondents 
reported believing that their individual purchases would not make any difference; only a 
few people said they did not care about labor rights.   
The second round of the survey asked a follow-up question to respondents who 
would not buy the more expensive $60 shirt (in this second round, 58 percent said they 
would not pay the extra $10).  In the follow-up question, 33 percent said their purchases 
would not change anything; 28 percent said that sweatshop workers needed jobs too; and 
nine percent said that the extra $10 will not go to the people who need it.  Only 16 
percent said that they did not care. 
 This survey indicates that consumers have complex feelings about the labor 
conditions.  On the one hand, 41.5 percent were willing to spend more on a guarantee of 
good working conditions.  On the other hand, more than half were not willing spend more 
mainly because they did not believe their individual behavior would change the system. 
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 Another issue that complicates the relationship between consumers and workers is 
a lack of information. Among the 150 respondents to the survey, only 30 percent could 
name one brand that they believed did not use sweatshops.  Further, when asked if they 
would believe a brand that claimed to not use sweatshops, only 6 percent of respondents 
said that would completely believe the claim (although 60 percent said they would “sort 
of” believe the claim).  These responses indicate that consumers have not looked into 
how to purchase sweatshop-free clothing and that they would not believe corporate 
reports anyway.   
It appears that labor conditions only influence consumers in extreme cases where 
bad conditions taint a brand.  Nike in the 1990s is the classic example.  In the early 
1990s, Nike dominated the athletic shoe market by a wide margin, but negative reports 
about labor conditions in its supply chain hurt the brand.  By the end of the decade, Nike 
had lost considerable market share to Adidas and Reebok (Clancy 2011).  Another 
example of an extreme case was a brand being produced by talk-show host Cathy Lee 
Gifford.  Before her line hit the stores, labor activist Charles Kernaghan revealed that 
children in Honduras produced some of the clothing.  The revelation irreversibly 
damaged the brand and forced Gifford onto the defensive.  It is difficult to measure how 
damaging the reports were to sales, but Gifford’s name became synonymous with 
sweatshops for many people.  These examples indicate that consumers care about labor 







Investors are the other “consumers” of apparel companies in that they buy securities 
issued by these brands.  Investors exert a lot of control over a company.  They vote on the 
board of directors, they set compensation for senior management, and they can 
seamlessly exit a company by selling their shares. 
 Investors, even more than consumers, sit in the ultimate buyer’s market.  
Investors can literally choose from thousands of investment opportunities around the 
world, be they in apparel or some other industry – all they care about is the rate of return.  
Given the short-term focus of financial markets, apparel companies must constantly 
monitor their share prices and ensure a good return. 
 The evidence suggests that companies focus intently on keeping their shares in 
good standing.  An industry report by S&P Capital IQ of the United States’ largest 
apparel companies found that only 23 percent had negative earnings per share in 2008 
and only 10 percent had negative earnings in 2009 (Asaeda 2103).  This means that in a 
time of economic crisis, lower sales, and the laying off of personnel, the vast majority of 
companies managed to ensure that their investors profited. 
 Interviewees with experience in the private sector all emphasized that pressure 
from investors is an important reason why apparel companies squeeze their suppliers for 
every last penny, which in turn depresses workers’ salaries.  Investor pressure also works 
against companies adopting sustainable strategies for creating supply-chains with good 
labor standards.  One professional with years of experience in corporate-social 
responsibility reported that European and American firms respond to labor rights crises 
differently because of differences in financial markets.  I was told that American firms, 
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which have to post quarterly earnings, are much more likely to implement short-term 
solutions. European companies, which report bi-annually or annually, tend to implement 
longer-term, more sustainable solutions.  Further, the two American brands with the best 
reputations for labor standards, Levi-Strauss and New Balance, are both privately-owned, 
and several people attributed their high labor standards to the fact that they do not have to 
satisfy impersonal investors. 
Buyers and Intermediaries 
The next group of actors sit between factories and consumers.  They broadly fall into two 
different business models, buyers and intermediaries.  “Buyers” are firms that buy 
finished clothing from factories and sell to consumers.  “Intermediaries” are supply-chain 
experts that buy from factories on behalf of brands.  Although they are different types of 
businesses, they occupy the same position in the totem-pole and so are discusses together. 
There are several different types of buyers.  Some buyers own the factories that 
produce their clothing, but this is becoming increasingly rare.  It is more common for 
buyers to contract among dozens or hundreds of different factories.  Some buyers are a 
brand (e.g. The Gap), while other buyers own dozens of brands (e.g. PVH); finally, some 
brands are large retailers that invent brands to sell in their own stores (e.g. Macy’s or 
Wal-mart).   
Buyers are collectively powerful but individually weak.  IBISWorld, a leading 
business intelligence firm, classifies the US industry’s competition level as “high” 
(IBISWorld 2014) compared to other industries.  Gender-specific stores, family-clothing 
stores, department stores, discount retailers, and on-line retailers are all in intense 
competition with each other.  IBISWorld gives the industry a “medium” score for barriers 
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to entry because it is difficult to establish a brand and create a supply chain. Nevertheless, 
some of the most successful buyers in the US market are recent entrants, such as 
Underarmour, Lululemon, and H&M. 
 Buyers generally focus on designing, marketing, and selling clothing; they 
contract with factories to actually produce the clothing.  Today, almost all apparel 
production takes place in developing countries (the major exceptions are European 
countries that produce expensive, high-quality apparel).  Buyers began sourcing from 
developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s (Korzeniewicz 1994) to maintain 
profitability.  This process escalated in the 1990s as buyers turned against trade 
protectionism and began lobbying for free trade in apparel, much to the dismay of US 
producers (Kunz and Garner 2007). 
When dealing with a factory, a buyer has to take a lot into consideration.  A 
classic book on sourcing divides the buyer’s position into three costs: direct costs, macro 
costs, and indirect costs (Birnbaum 2005).  Direct costs are the cost of material plus the 
cost of production; these are the only costs that a buyer can really control.  Macro costs 
are the political costs of sourcing from a factory: delays due to bad infrastructure, 
corruption, quotas and tariffs charges, weak rule of law, and reputation risk from human 
rights problems.  Indirect costs include traveling to the factory, defective or low-quality 
work, shipping errors, and payments to intermediaries and agents.  This list shows that 
labor standards are certainly a consideration for a buyer, but they are just one 
consideration among many.   
Over the last twenty years, almost all buyers have created corporate-social 
responsibility (CSR) departments to deal with labor rights in their supply chain, but there 
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is wide variation in the degree of influence that these departments have within the firm.  
Industry insiders reported in interviews that a few buyers take labor rights seriously, 
many consider it a second tier priority, and many are totally unconcerned.  Fortunately, 
there does seem to be a general consensus, even among skeptics, that buyers are taking 
labor rights more seriously than a decade ago. 
Intermediaries are also very important in the apparel totem-pole.  Intermediaries 
are firms, mainly from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, that contract with brands 
and other apparel sellers to buy from factories.  Intermediaries work with small brands 
that do not want to construct an in-house supply-chain (for example, a celebrity that 
wants to launch an apparel line); intermediaries will also work with large buyers on 
specialized projects outside the buyer’s expertise (for example, if a formalwear brand 
wants to create a swimsuit for just one season).  Intermediaries may also be used to 
purchase raw materials, to ship finished goods, or to coordinate other aspects of the 
supply chain.  The head of the world’s largest intermediary, the Hong Kong based Li & 
Fung, described his company as an “orchestrator” that: “focuses on designing the best 
possible processes across a global network for delivering the right product to the right 
place at the right time at the right price (Fung et al. 2008).”   
  With respect to labor conditions, intermediaries do not face the same pressures 
as branded buyers.  Since they have no public face, intermediaries do not have to worry 
about consumers.  They do, however, have to worry about embarrassing the brands that 
they contract with.  There is no hard evidence on whether intermediaries act differently 
than branded buyers, but the general consensus among interviewees is that they worry a 
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lot less (Li & Fung, however, is a partner in Better Work; see chapter 6 for more 
information on partners).   
 Buyers and intermediaries exist in an intensely competitive market vis-à-vis 
consumers, but they have considerable buying power over the producers that sit below 
them in the totem pole (Applebaum et al. 1994; Gereffi 2002).  While there are dozens of 
large buyers in the world, there are thousands of small and medium producers scattered 
across the developing world. 
Producers 
Producers are businesses that actually make apparel.  There are a wide variety of 
producers.  They run the gamut from massive factories to household workshops, and they 
produce everything from haute-couture fashion to solid white t-shirts.  Most luxury 
apparel production takes place in Europe, while most non-luxury apparel is produced in 
developing countries.  For obvious reasons, non-luxury apparel producers are the most 
exposed to competition and have the worst labor standards.   
 This level of the totem-pole is characterized by low barriers to entry, low 
concentration of firms, excess production, and very slim margins (Gereffi 1994; 
IBISWorld 2013).  Consider a sobering statistic: IBISWorld defines a “major player” as a 
firm with 5 percent market share in its industry.  The largest non-luxury apparel producer 
in the world is VF Corp, which has a market share of 0.3 percent.  This makes apparel 
production one of the least centralized and most competitive industries in the world.  The 
2008 recession was particularly hard on producers, with a reported 13.8% drop in total 
revenue and countless firms going bankrupt (IBISWorld 2013). 
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 Over the last several decades, several issues have shaped apparel production.  The 
most important factor has been the shifting quotas and tariffs of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA).  This will be discussed in more detail below, but the key point is 
that production moved around the world in search of quotas and low tariffs, and although 
the MFA expired in 2005, its legacy can be seen in the wide geographic distribution of 
production. 
 Another important issue has been the rise of “fast fashion” among buyers 
(Abernathy et al. 1999; Abernathy et al. 2006).  Under the traditional buyer-producer 
relationship, buyers placed large orders many months in advance.  Buyers assumed most 
of the risk because they lost money if consumers did not want the apparel they had 
purchased from producers.  Under “fast fashion,” buyers order small batches and expect 
delivery in several weeks.  If the initial batch sells well, then producers are expected to 
quickly make more.  And if the line sells poorly, then it is simply discontinued.  Fast 
fashion requires producers to have better communication with buyers, better technology, 
a more fluid labor force, and better management systems.  It also forces producers to 
assume more risk, because producers must hold fabric and even finished products that 
buyers may never want.  In an extensive survey, one research found that a producer’s 
profitability was directly tied to its ability to adapt to fast fashion (Abernathy 1999, 257).   
This transformation occurred in the 1990s, a time when labor conditions also 
came to the fore.  Therefore, producers were struggling to adopt a business model that is 
bad for workers (less stability in orders, faster turn around, faster changes in style) while 
also being pressured to improve working conditions.   
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 The 2008 financial crisis led to many producers going out of business.  A decline 
in orders contributed, but many producers were also heavily in debt, many operated 
unprofitably before the crisis, and many depended on cheap borrowing.  As capital dried 
up, these producers were forced to close shop (Forstater 2010). 
 In this market, buyers and intermediaries are able to use their position to force 
ever-lower prices and other concessions onto producers.  This is good for consumers, as 
the relative cost of apparel has shrunk compared to other consumer goods (Asaeda 2013), 
but it is bad for producers and their employees (Forstater 2010).  
 IBISWorld provides an estimate of the average producer’s costs.  60 percent come 
from the fabric they purchase; 19.7 percent come from operating costs other than wages; 
and 16.3 percent come from wages.  Profits after of taxes and interest payments varies 
from country to country, but it can be less than 1 percent in many cases.  Producers have 
no control over their major cost (i.e. fabric), and little control over their operating costs, 
so their attempts to cut costs are often directed at workers.   
These numbers are enlightening.  Assuming a factory makes a one percent net 
profit, if they decrease their wage bill by just one percent of total costs then their profits 
will double.  Looking at the numbers this way, it is clear why apparel workers are 
constantly exploited over small amounts of money. 
Workers 
Workers in non-luxury apparel production live in dozens of countries with a wide variety 
of contexts, but a few commonalities exist.  The vast majority of workers are women in 
their early twenties.  They are often from rural areas, they are not well educated, and they 
have few skills.  They expect to work for several years in order to support family 
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members and save enough money for a dowry.  For many of these women, working in 
apparel is an unpleasant interlude between childhood and motherhood, but a sacrifice 
worth making for a better life.  In this sense, Asian women making clothing today are 
very similar to English women working in mills 150 years ago (Rivoli 2009 makes this 
point very nicely). 
 Workers in apparel production generally have worse labor rights than other 
industries.  Workers may not be educated enough to know what their rights are.  
Employers and governments may collude to prevent unionization and effective 
enforcement of labor laws.  Unionization, even under a favorable political climate, is 
complicated by high turnover in the workforce.  In many countries, the availability of 
workers exceeds demand, so employers can set low wages.  Moreover, employers often 
arrange labor contracts in ways that facilitate exploitation; techniques include delaying 
wages by several months, holding identification cards, fining workers arbitrarily, and 
forcing workers to live on company-controlled compounds.  
 Salaries vary from country to country.  In Eastern Europe, workers can make 
$3.00-$4.00 per hour.  An hourly wage in Mexico is approximately $2.50; it is under 
$1.50 in Central America and the Caribbean; under $1.00 in China and most East Asian 
countries; and under $0.50 in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (Kunz and Garner 2007).  
This variation contradicts the simplistic notion that apparel production is constantly 
chasing the cheapest workforce.  Low labor costs are obviously important, but 
productivity, quality, speed, flexibility, and political stability are equally important.   
The next section of this chapter will examine the apparel industry from the 
country-level perspective in order to flesh out these issues. 
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2. The Politics of Apparel 
In general, the politics of apparel can be divided into those of importing countries, which 
govern the market between buyers and producer, and the politics of exporting countries, 
which govern the markets between producers and workers.  Figure 4.2 provides a simple 
illustration. 
     Figure 2.2: The Politics of the Apparel Totem Pole 
   
Before discussing the details of these two categories, it is worth looking at the 
data on trade flows.  Table 4.1 shows the percent of world apparel exporters accounted 
for by each of the ten largest exporting countries.  It also shows all eight countries that 







Table 2.1: Percent of World Exports from Top 10 Producers                              
and Better Work Participants 
  2002 2012 Difference in Share 
China 20.3% 37.8% 17.5% 
EU 27(a) 30.6% 25.8% -4.8% 
Hong Kong 11.0% 5.3% -5.7% 
Bangladesh* 2.4% 4.7% 2.4% 
Turkey 4.0% 3.4% -0.6% 
Vietnam* 1.3% 3.3% 2.0% 
India 2.9% 3.3% 0.4% 
Indonesia* 1.9% 1.8% -0.1% 
United States 3.0% 1.3% -1.6% 
Malaysia 1.0% 1.1% 0.1% 
Mexico 3.8% 1.1% -2.7% 
Cambodia* 0.6% 1.0% 0.4% 
Jordan* 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 
Haiti* 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Lesotho* 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Nicaragua* <0.1% <0.1% 0.0% 
World Total $208.6 billion $441.8 billion   
Source: (WTO 2014) 
(a) This includes intra-EU trade 
* Countries with a Better Work program 
 
The numbers from China immediately stand out.  Since 2002, China has almost 
doubled its market share.  This came mainly at the expense of the European Union (EU), 
Mexico, and the United States; Hong Kong also appears to have lost market share, but it 
is likely that much of its 2002 exports were produced in China and routed through Hong 
Kong to take advantage of lower quotas.   
Table 4.2 shows the change in apparel imports just to the United States.  The 






Table 2.2: Change in US Apparel Imports  
Country 2002 2012 Difference in Share 
China 9.8% 37.8% 28.0% 
CAFTA-DR(a) 16.0% 10.2% -5.8% 
Vietnam 1.6% 9.2% 7.6% 
Indonesia 3.6% 6.4% 2.8% 
Bangladesh 3.3% 5.8% 2.5% 
Mexico 13.0% 4.8% -8.2% 
India 3.3% 4.0% 0.7% 
Cambodia 1.8% 3.3% 1.5% 
EU 27 4.2% 2.5% -1.7% 
Sri Lanka 2.5% 1.9% -0.6% 
Pakistan 1.5% 1.9% 0.4% 
Philippines 3.2% 1.5% -1.7% 
Thailand 3.0% 1.4% -1.6% 
Jordan 0.7% 1.3% 0.6% 
Egypt 0.6% 1.1% 0.5% 
Haiti 0.4% 1.0% 0.6% 
WORLD $57.0 billion $76.8 Billion   
Source: (OTEXA 2014) 
(a) Includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua 
 
Table 4.3 shows the global share of apparel imports accounted by the 10 largest 
importers.  The most important finding in this figure is that the market share of the top 
importers decreased between 2002 and 2012, although the United States and EU still 
remain by far the largest importers.  These decreases were not offset by any one country 
(but keep in mind that they lost market share; their absolute imports increased).  Rather, a 
number of countries have increased their share by small amounts.  Among the fabled 
BRICS, Russia has increased its share by 1.8 percent, Brazil by 0.5 percent, China by 0.4 
percent, South Africa by 0.3 percent, and India by 0.1 percent.  Other emerging 
economies such as Chile, Panama, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates had increases 




Table 2.3: Share of World Imports Accounted for by 10 Largest Importers 
Country 2002 2012 Difference in Share 
EU 27 (a) 43.6% 38.5% -5.1% 
United States 32.0% 19.9% -12.1% 
Japan 8.4% 7.7% -0.8% 
United Kingdom 7.0% 5.1% -1.9% 
Hong Kong, China 7.5% 3.7% -3.8% 
Canada 1.9% 2.1% 0.2% 
Russian Federation 0.3% 2.1% 1.8% 
Republic of Korea 1.1% 1.4% 0.3% 
Australia 0.9% 1.4% 0.5% 
Switzerland 1.7% 1.3% -0.4% 
World Total $208.6 billion $441.8 billion   
Source: (WTO 2014) 
(a) Includes intra-EU trade 
 
The changing distribution of imports reflects changes to the global economy as a 
whole.  The traditional centers of economic activity, the United States and EU, are slowly 
but inexorably losing relative importance to emerging economies.  In the coming 
decades, the consumers, buyers, and governments in developed countries will have less 
and less power to influence apparel producers.  What this means for labor standards is 
uncertain.  Because almost all labor rights initiatives come from western countries, their 
declining importance could mean that apparel producers will ignore international efforts 
to improve conditions.  But if emerging markets pick up the baton, then pressure will 
remain on producers.  Only time will tell which scenario comes to pass. 
Politics of Importing Countries 
Most apparel production is for international trade (IBISWorld estimates that 75.4 percent 
of the industry’s revenue comes from international trade).  Among non-luxury apparel, 
the share accounted for by international trade is probably higher, given that most 
production for domestic markets is of European luxury goods. 
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 The United States and EU are by far the world’s largest markets; this gives their 
governments the leverage to set terms in trade. These governments have used their 
leverage repeatedly over the last forty years to protect domestic industries through quotas 
and tariffs.  Quotas put limits on imports from a specific country and can be measured by 
piece or by value.  Tariffs are special taxes placed on imports which can also be 
calculated by piece or by value. 
 The United States and EU have deployed these trade barriers to different ends.  
The EU has historically allowed cheap imports of non-luxury apparel.  This has caused 
European producers to focus on high-quality, luxury apparel.  As a result, Europe today 
has very open trade with most apparel producing countries, with the exception of China 
and Hong Kong (Gereffi and Frederick 2010, 6).  European countries also have large and 
profitable luxury apparel industries. 
The United States, on the other hand, has used trade barriers to protect its low-
quality apparel industry.  This began in the 1950s, when the US government negotiated a 
so-called “voluntary-export restraint” agreement with Japan.  Under the terms of this 
agreement, Japan would voluntarily restrict its exports of cotton apparel to the United 
States.  This trend continued in the 1960s when President John F. Kennedy negotiated the 
ironically named Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, under which the United 
States imposed quotas on trade.  This arrangement was negotiated as an exception to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under the GATT’s provision that free 
trade should not cause “undo disruption.”  The Short-Term Arrangement quickly gave 
way to the Long-Term Arrangement, which gave way to the MFA in 1974. 
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The MFA has had a powerful effect the global apparel industry.  Under the MFA, 
countries were able to impose quotas and tariffs at will on exporting countries.  This led 
to the geographic dispersion of apparel production as producers opened up factories in 
countries without quotas (Gereffi and Frederick 2010; Rivoli 2009).  Bangladesh, for 
example, had virtually no apparel production in the 1970s and so was omitted from the 
MFA.  To take advantage of quota-free exports, in 1979 a Korean company began 
production in Bangladesh; by 1987, the country exported 2.3 million shirts (Elms 2007, 
1).  Of course, Bangladesh had quotas imposed during the next round of the MFA and so 
production shifted to neighboring countries like Cambodia and Vietnam. 
During the GATT’s Uruguay Round, importers agreed to phase-out the MFA 
between 1995 and 2005.  European countries moved quickly to end the system, since 
their domestic apparel industries had upgraded to luxury goods (Kunz and Garner 2007, 
109).  The US, however, dragged its feet and today continues to impose tariffs and quotas 
on apparel exporters.   
The US’s trade barriers have had some unintended consequences.  The US 
apparel industry has focused on getting trade protection instead of upgrading to luxury 
apparel, and so the industry continues to compete directly with producers to developing 
countries.  US buyers, on the other hand, have not been able to concentrate their supply 
chains into a few countries, nor have they been able to develop long-term relationships 
with factories because they are always chasing the lowest quota around the planet (Rivoli 
2009). 
 Beyond restrictions on apparel imports, the United States also includes “yarn-
forward” and “fabric-forward” provisions into its trade agreements.  Under these 
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provisions, producers must use fabric and yarn from the United States in order to receive 
preferential trade access.  This complicates the industry, because some countries are only 
competitive if they buy fabric from the United States, while others are competitive 
regardless of their fabric’s origin. 
 In addition to protecting domestic industries, the United States and EU also use 
trade access to promote various foreign policy agendas.  During the Cold War, the United 
States gave preferential access to South Korea and Taiwan.  Today, the US-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement is a reward for Jordan’s recognition Israel (Kunz and Garner 2007, 
303).  The EU, on its side, has given preferential access to former USSR countries and to 
Turkey as a way to create ties with these countries short of EU ascension.  Individual 
European countries have also promoted trade with former colonies as a means of 
reparations for colonialism. 
 Trade access has been used as a tool to promote human rights, although this has 
happened far less than labor activists would like and these moves have often been mixed 
with political motives.  For example, the United States and EU erected trade barriers 
against Myanmar in the 1990s when the military government jailed Aung Sang Suu Kyi; 
these trade barriers strangled the country’s nascent apparel industry. (Cynics could argue 
that it was Myanmar’s geopolitical opposition to the United States, not its human rights, 
which prompted the trade barriers.)   
The US-Cambodia trade agreement from the late 1990s, which created the first 
iteration of Better Work, is a clearer example.  The United States dropped all quotas and 
tariffs against Cambodian apparel provided the industry allow independent monitoring 
(Polaski 2006).  More recently, the United States and EU have both used the threat of 
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tariffs to force Bangladesh’s government to make significant improvements in labor 
rights following the Rana Plaza and Tazreen factory disasters (Saini 2014).   
The next chapter of this dissertation provides a much more detailed discussion of 
these efforts by importing countries to promote labor rights around the world. 
Politics of Exporting Countries 
The politics of apparel in exporting countries are surprisingly complex; many countries 
have tried and failed to become exporters because an apparel industry requires a 
reasonably modern political system.  The apparel industry may seem primitive, but a 
country must have the basic foundations of a developed economy in order to compete 
internationally.  These foundations include basic physical infrastructure of roads, 
electricity, and water.  The country must have a legal system to protect property and state 
institutions cannot be too corrupt.  The workforce must be somewhat educated and have a 
work ethic that is conducive to doing repetitive tasks for long periods of time.  The 
owners of factories and workshops must be able to meet strict deadlines, manage multiple 
customers from different countries, and provide an environment that will attract workers. 
All of this requires a delicate balance between workers, employers, and the 
government.  If each of these groups uncompromisingly pursues their best interests, the 
industry will collapse.  Workers would like high salaries, bonuses, vacations, and shorter 
working hours.  But if their compensation rises higher than their productivity, the 
industry will fail and buyers will go elsewhere. 
Employers, on the other hand, would like to pay their workers as little as possible 
for as much work as possible.  But employers do need to attract skilled workers, they 
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need to protect multinational buyers from reputation risk, and they need to avoid trouble 
with the law.   
Governments have the trickiest role.  All governments, even authoritarian 
dictatorships, need some semblance of public legitimacy and so they must appear to side 
with workers.  But government elites and economic elites are so intertwined in most 
countries that governments will usually support employers.  Elites also want to attract 
foreign investment and trade.  This has led to many countries having excellent laws 
supporting of workers’ rights, but no one actually enforces the law.  This allows political 
elites to maintain the façade of caring about workers’ rights without having to confront 
economic elites or threaten foreign investment. 
As mentioned above, despite the relative simplicity of apparel, the industry does 
require a government capable of providing basic public services (Tewari 2006 discusses 
three cases that illustrate the key role of governments).  Property rights must be 
protected; otherwise, foreign firms with the necessary expertise will not risk investing in 
the country.  The basics of industrial infrastructure must be put in place and maintained; 
i.e. roads, electricity, running water, and ports.  In the case of incipient industries, the 
government may need to provide favorable loans, export subsidies, tax credits, and other 
forms of assistance; and in the case of mature industries, the government may need to 
assist producers in moving to higher value-added functions in apparel or into new 
industries all together.  Political stability is necessary for producers to succeed in global 
supply chains and attract international buyers; if a country has frequent riots or military 
coups, then foreign businesses will not be willing to invest in the country.   
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Finally, corruption must be kept within acceptable levels.  Although corruption is 
the target of endless criticism from developed countries, in truth corruption itself is not an 
impediment to economic development.  Corruption only becomes a problem when its 
costs are too high, when it is unpredictable, and when the person asking for a bribe 
cannot deliver the promised service.  One industry expert wrote that China’s success in 
exporting clothing in the 1990s was due part to Beijing routinizing corruption in export 
zones (Birnbaum 2005).  Corruption in these zones was still widespread, but the bribes 
were predictable and the bureaucrats then did their jobs without demanding more.  This 
allowed foreign businesses to treat corruption as a simple business cost that did not 
impede trade. 
An additional political complication arises between central governments and local 
governments.  Central governments are focused on the regime’s legitimacy, the 
industry’s international competitiveness, and the country’s reputation, so they usually 
want to protect workers and minimize corruption.  But local governments do not think 
beyond the few factories in their jurisdiction; they are usually colluding with employers 
at the expense of workers and the industry as a whole.  In several Better Work countries, 
for example, the program acts to support the central government’s priorities in areas 
where the local governments have failed (Amengual and Chirot 2015 discusses a 
poignant example). 
Another complication is foreign ownership.  In earlier phases of industrialization, 
factory owners and workers came from the same country and were subject to the same 
political systems (e.g. England, America, Japan, Korea).  But today, many factories in 
developing countries are owned and managed by firms from East Asian countries, mainly 
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Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Gereffi and Frederick 2010).  Foreign ownership creates 
a strange set of dynamics.  To use Albert Hirschman’s terminology, foreign owners 
usually have little “voice” in the government, but they also find it easier to “exit” 
(Hirschman 1970).   This means the foreign owners are ready to move factories to a 
different country should a problem arise, so governments must be sensitive to their needs.  
On the other side, however, governments worried about their legitimacy are often loathe 
to defend foreigners at the expense of their own populations.  In Vietnam, for example, 
the government allowed massive demonstrations against Chinese factory owners even 
though the government usually never allows its citizens to organize.  This conflict leads 
to governments and employers needing each other without fully trusting each other. 
There is no single political arrangement that works for exporting countries.  Many 
balances are possible depending on culture, economy, and type of government.  From the 
perspective of labor rights, however, it worth keeping in mind that the domestic politics 
of an exporting country has a far stronger effect on labor conditions than international 
law, corporate codes of conduct, or any other variable (Locke 2012; Mosley 2010).   
3. Future Trends 
The future of the apparel industry will be shaped by a several trends.  First, as the effects 
of the MFA fades, production will leave countries whose competitiveness is based on 
quotas.  Second, rising wages in China will probably cause the country’s share of apparel 
production to decline.  Third, buyers and producers will likely develop more permanent 
relationships that will change the nature of the industry.  Fourth, emerging economies 
will become more important as apparel importers, making western countries less central 
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to the demand side of the industry.  Finally, technological change is a wildcard that could 
have little effect or could upend the industry. 
 Although the MFA expired in 2005, its legacy remains.  In the run-up to its 
expiration, many analysts predicted that China would dominate production and many 
countries’ industries would collapse (Rivoli 2009).  Mexican and Central American 
suppliers to the United States, along with North African and Eastern European suppliers 
to the EU, seemed especially vulnerable because their wages were so much higher than 
China.  Although these countries did not immediately lose market share in 2005, by 2014 
they had lost market share to lower-cost countries.  Given that many of these regions 
were only competitive under the MFA, it is likely that they will continue to lose market 
share as production consolidates in East and South Asia (Staritz 2011). 
 The trend towards consolidation, however, is being offset by rising wages in 
China (Asaeda 2013).  Chinese workers in coastal cities no longer have to accept the low 
wages that come with apparel, placing China’s industry at a crossroads.  It can either 
expand into China’s interior where wages are lower or it can move into poorer Asian 
countries.  If production begins leaving China, the existing apparel producing countries 
will not have the capacity to absorb China’s losses.  This will bring new countries and 
regions into the industry, such as Myanmar and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 The growing interdependence between buyers and producers may also reshape the 
industry.  In the past, buyers have kept producers at arms-length to keep producers in 
bidding wars with each other.  But as buyer’s needs have become more complex, they 
have deepened their relationships with producers.  This trend is supported by the end of 
the MFA’s system of shifting quotas.  As buyers and producers develop deeper 
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relationships, successful producers will have to be more sophisticated, organized, and 
modern.  Successful producers will also gain some leverage with buyers, since buyers 
cannot simply go across the street to find a new producer. This may ease the pressure 
being put on producers and raise profit margins (Gereffi and Frederick 2010; Staritz 
2011; Azmeh and Nadvi 2014).  What this holds for workers is uncertain.  Less pressure 
on producers could lead to less pressure on workers, but producers could also continue to 
squeeze workers just as hard. 
 Technological change is the ultimate wildcard.  Although technology has 
transformed most aspects of the apparel industry, actual apparel production has proven 
resistant to technology.  Machines simply cannot handle soft fabric well enough to make 
two pieces line up properly (Abernathy 1999).  As a consequence, the demand for labor 
in garment production has kept pace with demand for finished goods (apparel may be the 
only manufacturing industry where this is the case).  However, one day someone may 
invent a cheap, effective robot that can out-perform a human.  Such a technology would 
be catastrophic.  Tens of millions of workers would lose their jobs and dozens of 
developing countries would fall into recession.  It would also close off the bottom-rung of 
the ladder of industrialization.   
Conclusion 
It would be nice to imagine that improved labor rights is one of the top issues that will 
shape the apparel industry over the coming years, but there is not much evidence that it 
will.  At best, labor rights remains a second-tier issue for actors in the apparel totem-pole, 
especially since existing initiatives to address labor rights have provided an adequate 
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response to sporadic labor rights scandals.  The next chapter will discuss these initiatives, 












































Chapter Three: A History of International Labor Rights in Apparel 
Modern labor rights began proliferating across the Western world in the late 1800s, 
roughly a generation after urbanization and industrialization transformed these societies 
(Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation gives an excellent discussion of this time 
period).  Not long after, states and labor unions began pushing to elevate labor laws into 
the international arena. 
 Over the last century, efforts to promote labor rights internationally fell into three 
broad categories.  The first effort is the promotion of international labor law and the 
creation of the ILO, an international organization founded in 1919 to coordinate 
international labor treaties.  The second effort to promote labor laws is the embedding of 
labor provisions in trade treaties.  These attempts began in the 1980s when the United 
States and European Community began insisting that their trade partners in developing 
countries agree to human rights provisions as a condition of completing trade agreements.  
This effort reached its pinnacle in the 1990s and, although it continues today, is generally 
considered a failure.  The third effort to promote international labor rights comes from 
private compliance initiatives (PCI) in which multinational corporations, NGOs, and 
auditing agencies monitor the working conditions in corporate supply chains.  This effort 
began in the 1990s and has increased in intensity ever since despite the evidence that 
PCIs are not effective. 
 The following sections discuss each of these three categories: international labor 
law, embedding labor rights in trade treaties, and private compliance initiatives.  The 
sections will discuss when these efforts began, how they have fared, and why each has 
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been found unsatisfactory.  The final section of the paper discusses how Better Work fits 
into these three categories while going beyond them in important ways. 
1. International Labor Law   
 International labor law has always been intimately connected with the institution 
designed to coordinate its creation and implementation, the ILO.  The ILO was founded 
after World War I during the Treaty of Versailles and was originally part of the League of 
Nations.  The ILO’s purpose was to help countries coordinate the creation of treaties 
governing international labor law, monitor countries’ compliance with their treaty 
obligations, and persuade countries to join treaties and enforce the treaties they have 
ratified.   Early labor rights conventions focused on working hours, minimum working 
ages, women’s rights, and labor rights on the sea (ILO NORMLEX 2015).   
 The ILO’s effectiveness was hobbled by the weakness of the League of Nations, 
the Great Depression, the schism between Communism and the liberal west, and the 
outbreak of World War II (Hughes and Haworth 2011, chapter 1).  In the 1930s, the ILO 
was salvaged from the League of Nations and relocated to Montreal.  It was subsequently 
attached to the United Nations at the end of World War II and renewed its constitution 
through the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia.  At the time, the ILO was championed by 
the United States government, which saw the ILO as a counterweight to Communism by 
promoting labor rights within a capitalist economy.   
The ILO came to disappoint the US’s expectations.  The organization remained 
neutral in the Cold War, so both the United States and Soviet Union regarded it with 
suspicion.  The Soviet Union constantly criticized the ILO as being dominated by the 
United States, while the United States actually withdrew from the organization in the late 
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1970s when the director general appointed an assistant director from the USSR (Hughes 
and Haworth 2011, chapter 1).  The United States eventually rejoined, but the 
organization remained on the sidelines as the more powerful Bretton Woods institutions 
dominated international economic discussions in the 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization created a new set of 
challenges for the ILO.  Instead of being caught between two powerful states, the ILO 
had to define its relevance in an era when labor rights were seen as an impediment to 
market forces.  The ILO had always been a critic of the market orthodoxy that had 
pervaded in the West in the 1980s, but was generally ignored.  The 2008 global financial 
crisis and its aftermath have left an ideological vacuum within which the ILO may gain 
prominence by promoting alternatives to market orthodoxy, but whether or not it can do 
this is an open question (Onis and Guven 2011). 
The ILO has a complex governance structure.  The International Labor 
Conference (ILC) sets the broad policies of the organization.  Each member country has 
four representatives at the ILC: two from government, one from labor, and one 
representing employers.  These four representatives each have their own vote and can 
vote against each other.  The ILC elects members of the ILO’s Governing Body, a 
smaller organization that directs more detailed policies and elects the Director-General. 
The ILC’s core purpose is adopting international labor “standards,” which are 
aspirations more than laws.  Once the ILC adopts a standard, it becomes one of the ILO’s 
conventions.  However, member states are under no obligation to join the convention, 
even if their representatives voted for it at the ILC.  The ILO currently has 189 
conventions (see ILO NORMLEX for a full list), eight of which are deemed 
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“fundamental” by the ILO.  These fundamental conventions cover four topics, sometimes 
referred to as the four “core labor rights.”  These are freedom of association, child labor, 
forced labor, and unfair discrimination. 
The ILO’s approach to labor rights has some obvious weaknesses.  ILO member 
states do not have to join any convention they do not wish to, even the eight fundamental 
conventions.  The United States, for example, despite being one of the ILO’s largest 
donors, has only ratified two of the eight core conventions. 
The ILO monitoring function is also weak (Hagen 2003).  Countries self-report on 
their compliance with conventions while the ILO only conducts cursory investigations.  
Further, the ILO only looks at whether or not a country’s domestic laws are in 
compliance with international conventions – the ILO almost never concerns itself with 
how laws are actually implemented, a glaring oversight given that many countries have 
excellent laws on the books but no implementation. 
Finally, the ILO lacks enforcement power.  The ILO’s Constitution allows the 
ILO to hear complaints brought against countries, either by other countries or by groups 
within the country.  If a complaint is brought, the ILO is supposed to create a commission 
to investigate and make recommendations.  If the country ignores the recommendations, 
then the issue will be heard by the Governing Body, which will propose action.  If the 
country ignores the recommended action, then the Governing Body may recommend that 
the ILC hear the case and “take such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure 
compliance forthwith” (ILO Constitution, Article 33).  In its entire history, the ILO has 
only used this power once, in 2000, on the issue of forced labor in Myanmar (Elliott and 
Freeman 2003).   As one scholar put it, “the procedures that must be followed to obtain 
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an actual condemnation by an official organ of the ILO are truly cumbersome.  The 
scopes open for obstructionism or complete evasion of any responsibility are 
considerable (Hagen 2003, 23).”   
The weakness of international labor law and the ILO became salient in the 1970s 
as global trade intensified and developed countries became increasingly open to 
manufactured goods from developing countries.  Unions and labor rights activists in 
developed countries became frustrated with traditional international law and turned to 
more unilateral actions, notably putting human rights issues in trade treaties.  The next 
section will discuss these efforts. 
2. Embedding Human Rights in Trade Treaties 
Beginning in the 1980s, the United States and European Union (then the European 
Community) began introducing human rights clauses into trade treaties with developing 
countries.  The exact motivations of these governments remains disputed, but it was some 
combination of concern for egregious violations in developing countries, demands for 
protection from unions and industries within their borders, and pressure from human 
rights NGOs (Hafner-Burton 2013). 
 The United States first combined labor rights and trade in the 1984 Renewal Act 
of the General System of Preferences (GSP).  The GSP, created in 1974 by the US 
Congress, lowered tariffs on products from certain developing countries.  Its purpose was 
to incentivize cooperation with US priorities, such as counter-terrorism, resisting 
communism, and participating in anti-drug activities.  The 1984 Renewal Act contained a 
provision stating that the US President could remove countries from the GSP if that 
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country “has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized labor 
rights (Alston 2003, 72).” 
 This provision set a precedent subsequent trade treaties.  The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included a side agreement on labor rights that set up a 
special commission to investigate violations.  The Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) also contained language requiring countries to uphold their own 
labor laws.   
 In the 1990s, the United States pushed to have labor rights included in discussions 
for the WTO.  Developing countries, however, feared this would lead to protectionism 
and were adamant that WTO negotiations not even discuss labor rights (Gadbaw and 
Medwig 2003).  After much discussion, the WTO Singapore Ministerial in 1996 asserted 
that labor rights would be the sole provision of the ILO (Singapore WTO Ministerial 
1996).  One observer wrote that this was “the WTO vigorously batting the ‘ball’ of trade–
labor linkage back into the ILO’s court, expecting the ILO simply to drop the ball 
(Blackett 2015).” 
Regardless of its failure to include labor rights in the WTO, the United States, 
even under the Bush administration, included provisions in bilateral free trade agreements 
with Chile, Colombia, Jordan, Korea, Oman, Panama, and Singapore.  The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, an ambitious trade treaty that has been signed by President Barack Obama 
but not yet ratified by the US Senate, also contains labor rights provisions, notably a side 
agreement with Vietnam to improve freedom of association. 
The EU followed a similar path in its trade agreements with African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) countries.  These ACP countries are former European colonies that 
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receive preferential trade access as reparations for colonialism.  They first received 
preferential trade access to Europe in the Lomé Convention of 1975 between the 
European Community and ACP countries.  The original convention did not mention labor 
or human rights, but the fourth version of the convention, signed in 1990, required ACP 
countries to respect human rights, democracy, and rule of law.  The Cotonou Agreement, 
signed in 2000, replaced the Lomé Convention and had similar requirements.  The 
Agreement contained specific provisions to a “political dimension” that calls for 
countries to discuss and uphold treaties regarding the “arms trade, excessive military 
expenditure, drugs and organized crime, ethnic, religious or racial discrimination... 
human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance (Cotonou 
Agreement, Article 8.4).”  As can be seen from this list, the EU has pursued a broad 
spectrum of issues while the United States has focused narrowly on labor rights and child 
labor (Hafner-Burton 2013).  The EU included similar language in bilateral treaties with 
Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, and Venezuela.   
Although embedding labor rights in trade treaties has become standard practice in 
the United States and EU, scholars looking at this practice deem it ineffective at 
improving actual rights on the ground.   Politicians in developed countries have rarely 
had the will to strongly enforce these provisions; governments in developing countries 
were usually bullied into signing these agreements and had no plans to put them into 
effect; and labor activists have been unable to use these treaties to get justice for rights 
violations. 
Under the GSP, for example, the first President George H.W. Bush never 
removed a country for labor rights violations, even when the US State Department issued 
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reports condemning the country’s labor conditions.  The GSP Subcommittee responsible 
for hearing complaints refused to take action on any number of reports.  As a test case, 
labor rights activists brought a case to the subcommittee and, after much effort, the case 
foundered on procedural issues and the substance of the matter was never considered.  
One scholar believed that this was deliberate obfuscation on the part of the Bush 
administration, writing that the subcommittee did its best to “undermine” the labor 
provisions of the GSP (Collingsworth 2003).  President Bill Clinton used the GSP to 
pressure small countries like Guatemala to improve working conditions, but he ignored 
equally egregious rights violations in important markets like Indonesia and Malaysia 
(Compa and Vogt 2001).  Clinton even brought Pakistan into the GSP for diplomatic 
reasons despite the country’s terrible working conditions and supported China’s 
ascension to the WTO without regard for its abysmal labor rights record. 
The labor side agreement of NAFTA is similarly toothless.   An arbitration court, 
called the National Administrative Office, was created to hear cases of labor rights 
abuses, but the actual process of having a case heard is long, expensive, and opaque.  One 
scholar estimated that it would take almost four years to have a case heard (Diamond 
2003).  This author points out that NAFTA’s protections for workers are incredibly weak 
compared to the treaty’s protections for investors and intellectual property.  The CAFTA 
agreement also lacks enforcement (Cuyvers and de Meyer 2012); its labor rights 
provisions have only been invoked once, against Guatemala (US Trade Representative 
2015). 
If bilateral trade treaties have any effectiveness, it occurs before the treaty is 
signed.  One expert found that both Oman and Chile both substantively altered their labor 
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laws, especially around improving freedom of association, in order to finalize a trade 
treaty with the United States (Hafner-Burton 2013).  This was done to mollify Democrats 
in the US Senate who would otherwise vote against the treaty.  Once trade treaties have 
been signed, however, the labor rights provisions are almost never enforced by the United 
States. 
 The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries has also been 
weakly enforced.  These countries continue to enjoy preferential access to EU markets 
despite frequently violating the political dimensions of the agreement.  On a positive 
note, however, the EU has threatened several countries with expulsion from the ACP 
after military coups and crooked elections (Hafner-Burton 2013).  This threat has given 
the EU some leverage over these countries to push for free elections and democracy.  The 
EU’s treaty with Bangladesh was similarly invoked after the Rana Plaza disaster to 
pressure the country to improve worker safety. 
Enthusiasm about embedding labor rights in trade treaties peaked in the late 1990s 
when developing countries resisted inclusion of a social clause at the WTO.  At this 
point, labor activists despaired of working with states and turned directly to the private 
sector, leading to rise of private compliance initiatives. 
3. Private Compliance Initiatives 
PCIs began rapidly proliferating in the 1990s.§  Their rise was due in part to frustration 
with international law and trade treaties, but was also driven by the ideology of the NGOs 
that pushed for them (Compa and Darricarrere 2003).  These NGOs differed from labor 
unions in that they understood how to pressure the media and public opinion far more 
                                                 
§ The earliest example of a US corporate code of conduct is the Sullivan Principles that addressed apartheid 
in South Africa.  The author of this code repudiated it as ineffective and called for US legislation instead 
(Compa and Darricarrere 2003). 
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effectively then they understood how to lobby their governments; they were more 
globally-minded then unions, which tend to be nationalistic; they also wanted immediate 
improvements in working conditions rather than pushing for lofty political victories like 
improved legislation on freedom of association. 
 The final reason PCIs spread was that multinational corporations (MNC) proved 
surprisingly willing to adopt these initiatives in response to activist pressure.  It is worth 
remembering that, just two decades ago, Nike’s top executive in Indonesia reported that 
he never asked factories in his supply chain about labor conditions, saying: “I don’t know 
that I need to know (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994, 328)”.  Today, Nike has a large 
department committed solely to monitoring working conditions in its supply chain and 
virtually every other apparel company participates in at least one PCI.  It is hard to know 
why apparel companies did not simply refuse to accept responsibility.  If they had 
collectively refused, perhaps the activist pressure would have dissipated and PCIs would 
never have come into existence. 
PCIs have proliferated in other industries as well, with the Kimberly Process for 
diamonds, the Forest Stewardship Council for forest products, the Harkin-Engel Protocol 
to eliminate child labor in cocoa production, the Electronics Industry Citizens Coalition, 
and the United Nations Global Compact which covers all industries.  Today, it has 
become a norm for MNCs with global supply chains to at least pay lip service to PCIs.  
One study of over 500 large companies found that 88 percent had an internal PCI, 39 
percent participated in an industry PCI, and 32 percent participated in a universal PCI 
(Sethi and Schepers 2013). 
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The first code of conduct in apparel was implemented by Levi Strauss 
Corporation in 1991.  The company took a strong stance against forced labor and child 
labor and refused to source products from China.  Other companies followed suit, but 
labor activists criticized these internal codes of conduct and began demanding more 
transparent codes that were conducted by independent entities (Meyer and Gereffi 2010).  
This led to a proliferation of overlapping and competing industry standards with a mix of 
corporate and NGO control. 
At one end of the spectrum, there were corporate-controlled standards like 
Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), which creates standards and then 
certifies for-profit companies to inspect factories in accordance with WRAP standards.  
Social Accountability 8000 has a similar model to WRAP but has some input from 
NGOs, although it is generally considered a corporate-controlled initiative (O’Rourke 
2006).   
The Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC) is at the other end of the spectrum.  The 
WRC encourages universities to adopt codes of conduct and inspects factories that 
produce branded apparel for universities (e.g. a Reebok sweatshirt being sold in Penn 
State’s bookstore).  The WRC is also the only organization that accepts and investigates 
complaints directly from workers.  Its board of directors is composed of NGOs, 
universities, and multinationals and is the most strident in its demands for improved 
working conditions.  The WRC has never achieved a wide reach because of its perceived 
antagonism to the private sector, but it has leveraged the power of universities to give 
itself a strong voice in discussions over international labor rights. 
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The Fair Labor Association (FLA) has become the premier industry standard by 
equally balancing NGOs and MNCs, thereby achieving credibility from both sides.  The 
FLA’s core function is certifying the internal codes of conduct created and implemented 
by brands themselves.  The FLA also conducts its own assessments of factories that 
participate in the supply chain of member brands. 
In Europe, the Ethical Trading Initiative, a British program with ties to NGOs, 
industry, and the government has focused on conducting research and disseminating best 
practices.  The Fair Wear Foundation, originally a Dutch initiative, plays a role similar to 
the FLA in that it certifies brands internal codes of conduct and inspects a small 
percentage of factories to ensure compliance. 
The sociologist Tim Bartley provides an insightful explanation for why standards 
in the apparel industry are so fractured (Bartley 2007).  He points out that PCIs are not 
technocratic responses to problems, but rather are a site of political contestation bounded 
by norms and institutions.  As a counterfactual, he contrasts apparel with the forest goods 
industry, an industry in which the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is the single 
dominant standard ensuring that forest products are harvested sustainably.  Bartely 
determined that several key variables have driven the differences between standards in 
apparel and forest goods. 
In the forest industry, all major buyers of wood adopted the FSC early on and 
cooperated with each other to implement the program.  In apparel, buyers have not 
cooperated well and have resisted giving any authority to industry-wide associations like 
the FLA (for example, the FLA only certifies buyers’ internal codes while the FSC 
certifies the actual producers of forest products).   
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In the forest industry, environmental NGOs coordinated to play a dominant, early 
role in the FSC and defined the terms of the program before industry came on board.  
Further, the FSC institutionalized equal participation between NGOs from the global 
north and south (Dingworth 2008) which increased the program’s legitimacy and kept 
NGOs united. In apparel, however, labor NGOs never coalesced around a single 
approach and were always playing catch-up with MNCs.  Even in initiatives with NGO 
involvement, the MNCs were simply too powerful and well organized for the NGOs to 
balance them (Meyer and Gereffi 2010).  The only labor groups with the organizational 
capacity to stand up to MNCs were labor unions, but they were pushed out of the FLA 
because the program would not demand a living wage or freedom of association (Howard 
1999).   The departure of unions, however, did not stop the FLA from becoming the 
dominant standard in labor rights.  This signaled to MNCs that they could “shop around” 
for compliant NGOs to partner with. 
A final difference between forestry and apparel is that FSC quickly achieved 
worldwide reach, such that one can see the FSC seal on paper and wood products all 
around the world.   In apparel, meanwhile, different governments stepped in to promote 
different standards, leading to divisions between the United States and Europe that persist 
today. 
All these factors created a situation where almost every apparel company has its 
own internal code, occasionally hires third party monitors, and belongs to numerous 
industry-wide initiatives and standards.  The system is so inefficient that factory owners 
complain about the amount of time and energy that they must put into satisfying frequent 
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inspections.  And despite all this effort, the monitoring of working conditions in apparel 
has had almost no effect. 
Every academic analysis of PCIs has found that these initiatives had, at best, a 
small impact on labor rights.  Theoretical papers have pointed out the numerous flaws in 
PCIs (Locke et al 2009; Meyer and Gereffi 2010; Wells 2007).  The first flaw is that the 
agents of a PCI may be unwilling to find problems.  Internal monitoring by MNCs may 
only try to protect the MNC from scandal and so the PCI will ignore anything other than 
child labor and egregious safety violations.  Third party monitors, who are paid by MNCs 
or factories, similarly have no incentive to write a harsh report when their competitors are 
willing to write a glowing one.  One former monitor wrote an op-ed in which he claimed 
that his employer deliberately avoided making waves for factories or brands in order to 
ensure repeated business (Frank 2008). 
The second flaw in the PCI approach is that sincere monitors are often unable to 
find problems.  Factory owners have an incentive to hide problems and they are usually 
better at covering up problems than auditors are at finding them.  The flaw is particularly 
acute for more nuanced issues like sexual harassment, gender discrimination, or freedom 
of association violations.  Managers will obviously not engage in these behaviors directly 
in front of auditors and will coach workers in how to talk to auditors.  Therefore, auditors 
must visit workers offsite, return to a factory repeatedly, and interview union 
representatives to assess these issues.  Very few PCIs are willing to devote the resources 
to conducting such thorough audits. 
 The third flaw is that finding problems rarely leads to those problems being 
addressed.  The PCI model assumes that MNCs will punish code violators and reward 
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factories with good records, but in practice this almost never happens (Better Work 
Research Brief 2011b).  MNCs only worry about factories violating the worst labor laws, 
such as child labor and forced labor.  Beyond these issues, MNCs care far more about 
price, quality, and timeliness.   Additionally, even in the case that an MNC does sincerely 
want to pressure a factory, the factory may ignore the MNC.  Apparel factories usually 
have orders with half a dozen buyers at once and rarely receive a guarantee of repeat 
business, so they have no reason to radically change labor practices in response to a 
single MNC.  They are more likely to implement meaningless surface changes and hope 
that the pressure goes away. 
 Empirical analyses have corroborated the theoretical criticisms discussed above.  
One academic followed a team of PriceWaterhouseCoopers auditors in China and Korea 
and determined that the audits were “significantly flawed.”  They auditors got most of 
their information from managers, they allowed managers to select workers for interviews, 
and they interviewed workers at the factory with mangers nearby.  As such, auditors 
missed significant safety problems, double bookkeeping, and freedom of association 
violations (O’Rourke 2000).   
 Another academic was given access by Nike to the company’s internal monitoring 
reports, providing the most complete analysis of an MNC’s code of conduct.  He found 
little evidence of improvements in Nike’s supply chain and some evidence of worsening 
(Locke 2007; Locke 2013). This finding is significant because Nike has one of the 
industry’s most comprehensive monitoring programs.  The company has over 100 staff 
members around the world dedicated just to monitoring working conditions; their audit is 
relatively comprehensive; and the FLA also audits five percent of the company’s supply 
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chain.  If Nike’s monitoring efforts have not yielded improvements, then one can 
reasonably infer that other MNCs’ internal codes are equally ineffective. 
 An analysis of the FLA’s monitoring and remediation efforts is a little more 
positive (Anner 2012).  This academic found that FLA auditors were able remediate 
many of violations they found related to child labor, wages, and safety.  However, the 
FLA was far less able to confront freedom of association problems.   Of the total number 
of violations found by FLA auditors, only 5 percent related to freedom of association 
while 40 percent related to safety and 31 percent related to wages.  Remediation rates 
were also lowest for freedom of association issues (and these remediation rates were self-
reported by the FLA so they likely overstated success).  The author concluded that the 
FLA was able to enforce a basic minimum of labor standards but was unable to address 
deeper problems. 
 There is some evidence that PCIs can have an effect when they operate outside 
the normal model.  For example, health and safety issues improved in factories that 
worked with Nike when the MNC had a long-term relationship with the factory and 
conducted repeated trainings (Locke 2013).  In this case, the improvements were not the 
result of monitoring, they were the result of collaboration and problem solving.  
Similarly, child labor in the soccer ball sewing industry was eradicated from Pakistan 
after MNCs worked together with local NGOs and formed a comprehensive approach to 
eliminating child labor from the supply chain; it also helped that MNCs threatened to 
exist the country altogether if producers did not comply (Nadvi et al 2011). 
 All of this suggests that PCIs can have some effect when they cooperate with 
local actors such as governments, unions, and NGOs (Meyer and Gereffi 2010, Locke 
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2013).  Further, PCIs can be more effective if they focus less on monitoring and more on 
cooperating with factories to jointly develop solutions and share best practices (O’Rourke 
2003, Locke 2009).  Lastly, MNCs must occasionally make credible threats of sanctions 
against factories that refuse to comply. 
 These insights, unfortunately, seem not to have penetrated the public discussion 
around PCIs.  When I read newspaper articles or NGO reports, people are generally 
calling for more comprehensive monitoring or stricter incentives for factory owners to 
cooperate.  Hopefully there will be a paradigm change in PCIs in the near future, with 
more of an emphasis on solving problems than on simply monitoring them.  Regardless, 
PCIs remain a very common response to supply chain problems and will doubtless 
continue to proliferate for the foreseeable future.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed three efforts to improve international labor rights. International labor 
law, which began at the turn of the twentieth century; embedding labor rights in trade agreements, 
which became a norm in the 1980s; and PCIs which have been proliferating since the 1990s.  All 
three efforts continue today despite little evidence that they work to improve actual working 
conditions. 
The Better Work program is closest to a PCI in its operations, but it incorporates 
international law and, in some countries, trade treaties.  Better Work is like a PCI in that it 
monitors factories, provides reports to MNCs, and relies on pressure from MNCs to drive factory 
participation in the program.  Better Work upholds international law by monitoring for the ILO’s 
eight fundamental conventions, regardless of whether or not countries have joined these 
treaties.  Better Work also links with trade treaties in Haiti, Jordan, Lesotho, and Nicaragua.  In 
these four countries, some of Better Work’s authority is derived from US trade treaties that call 
for improved labor rights.  
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Better Work goes beyond other PCIs by doing what the experts discussed in the previous 
section recommend.  The program cooperates closely with local governments and, when possible, 
local unions.  It also emphasizes cooperating with factories and developing long-term solutions 
instead of quick fixes.  These efforts allow the program to develop comprehensive solutions to 
problems and have led to real change in the countries where it operates.  In this way, Better Work 
goes far beyond what any other PCI has achieved.  The next five chapters of this dissertation turn 




































Chapter Four: Better Work’s Operations 
Better Work’s activities cover a wide breadth.  Better Work is the largest ILO program in 
all the countries where it operates and is often one of the country’s largest United Nations 
programs.  Moreover, Better Work has unparalleled access to stakeholders and 
knowledge of local conditions; this makes it a desirable partner for many other actors 
including other ILO and IFC departments, multinational buyers’ aid programs, and 
academic researchers. 
 This chapter will describe these activities in two categories.  The first category 
covers the program’s “Core Services.”  These are activities that take place within 
factories and include monitoring working conditions and helping factories improve.  The 
second category, “Stakeholder Engagement,” refers to Better Work’s activities outside 
the factory gates and includes working with government ministries and national labor 
unions, partnering with international buyers, and contributing to intellectual discussions 
about labor rights and economic development at the global level.  
1. Core Services 
Better Work’s “Core Services” are activities that are directly aimed at improving labor 
conditions and productivity in individual factories.  These activities form the center of the 
Better Work model, they are the easiest activities to understand, and their effect is the 
easiest to measure. 
 In Better Work’s internal language, Core Services are divided into three 
categories: monitoring, advising, and training.  “Monitoring” involves a lengthy 
inspection of working conditions in the factory using a detailed checklist.  “Advising” 
involves helping a factory set priorities and organize a worker-manager committee to 
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implement changes (The term “advising” is a bit misleading. Better Work does not 
actually advise factories on specifically what to do; rather, it tries to create the underlying 
conditions for factory-led improvements.)  Every factory that joins Better Work agrees to 
a series of monitoring and advising visits by Better Work staff.  “Training,” the third 
Core Service, refers to optional classes that factories can participate in for an additional 
fee.  These three types of core services are discussed in more detail below. 
Monitoring 
When a factory begins to participate in Better Work, it agrees to give Better Work staff, 
called Enterprise Advisers (EAs), uninhibited access to the factory.  EAs do not have to 
announce their visits, they can meet privately with anyone in the factory, and they can 
inspect any part of the factory that they choose.  Factories are monitored once a year, but 
EAs visit a factory roughly once a month for Advising visits (discussed below). 
 The EAs use a 256 point checklist called the Compliance Assessment Tool 
(CAT).  The CAT is organized into eight broad categories called Compliance Clusters.  
Four of these clusters are the ILO’s four core labor rights: abolition of child labor, 
abolition of forced labor, abolition of discrimination, and freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  The other four clusters contain questions based on domestic labor 
law; they are compensation, contracts and human resources, occupational safety and 
health, and working time. 
These eight Compliance Clusters are each then subdivided into roughly a half 
dozen Compliance Points, which are more specific.  For example, the cluster on 
discrimination is divided into four points: race and origin, religion and political opinion, 
gender, and other.  Table 4.1 shows how clusters are divided into points (this table has 
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been taken from Better Work’s annual reports).  These Compliance Points are further 
subdivided into yes-or-no questions that EAs actually monitor.  For example, the Gender 
Compliance Point is divided into 11 questions that ask if job applications refer to gender, 
if applicants must submit to a pregnancy test, if gender is a factor in promotions, etc. 
Table 4.1: How the CAT Breaks Down into Clusters and Points  








1 Child Labor Child Laborers  
Unconditional Worst Forms  
Hazardous Work  
Documentation and Protection of Young Workers 
2 Discrimination Race and Origin  
Religion and Political Opinion  
Gender  
Other Grounds 
3 Forced Labor Coercion  
Bonded Labor  
Forced Labor and Overtime  
Prison Labor  
4 Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining 
Union Operations  
Freedom to Associate 
Interference and Discrimination  








5 Compensation Minimum wages  
Overtime wages  
Premium Pay 
Method of Payment  
Wage Information, Use and Deduction  
Paid Leave  
Social Security and Other Benefits  
6 Contracts and Human 
Resources 
Employment Contracts  
Contracting Procedures  
Termination  
Dialogue, Discipline and Disputes  
7 Occupational Safety and Health OSH Management Systems  
Chemicals and Hazardous Substances  
Worker Protection  
Working Environment  
Health Services and First Aid  
Welfare Facilities  
Worker Accommodation  
Emergency Preparedness  





 The CAT is standardized across Better Work countries, but there is some 
variation on specific questions.  National legal experts and the labor ministry give input 
on the specific questions that inform the Compliance Points so that the questions make 
sense in the local context.  The CAT also varies across countries because Better Work 
only monitors for compliance with domestic law (however, if domestic law contradicts or 
has a lower standard than the ILO conventions, international law prevails).  For example, 
Jordanian law does not have a maximum number of work hours in a week, while other 
countries do, so Better Work cannot monitor that point in Jordan.  To give another 
example, Indonesian law requires that one percent of a factory’s workforce be disabled, 
so Better Work only monitors this point in Indonesia.  
 The strengths and weaknesses of the CAT engenders some debate within Better 
Work.  One strength is its level of detail: everyone interviewed agreed that Better Work’s 
CAT is far more extensive than the reports done by buyers’ CSR departments or by third-
party monitors.  EAs go to factories in teams of two and conduct a two-day long 
inspection; private monitors usually spend half a day and often go alone.  These private 
monitors also often do not speak the local language, while EAs are recruited locally so 
they understand the language and culture.  Another strength of the CAT is that it monitors 
for international law, so omissions in domestic laws will not affect the quality of the 
reporting.  Further, Better Work explicitly includes freedom of association issues, which 
are usually overlooked by private-sector monitoring schemes.  Even the much-publicized 
Bangladesh Accord and Alliance only monitor for fire and building safety.  The final 
strength of the CAT is that buyers like it and are willing to pay for it. 
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 The CAT has several weaknesses.  The first is that the CAT is essentially a long 
list of yes-or-no questions, even though many labor rights issues are qualitative in nature 
and are not easily reduced to a series of binary questions.  This partly an issue of degree: 
a factory with a few minor safety violations and a factory that is about to explode may 
fail a similar number of questions, despite one being in far worse shape.  The greater 
problem is that many issues cannot be captured with a binary yes-or-no question.  For 
example, a factory that does not have an explicit anti-union policy will not fail a freedom 
of association question even if workers believe they will be fired for attending union 
meetings.  In a case like this, a qualitative, subjective report that contains interviews 
would be far more enlightening than a checklist. 
Another weakness with the CAT is that a factory may improve on the CAT 
without actually improving working conditions.  For example, a factory may implement a 
written fire safety policy and form a fire safety committee, leading to improvements on 
the CAT; but these new policies may not lead to actual improvements in safety.  In such a 
case, the factory’s CAT would improve even though workers’ actual safety has not 
changed.  This weakness is especially salient for subjective problems like sexual 
harassment.  For example, a factory could institute an explicit anti-sexual harassment 
policy and hold a sexual harassment workshop, leading to improvements on the CAT.  
But these policies could have no effect on a culture of sexual intimidation of workers by 
managers.   In this case, the CAT would show improvement even when the conditions of 
women have not actually improved. 
 Monitoring by Better Work is also different from other inspections in a 
fundamental way.  Other inspectors, such as labor inspectors or buyers’ monitors, visit a 
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factory to uncover violations and threaten sanctions.  Better Work EAs, on the other 
hand, treat the initial evaluation as a “needs assessment” whereby the EAs and the factory 
work together to identify problem areas to be improved upon.   
To use an analogy: other inspectors are like the police, seeking to identify and 
punish criminals.  Better Work EAs, on the other hand, are like doctors trying to find and 
cure a disease.  This approach is one of Better Work’s strengths.  Over the last two 
decades, factory managers have become adept at hiding problems from monitors sent by 
international buyers.  Managers routinely keep two sets of books, they coach workers on 
what to say, and they make superficial changes to safety equipment when inspectors are 
around.  By promising to work with factories and not punish them, Better Work’s model 
theoretically leads to factory managers being more forthcoming about problems.   
Not all factory managers, however, immediately view EAs as partners coming to 
help them.  Frequently, managers are not even aware of the differences between Better 
Work and all the other monitors that come to their factory.  Officials at employers’ 
associations at the international and domestic levels reported that it can take several years 
for factory managers to begin understanding the Better Work model and appreciating that 
Better Work can help them if they are honest about problems.   
A further complication comes from the buyers.  Although buyers that participate 
in Better Work promise not to punish factories that are honest about problems and trying 
to improve, factories may not believe that buyers will give them time to improve and so 
will try to hide problems.  All of this leads to a delicate balancing act based on trust and 
reputation, both of which take a long time to build, can evaporate quickly, and are based 
as much on perception as on reality.   
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A case in Jordan in 2012 is illustrative of this balancing act. Better Work Jordan 
began operating in 2008 and spent over three years convincing factories in the country to 
begin participating in Better Work.  Then, in the beginning of 2012, an NGO released a 
report that a manager in a Jordanian factory had sexually assaulted dozens of women 
(Kernaghan 2012).   
How should Better Work respond when a report like this is published?  If Better 
Work does not respond right away, then it loses credibility in the eyes of buyers and labor 
rights advocates. But if Better Work suspends the presumption of innocence and 
immediately condemns the factory, then it will lose the trust of owners.  The program has 
no perfect response.  (This case is discussed in more detail in chapter 8; the main point 
here is that Better Work staff have a difficult time maintaining the faith of every 
stakeholder.) 
Another way Better Work ensures that factories will not be punished for 
violations is by keeping reports confidential from the government.  There are, however, 
rare exceptions to the confidentiality of factories, so-called “zero-tolerance” violations, 
which are extreme violations like child labor.  If an EA finds a zero-tolerance issue, then 
it will inform the government.  
 Another limitation of Better Work monitoring is that it is so labor intensive.  
According to an internal evaluation, EAs in several countries spend more time on 
monitoring than on advising and training activities.  Given that Better Work’s goal is to 
improve labor conditions, not simply document them, monitoring is a poor use of staff 
time.  In May of 2015, the program implemented some changes to its model to reduce the 




Advising is Better Work’s second Core Service and is also a mandatory activity for 
factories that participate in the program.  “Advising” is poorly named because it gives the 
impression that EAs are telling factories what to do.  The reality is that, during these 
activities, Better Work staff set up the conditions for factories to improve themselves. 
The main activity in advising is the formation of the awkwardly-named 
Performance Improvement Consultative Committees (PICCs).  These PICCs have equal 
representation from workers and managers; ideally, the worker representatives are 
directly-elected by other workers, although this is not implemented properly in all 
factories.  The manager representatives are chosen by management.  The PICCs’ mandate 
is to prioritize problems in the factory and develop solutions that are jointly-approved by 
workers and managers.   
During advising visits, Better Work EAs go to factories in order to supervise 
elections for workers’ representatives, to stimulate discussion between workers and 
managers, to present the results of the CAT, and to generally make the PICCs run 
smoothly.  The EAs are not supposed to actually run the meetings.  The goal is for the 
PICCs to eventually operate without any Better Work staff present.   
 All the stakeholders who were interviewed emphasized that PICCs are one of 
Better Work’s key innovations in improving workplace conditions.  Although they are 
simple from a technocratic perspective, PICCs can be profoundly transformative because 
there is often so little communication between workers and managers. Survey results 
have shown that managers often misunderstand what workers want (Domat 2013). 
Additionally, workers often have no formal way to communicate with managers and even 
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when compliant procedures are in place, they are not used.  Several stakeholders went so 
far as to say that many strikes could be prevented if workers could voice their concerns 
about relatively minor issues. 
 The PICCs create a channel for communication between workers and employers 
where none previously existed.  This makes it possible for managers to become aware of 
worker complaints early-on and take action to remedy or ameliorate the problem.  The 
PICCs also provide a way for workers to make suggestions on how a factory can improve 
both productivity and working conditions, which can lead to better policies.   
The most important, but hardest to measure, impact of the PICCs is their potential 
to change the culture and working environment of a factory.  When workers are treated as 
adults who are capable of meeting managers as equals, then the workplace becomes more 
enjoyable, workers are more loyal, and operations are generally smoother.  A direct 
relationship between the two has not been established, but most of the stakeholders who 
were interviewed believed that PICCs improve the workplace environment.   
One of the biggest obstacles to the PICCs are cultural barriers. One barrier is that 
managers often have a paternalistic view of their workers.  Hee Won Khym, a senior 
staffer at a prominent labor rights NGO, relayed a story in which one Korean factory 
owner had literally told her that his workers were like his children and he was like their 
father; he provided them with jobs and in turn they should be obedient to him.  A bi-
partite committee that gives workers equal voice with managers would challenge this 
man’s worldview.  Further, the workers may have an aversion to the PICC.  They may 
feel that they do not have a right to speak up, they may lack confidence, or they may fear 
punishment for standing out.  In countries with a history of authoritarianism and 
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paternalism, workers have been conditioned to accept poor conditions rather than 
advocate for change.  All of this is compounded by linguistic, racial, and caste 
differences between managers and workers.  In many Better Work countries, factory 
owners and managers are from Taiwan, Korea, or China.  The managers may not speak 
the local language, or only speak it poorly, and they may not understand the customs of 
their workers.   
 As a result of these obstacles, it can take years for a factory to have a proper PICC 
with worker elections, open and honest debate between PICC representatives, and 
implementation of the PICC’s decisions.  But once managers and workers begin trusting 
the PICC, then it can form the basis for continuous improvements far beyond what 
monitoring alone can achieve. 
 A final challenge to the PICCs is that they create tension with local labor unions.  
Strictly speaking, PICCs do not engage in the core mission of labor unions, i.e. 
organizing workers and negotiating collective agreements.  The line between PICCs and 
unions, however, can get blurry.  Factory owners sometimes refuse to meet with unions 
after forming a PICC in their factory, claiming that the PICC makes unions redundant.  
Also, PICCs cover some of the issues that labor unions have addressed, such as safety 
and compliance with labor law.  A final source of confusion comes from collective 
bargaining agreements. PICCs do not negotiate collective bargaining agreements, but 
they can be a forum for discussion if an agreement is not being implemented properly.  In 
this case, the PICC and the union overlap in function.  In most countries, Better Work 





The “Training” Core Service is relatively straightforward.  When factories begin 
participating in Better Work, they become eligible to receive specific trainings from EAs.  
These trainings are optional and factories must pay extra for them.  The trainings can be 
held at the factories, at Better Work’s headquarters, and more than one factory can 
receive training at a time. 
 The trainings on offer cover a wide spectrum.  Some trainings are relevant for 
everyone in the factory and cover working conditions, such as occupational health and 
safety, labor law, compensation issues, and how to run and use a PICC.  Other trainings 
are specific to jobs within a factory.  There is specific training for human resource 
personnel; the most popular training shows supervisors how to motivate workers without 
resorting to threats and shouting.  Some trainings are relevant for workers’ lives outside 
the factory and include maternal health, nutrition, and financial literacy.  Another 
category of trainings focus on interpersonal skills like communication, conflict 
resolution, and negotiation.  A final category of trainings focus on improving 
productivity. 
 There are two issues worth discussing with trainings.  First, they are expensive for 
Better Work.  Even though the factories must pay for them, the price of the trainings does 
not cover their full cost.  This leads to the strange situation wherein the governments of 
developed countries are subsiding the training of factory personnel in developing 
countries.  It is an open question if factories would be willing to pay the full cost of the 
trainings, but given the industry’s short horizon, it is possible that factory owners would 
not pay for trainings even if the benefits could be recovered in a year or two. 
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 The second issue with the trainings is the tension between labor rights and 
productivity.  For obvious reasons, the factory owners are more interested in paying for 
productivity training than for trainings that improve workplace compliance.  The ILO and 
donors, on the other hand, prefer to support trainings related to working conditions.   
2. Stakeholder Engagement 
After several years of operating, Better Work staff realized that the apparel industry could 
not be improved one factory at a time; the industry is simply too big and too dynamic. 
The hope of Better Work is that it can leverage its work within factories into sustainable, 
widespread policies that effect an entire country or even the entire industry.  To this end, 
Better Work programs have engaged in a variety of activities with stakeholders such as 
advocating changes to laws, working with social partners, facilitating communication 
between stakeholders, influencing the ILO and IFC, and providing support for academic 
research and other development projects. 
Advocating Changes to National Laws 
In many countries with Better Work programs, the laws have not kept pace with the 
changing needs of an industrializing economy.  At times, Better Work country offices 
have successfully advocated for legal reforms.  In no case, however, did Better Work 
unilaterally push for changes in the law.  The pressure for reform always came from one 
of the three domestic social partners (governments, union, and employers); Better Work’s 
role was to provide support for the reform.   
 The clear examples of Better Work influencing labor laws come from Vietnam 
and Jordan.  Vietnam’s national union, the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor 
(VGCL), was looking for a model to improve industrial relations within large businesses.  
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The VGCL studied Better Work’s PICCs and was impressed by the model, especially the 
direct elections of workers.  When the Vietnamese legislature began drafting an updated 
Labor Code, the VGCL advocated for the inclusion of a law that would require all large 
businesses to have a committee modeled on the PICCs.  Although not all groups in 
Vietnam were supportive, the VGCL could point to years of research by Better Work 
showing that the PICCs improved working conditions.  Ultimately, the new Labor Law 
included a provision that all large business had to have bi-partite committees with direct 
workers elections, an interesting law for a communist, authoritarian country (Better Work 
Case Study 2013a). 
 In early 2012 in Jordan, the government, employers, and unions began discussing 
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would cover the entire industry.  Better 
Work Jordan began promoting the idea, training union and migrant worker association 
leaders, and bringing in ILO experts to provide advice.  After a series of negotiations, a 
CBA was signed by all parties that affected all 55,000 workers in Jordan’s garment 
industry.  The CBA covered issues such as wages, safety, legal recognition of unions, and 
working hours.  The CBA was especially important because it provided equal treatment 
for migrant workers, who make up the majority of the country’s garment sector workers 
and were provided few rights under the previous law (Better Work Case Study 2013b). 
 There are several other examples of Better Work influencing laws.  In Cambodia, 
BFC organized a meeting of social partners that successfully advocated for a law that 
banned exports from Cambodian prisons.  In Indonesia, Better Work was part of a larger 
effort to advocate for a recentralization of the labor ministry; this is important because a 
decentralization of the ministry after the Asian Financial Crisis had led to local labor 
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inspectors being captured by elites.  And in Haiti and Lesotho, Better Work has been 
formally contributing to labor and safety law revisions, although these efforts have not 
led to changes yet. 
 The upshot of all these efforts is that Better Work cannot change a country’s 
labors laws on its own.  But in cases where there is a negotiation occurring between 
different actors within a country, Better Work’s support for a particular position can tip 
the balance. 
Working with the Government 
Better Work always works closely with a country’s government.  This is common 
practice for an IO, but is unusual for a compliance program in apparel.  The labor 
ministry is usually the closest partner, although ministries of trade and commerce are also 
often involved.  Better Work’s activities with the labor ministry tend to fall into two 
categories: capacity building and partnerships.  Capacity building activities cover a broad 
spectrum: helping the labor inspectors design an assessment tool; training inspectors in 
techniques for conducting inspections; and teaching government officials domestic and 
international law.  In a few countries with low capacity, Better Work programs have also 
given input on how the labor ministry can reform its structure.  In Haiti, for example, 
Better Work staff have been central to an ILO program to essentially build a labor 
inspectorate from the ground up. 
 In countries where the labor ministry is better staffed and has more resources, 
Better Work and the ministry work more as partners in promoting joint priorities.  Better 
Work and the labor ministry often co-host information sessions and trainings for 
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employers, they may work jointly with unions, or the central ministry may cooperate with 
Better Work to train staff at the local level.   
An interesting example of this cooperation comes from Indonesia.  In 2014, the 
Indonesian government passed a law that required factories to appoint an employee who 
was responsible for ensuring that the factory complied with labor laws.  Indonesia’s labor 
ministry subsequently requested that Better Work train and provide certification for these 
employees.  Better Work in Indonesia has also played an important role in forcing 
factories to comply with national laws regarding wage negotiations.  In cases where 
factories have gotten illegal “permission” from provincial authorities to violate national 
law, Better Work has been the agent enforcing national labor law and requiring factories 
to negotiate properly with workers (Amengual and Chirot 2015). 
Other Social Partners 
Better Work programs make an attempt to work with unions because it was clear from 
BFC’s early years that a strong labor movement is crucial to good working conditions.  
There is, however, a great deal of variation between countries.  Some countries, such as 
Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Jordan, have a fairly centralized, organized labor movement.  
But other countries, notably Cambodia and Indonesia, have fractured labor movements 
with a lot of internal competition.  This variation means that Better Work’s activities with 
unions cannot be generalized across countries; however, every Better Work program does 
try to coordinate with unions as much as possible. 
 Better Work’s activities with employers’ association are straightforward.  
Employers’ associations give Better Work feedback on how factories perceive the 
program; Better Work will use the associations to disseminate information to factories 
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within the country; and Better Work can help employers communicate with the 
government, unions, and buyers.  
Channel for Communication  
Better Work plays a role as a channel for communication in two ways. First, between 
different domestic stakeholders and, second, between domestic and international 
stakeholders.  Although it is often difficult to connect this activity with a clear outcome, 
numerous people emphasized the value of Better Work facilitating communication.  
 In many developing countries, the three social partners often do not communicate 
very effectively among themselves.  In a context like this, Better Work can facilitate 
communication through its annual meeting with stakeholders and through periodic 
meetings and discussions.  For example, in an interview at the employers’ association in 
Vietnam, I was told that Better Work helps factory owners communicate their concerns to 
the government.  While it may seem odd that employers in Vietnam need an international 
organization to help them communicate with their own government, the Vietnamese 
government does not have a history and culture of discussion with the public. 
 Better Work also connects the domestic social partners with international actors.  
International buyers, for example, are often interested in meeting with government 
officials or unions leaders, but they do not know how to go about contacting these 
groups.  In this case, Better Work can help connect both actors.  Better Work also 
connects domestic actors with donor governments and other departments in the ILO and 
IFC.  For example, an ILO program to improve the capacity of Haiti’s labor inspectorate 
relied heavily on Better Work staff for local knowledge because the ILO department in 
charge of the program did not have enough expertise on Haiti.  In another example, when 
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the IFC wanted to launch a program to finance trade for Vietnamese factories, it used 
Better Work to promote the program among factory owners. 
Influencing the ILO and IFC 
Better Work staff want their research to have an influence on the ILO and IFC.  In 
practice, this means trying to persuade the ILO that the power of private sector can be 
harnessed in the service of improved labor rights while convincing the IFC that unions 
and labor rights are not detrimental to economic development and job creation. 
 Within the ILO, Better Work has had an effect on the institution’s ideology 
simply by being so successful.  In Better Work’s early years, many people within the ILO 
were skeptical about partnering with the private sector.  But by late 2014, the program 
had a positive reputation among ILO staff in Geneva and it generated a lot of interest.  In 
an institution that often fails to achieve results on the ground, Better Work was one of the 
few programs that could point to a concrete impact for its efforts.   
 Within the IFC, Better Work’s research made a significant contribution to the 
2013 Jobs Study that has set the institution’s current agenda.  A section on “Quality of 
Jobs” relies heavily on Better Work research and academic articles based on Better Work 
(IFC 2013 130-139); the section concludes that good quality jobs are good for businesses, 
good for development, and good for social cohesion.   
The extent to which this lesson has penetrated the IFC’s culture is hard to 
determine, but the IFC and World Bank are going through a period of intellectual soul-
searching.  The 2014 World Development Report discusses the human mind and has a 
chapter on the how the mental models of development experts cloud their judgment 
(World Bank 2014 180-191).  The report argues that development experts should base 
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their decisions on evidence, not models learned in graduate school.  If this is taken to 
heart by World Bank staff, it presents an opportunity for Better Work, with all its 
research, to have a strong influence within the institution.  
Academic Research  
One of Better Work’s main missions is to support academic research on its operations 
and on the apparel industry is general.  This mission has a dual purpose.  It provides 
Better Work’s stakeholders and donors with independent assessments of the program; it 
also creates a channel for Better Work to share its lessons with the world.  Further, 
because academics are independent, their research has more credibility in the public’s eye 
than reports by Better Work staff. 
 The largest research project supported by Better Work is a multi-year, multi-
country survey of workers and managers organized by a team of academics and based at 
Tufts University.  This project has conducted computer surveys of thousands of factory 
employees in five countries.  The compiled dataset is one of the largest datasets in the 
world containing microdata on workers’ lives; it also contains a lot of information about 
factory operations.  The data is available for use by any interested researcher and has 
formed the basis for numerous papers, most of which are summarized in chapter 8. 
 Better Work has supported several other research projects.  One survey 
specifically looked at the difference between workers’ and managers’ attitudes towards 
the workplace (Pike and Godfrey 2012). Another project, yet to be published looked at 
the effect of PICCs on the prevalence of strikes and labor unrest in Vietnam.  A third 
study found that Better Work increased the likelihood of factories properly negotiating 
wage contracts in Indonesia (Amengual and Chirot 2015).   
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Platform for Development Activities 
Better Work country programs often support development activities by donors, 
international organizations, and multinational buyers.  Since Better Work already has 
close connections with stakeholders in a country, and also has access to thousands of 
workers, an organization wishing to implement a program can achieve far more working 
through Better Work than it can setting up a program alone. 
 Programs by donors include the US Department of Labor funding a program in 
Vietnam to build the capacity of trade unions.  The Canadian government funded a 
project in 2012 to improve Haiti’s labor inspectorate; in 2014, the Canadian government 
began supporting a project to improve the capacity of all three social partners in Vietnam. 
 Better Work has supported the ILO’s Labor and Administration (LAB/ADMIN) 
office in implementing two large programs to build the capacity of the labor inspectorates 
in Haiti and Vietnam.  In these countries, Better Work has used its connections with the 
inspectorates to smooth the operations of LAB/ADMIN.  Better Work programs in 
Nicaragua and Jordan have also organized periodic workshops by ILO experts for labor 
inspectors.  With respect to the IFC, Better Work has helped support the IFC’s desire to 
work more closely with buyers and producers in the apparel industry. 
 Multinationals have also partnered with Better Work to implement corporate-
social responsibility programs.  The Levi Strauss Foundation, a non-profit supported by 
the apparel company, has funded several development activities through Better Work.  
The Disney Corporation also made a large donation to Better Work to cover the cost of a 
specific training course, titled “Supervisory Skills,” for factories in Better Work, 
regardless of whether or not these factories supply Disney.   American Eagle, another 
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company, funded HERproject in Cambodia; this is a program that educates women about 
nutrition, hygiene, and maternal health. 
Influencing Buyers  
A final activity is trying to influence international buyers.  Better Work organizes 
frequent Buyers’ Forums at the global, regional, and national level.  The forums are a 
chance for buyers to meet with each other, with Better Work, and with domestic 
stakeholders to discuss the most salient issues in labor rights.  Better Work uses these 
forums to highlight specific issues and attempt to raise the floor on behavior by buyers.   
The clearest example of Better Work’s organizing buyers was in Cambodia in 
2014 after numerous union members had been killed or arrested during political protests.  
As the crisis unfolded, BFC helped coordinate a letter from 25 multinational buyers 
demanding due process for people who had been arrested and a good faith resolution to 
the labor disputes.  The letter indicated that these buyers had already begun reducing their 
orders from Cambodia and threatened to pull even more orders if the violence and human 
rights abuses continued.  The letter included large buyers like Wal-Mart, PVH, and H&M 
and reportedly influenced the government to resolve the dispute. 
 The Buyer Partnerships are the central way that Better Work tries to influence 
buyers.  When buyers become “partners,” they sign a legal agreement with the ILO and 
IFC that entails certain commitments.  These include not duplicating audits in factories 
that participate in Better Work, not pulling orders from factories that are transparent 
about their problems, encouraging all the factories in their supply chain to participate in 
Better Work, and supporting Better Work’s factory-specific plans to remediate problems.  
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The agreement also contains a provision that buyers should identify and address their 
own business practices that contribute to non-compliance from their suppliers.   
This last commitment deserves some extra discussion.  Everyone interviewed 
highlighted the fact that buyers’ business practices are one of the main drivers of poor 
working conditions in the industry. Buyers consistently want better quality, cheaper 
prices, and faster turnaround, all of which puts a lot of pressure on factory owners and 
workers. Many people reported that one of Better Work’s weaknesses is that buyers are 
not required to alter their behavior in any way.  The Partnership Agreement attempts to 
compensate for this weakness by having buyers commit to addressing business practices, 
but the simple truth is that Better Work has no levers for getting buyers to change their 
behavior.  As such, Better Work has to rely on persuasion, public opinion, and the 
changing culture of the apparel industry to effect change. 
Conclusion 
Better Work’s operations can be divided into two broad categories: its “core services” 
that improve labor standards within factories and “stakeholder engagement,” processes 
through which the program partners with other actors to improve conditions beyond 
individual factories.  This chapter has discussed these operations in detail. 
 The next chapter looks at Better Work’s governance and stakeholders.  It provides 
the political context for the program’s operations, showing how the interests and power 






Chapter Five: Perspectives from Different Stakeholders 
Better Work’s most fascinating aspect is the diversity of its stakeholders.  The program 
receives input from governments in developed and developing countries, multinational 
corporations, national employers’ associations, the global trade union movement, and two 
international organizations.  Each one of these stakeholders has a powerful voice and has 
the ability to disrupt or even stop Better Work altogether.  Wealthy governments could 
withhold funds, governments in developing countries could refuse to allow the program 
to continue, multinationals could stop subscribing to reports, trade unions could destroy 
Better Work’s legitimacy by pulling support, and employers’ associations could urge 
their members not to participate. 
 Given this diverse set of interests, it is impressive that Better Work manages to 
satisfy all these constituencies.  If we understand Better Work not as a technical response 
to a problem but rather as a site of contestation between actors with conflicting interests, 
then the questions arises: why do all these actors participate in Better Work rather than 
pushing their own initiatives or simply doing nothing?  Or to take Albert Hirschman’s 
famous phrasing: why do these stakeholders choose “voice” and “loyalty” over “exit” 
(Hirschman 1970)?  This chapter discusses each of Better Work’s major stakeholders and 
explains why they support, or at least do not resist, the program.   
1. The Management Group, the ILO, and the IFC 
The highest source of authority for Better Work is the Management Group (MG).  The 
MG is always composed of two senior officials from the ILO and two from the IFC.  The 
MG sets the long-term direction of the program, deciding on which countries to enter, 
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whether or not to expand to new industries, and to incorporate new types of assessments 
(e.g. environmental assessments). 
 In interviews, everyone stressed that the MG operates by consensus and there is 
very little friction between the ILO and IFC representatives.  Although each organization 
is interested in Better Work for different reasons, their goals are not mutually exclusive 
and often overlap.  One interviewee pointed out that the MG’s structure does not lead to 
conflict for two reasons.  First, the ILO and IFC staff appointed to the MG are senior 
enough that they can make decisions independently of their own bureaucracies.  If the 
staff on the MG needed approval from multiple individuals within their own 
organizations, then agreement would probably be far more difficult.   
The second reason for a lack of conflict between the ILO and IFC is their 
different competencies.  The ILO is obviously the expert on labor rights and has a lot of 
credibility in the eyes of unions and labor rights NGOs.  The IFC, on the other hand, has 
expertise in productivity and efficiency, trade promotion, and financial sustainability.  
This division of competencies has fostered collaboration and sidestepped the turf wars 
that often accompany partnerships between organizations. 
At first glance, it would seem to be a problem that Better Work is positioned 
between two international organizations that are known for having stifling bureaucracy.  
In several interviews, however, senior staff stressed that Better Work’s position between 
two organizations has actually been beneficial.  Instead of being swamped by two 
bureaucracies, it has remained somewhat independent of both, allowing the Management 
Group and the directors to make decisions quickly and without excessive reporting and 




The ILO and IFC are each interested in Better Work for different reasons.  The ILO’s 
position on Better Work and has gone from skeptical in 1999 to an optimistic embrace 
today.  This change is partly a response to the ILO’s perpetual crisis of legitimacy.  Since 
its founding in 1919, the organization has always had to argue that its work is relevant to 
the changing world economy (Maupain 2013).  Today, the ILO claims relevancy on two 
grounds: it hosts international labor rights forums and it conducts technical capacity 
building programs.  On the first count, the ILO is clearly relevant: no other international 
organization is devoted to labor rights (although it relies on countries to self-report and 
lacks enforcement).   
On the second count, technical capacity, the ILO is less relevant.  The ILO’s work 
on addressing child labor has met with some success, but its effect is miniscule compared 
to the scale of the problem (Elliott and Freeman 2003, 101).  Its other capacity building 
programs have had less measurable results.  In 2012, the United Kingdom’s development 
agency, Department for International Development (DFID) released an audit of 
international organizations in which the ILO received one of the lowest scores (DFID 
2012).  DFID’s low confidence in the ILO is mirrored by the FUNDS project’s survey of 
several thousand UN experts.  The survey found that 51 percent of respondents consider 
the ILO to be “highly relevant,” but only 16 percent consider it “highly effective” 
(Browne and Weiss 2014). 
On top of its weak reputation for capacity building, the ILO is adapting poorly to 
globalization (Maupain 2013). The ILO’s tripartite model assumes strong states and 
corporatist unions and employers; it is not well suited to the contemporary economy in 
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which multinational corporations drive production in countries with weak states and 
nascent labor movements.   
 In this context of crisis, ILO personnel perceive Better Work as a solution to the 
organization’s shortcomings.  Better Work has improved labor rights in a highly 
globalized industry, it involves multinationals more directly than any other ILO initiative, 
it provides some support for the idea that responsible labor practices are good for 
business, and it provides a platform for other ILO departments to work in countries.  
Other ILO departments are eager to partner with Better Work because the program had 
local knowledge, staff on the ground, and connections with key domestic stakeholders.  
 There is, however, resistance to Better Work from two sources in the ILO.  The 
first source is unions, which are generally suspicious of public-private partnerships.  The 
unions accept Better Work because they are given a voice on the Advisory Group, but 
union representatives fear that programs like Better Work will dull the voice for stronger 
unions within developing countries.  The second group of skeptics are the governments 
and employers in developing countries.  They see, correctly, that Better Work is driven 
by western governments and corporations, so they instinctively fear a loss of control and 
sovereignty.  They also worry that international labor standards could support 
protectionism in western countries.   
The IFC 
From the IFC’s perspective, Better Work is an answer to both external and internal 
pressures.  The first source of external pressure is image.  The IFC (and the World Bank 
more broadly) are often perceived as being so focused on macro-economic indicators that 
they ignore the human element of economic development (whether or not this is 
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warranted is a whole other dissertation).  Through its involvement in a labor rights 
program like Better Work, the IFC is able to show its critics that it too cares about 
people. 
 The second source of external pressure on the IFC is its declining relevance.   The 
IFC used to be the dominant source of financing for the private sector in developing 
countries.  In recent years, however, private banks, sovereign wealth funds, and other 
development banks have been increasingly willing to invest in developing countries.  
Today, the IFC is a relatively small player in many developing countries, leading some to 
question what purpose it serves. 
 Nigel Twose, a Director at the IFC, argued in an interview that the IFC remains 
relevant in two ways.  First, it makes loans in countries and industries that private finance 
will not risk entering.  Second, the IFC’s loans are more socially beneficial than private 
sector loans.  Key to this has been the IFC’s “Performance Standards,” a set of eight 
standards that cover the environment, labor rights, and social justice issues.  All firms 
that borrow from the IFC must comply with these eight standards, which allegedly 
ensures that the IFC’s loans will be socially beneficial (IFC 2012).  Better Work, and 
programs like it, clearly fit into the IFC’s agenda of promoting standards in order to 
support socially-beneficial lending. 
 The IFC’s interest in Better Work is also a response to internal pressures.  The 
new World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, has redirected the World Bank away from a 
focus on overall economic growth towards focusing on the poorest 40 percent of the 
population in each country (Kim 2014).  Moreover, recent World Development Reports 
focusing on women in 2012 and jobs in 2013, have altered the organization’s focus.  
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Many IFC staff specifically brought up the importance of the 2013 World Development 
Report on Jobs (World Bank 2013) and the IFC Jobs Study (IFC 2013).  According to 
them, after this report was published, IFC staff began focusing intensely on job creation 
as the measure of a project’s success. 
 These internal pressures (focusing on the poorest 40 percent, women, and job 
creation) have led the IFC to renew its interest in the apparel industry.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, the apparel industry mainly attracts women from rural areas at the bottom of 
the income distribution; it is also a labor intensive industry that creates a lot of jobs.  
Several people I spoke with reported that Better Work is one of the IFC’s entry points 
into the apparel industry.   
 A final way that the IFC benefits from Better Work is through the program’s 
connections with multinationals.  The IFC has a long history of working with the private 
sector in developing countries, but it has not built strong relationships with western 
multinationals.  IFC staff reported that the organization would like to work more closely 
with international corporations and Better Work is one avenue to do this.  
 Outside of the MG, other departments in the IFC and ILO have one lever of 
control over Better Work.  International buyers have been encouraged by Better Work to 
sign a Partnership Agreement.  This gives the buyers special privileges within Better 
Work but also commits the buyers to specific activities.  These Partnership Agreements 
are legal documents and, because Better Work does not have legal personality, it is the 
legal departments at the ILO and IFC that sign the agreements.  Therefore, other 




2. The Global Advisory Committee 
Better Work’s Global Advisory Committee is the second body that provides oversight for 
Better Work.  Its members include donors, multinational buyers, international trade 
unions, international employers’ associations, academics and NGOs.  The Global 
Advisory Committee does not have any formal authority; it does not vote on policies, nor 
can it veto any policies.  Its voice, however, is given a lot of weight by Better Work’s 
director and the Management Group.   
The director of Better Work, Dan Rees, reported that he would probably not 
implement a policy if a member of the Advisory Committee were dead-set against it, but 
he does not require strong support from every member on every decision.  Given that the 
members of the Advisory Committee have different and occasionally-conflicting 
interests, policies with strong support from one constituent may raise resistance in 
another.  That said, the goal of the Advisory Committee to reach consensus among the 
different stakeholders. 
Donors have a strong voice, since they ultimately control the purse strings.  
International unions and employers’ associations have a strong influence through the 
ILO’s tripartite model.  Multinationals are important because they drive factories into the 
program and their subscription fees are a source of revenue.  The academics and NGO 
representatives probably have the least powerful voice, although their expertise is valued 





Interviews were conducted for this dissertation from all the representatives from 
governments, employers, and unions; multinational were the only powerful stakeholders 
who did not respond to several requests for interviews.  The section below that discusses 
the position of multinationals is based on interviews with individuals from the private 
sector and from the Better Work staff members who liaise directly with buyers. 
Donors 
The donors have the strongest voice on the Global Advisory Committee because 
Better Work remains dependent on donor funding.  As of January 2015, the major donors 
to Better Work are the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark; 
Australia had been a major donor until a conservative government was elected in 2013 
that cut off all funding to the ILO. 
Interviews with government officials from each country uncovered a lot of 
similarities in their interests.  All the countries supported Better Work because they 
believe that the program is very effective at improving labor conditions; they all like that 
Name Title Affiliation
Mark Mittelhauser Associate Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs U.S. Department of Labor
Valerie Berset Bircher Deputy Head International Labour Affairs Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Jos Huber Senior Policy Advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands
Christian Bundegaard Attache Permanent Mission of Denmark to Geneva
Roberto Suárez Santos Deputy Secretary General International Organisation of Employers
Ariel Meyerstein Vice President of Labor and Corporate Responsibility US Council for International Business
Sharan Burrow General Secretary International Trade Union Confederation
Monika Kemperle Assistant General Secretary IndustriALL
Kindley Walsh-Lawlor Vice PresidentSocial & Environmental Responsibility Gap Inc.
Tobias Fischer Development Sustainability Manager H&M
Stephanie Barrientos Senior Lecturer University of Manchester
Naila Kabeer Professorial Fellow Institute of Development Studies, Brighton
Richard M. Locke Professor of Political Science Brown University
Aron Cramer President and CEO Business for Social Responsibility
Academics and NGOs







Better Work involves many stakeholders, especially multinationals; they like the detailed 
research and reporting that Better Work provides; and they like that Better Work is 
aiming for financial sustainability.   
Further, all donors had similar critiques: they would like Better Work to expand 
faster into new countries and new industries;, they want Better Work programs to achieve 
financial sustainability, and they believe that Better Work is still rather expensive (it is 
worth noting that these criticisms work at cross-purposes; donors want the program to 
take on more responsibility but also reduce costs).  There were, of course, differences 
between the donors that are discussed below. 
     The United States has been the sole donor for Cambodia since 2000 and became a 
donor to Better Work at the program’s inception.  The US government funds Better Work 
programs in Bangladesh, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, and Nicaragua; it also funds a 
special union building program in Vietnam.  It has pledged over $20 million between 
2009 and 2016; $9 million have been directed towards the program in Haiti; $4.5 for 
Nicaragua and Lesotho; over $2 million for Cambodia, and less than a $1 million for 
other countries.  The US does not fund the Global program because Congress mandates 
that all funding must be directly tied to development results.  This does not seem to 
weaken the US’s voice within Better Work, but it is ironic that the program’s oldest 
donor cannot support the part of the program that sets long-term policies. 
     Funding from the US government comes from the Department of Labor’s 
International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB).  The United States is unique among Better 
Work’s donor in explicitly tying its aid to trade agreements.  In fact, ILAB is expressly 
tasked by Congress to undertake programs in countries with which the United States has 
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a trade agreement.  This explains why the US government supports Better Work 
programs in Haiti, Jordan, Lesotho, and Nicaragua, countries with marginal importance 
to the apparel industry. 
    ILAB’s support for Better Work was not automatic in 2007; it could have fulfilled 
its Congressional mandate through programs other than Better Work.  Its deep 
commitment to Better Work partly stems from its involvement in BFC, but is also largely 
the result of one woman, Sandra Polaski.  She was director of ILAB in 2009 and pushed 
ILAB to support Better Work.  ILAB staff told me that this support met with some 
resistance because the bureau had historically worked almost exclusively with labor 
ministries, not unions or the private sector, so Better Work challenged its culture.  Today, 
however, Better Work is one of ILAB’s premier programs and has strong support within 
the bureau.  Further, Sandra Polaski is now Deputy Director for General Policy at the 
ILO and a member of Better Work’s Management Group. 
     The staff at ILAB were very positive about Better Work; their main criticism was 
that the program did not spend enough resources on capacity building of labor ministries 
(this is understandable, given ILAB’s long history of working with labor 
ministries).  They pointed out that Better Work does not have a clear plan on how to work 
with labor ministries and transfer skills and knowledge.  They also reported that Better 
Work is less effective on freedom of association than on other issues because the problem 
is so challenging (this is discussed in more detail in chapter 8). 
     The Dutch government began funding Better Work in 2010 and currently funds 
the Global program and programs in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam.  Funding 
comes from the Department of Foreign Affairs and is motivated by traditional aid 
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considerations.  Jos Huber, the Dutch officer responsible for Better Work, emphasized 
that her government likes two aspects of the program.  First, Better Work’s use of a 
“social democratic” model (i.e. the state mediates negotiations between unions and 
employers).  This is the Dutch model of domestic political economy and they believe that 
it can work in other contexts.  Second, Ms. Huber likes that Better Work explicitly 
includes union capacity building in its mission; strong unions are an integral piece of 
social democracy that is missing in most developing countries.  She pointed out that BFC 
had lacked this component and so Cambodia never developed a strong, centralized labor 
movement. 
     The Swiss government funds the Global program and programs in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam.  The funds come from the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO), a ministry that blends domestic economic policy, international trade and 
commerce, and labor policy.  Their involvement in Better Work is part of a larger vision 
to have programs running in the entire clothing supply chain, from raw materials to 
textiles to apparel.  In this vision, Better Work would improve apparel production while 
other programs would operate farther downstream.  Compared to the other donors, the 
Swiss really emphasize the business productivity aspect of Better Work.  They would like 
to see Better Work focus more on productivity training and proving the business case for 
compliance. The Swiss also like the multi-stakeholder aspect of Better Work because 
social dialogue is so central to Swiss culture. 
     The Danish are the most recent major donor, joining Better Work in 2014.  Their 
funding goes to the Global program and is to be used for the Bangladesh program and to 
pilot an environmental assessment program.  Funding comes from the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs’s Department for Green Growth, not the ministry of aid nor the Danish 
government’s usual partner to the ILO, the Ministry of Labor.  This is significant because 
the Danish government’s support for Better Work is motivated in large part by its Green 
Growth initiative, a strategy to promote environmentally friendly economic 
development.  As such, some of the Danish government’s funds will be used to support a 
pilot program in Vietnam for Better Work to begin monitoring and improving 
environmental standards in factories.  The Danish government also stressed the important 
of Better Work’s newly opened office in Bangladesh.  Several Danish apparel companies 
source from Bangladesh and the Danish would like to protect their reputation by ensuring 
decent labor conditions in the country.  
     The final donor worth discussing is the Australian government.  They were one of 
the original donors to Better Work in 2010 and supported programs in Cambodia, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia.  The 2010 Partnership Agreement between the ILO and the 
Australian government indicated that fully half of Australia’s AUD$15 million 
extrabudgetary commitment to the ILO should go to Better Work (DFAT 2010).  In 2013, 
I had an email exchange with a staffer in the Department of Education, Employment, and 
Workplace Relations (the department has subsequently been split into two departments, 
one for education and one for employment).  She wrote that Australia supported Better 
Work because Southeast Asia was priority region, it led to improvements in the 
Millennium Development Goals, and it supported the ILO’s Decent Work agenda.  She 
wrote that they were very satisfied with the program’s performance.  In late 2013, 
however, a conservative party government entered power in Australia and promptly cut 
all funding to the ILO, including money pledged to Better Work. Everyone interviewed 
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believed that the cutting of funding was ideological and not a result of problems with the 
program. 
     In these interviews, every country supported Better Work for the same reasons: its 
effectiveness, its access to stakeholders, and its clear reporting.  But each country also 
emphasized different aspects.  The United States wanted a program to accompany its free 
trade agreements; the Dutch wanted to promote social democracy; the Swiss believed in 
private sector development as the key to growth; the Danish wanted to improve the 
environmental impact of the apparel industry; and Australia placed a priority on 
Southeast Asia. 
 All the donors also believed that Better Work is the most successful program 
anywhere with respect to improving labor rights.  They had criticisms, certainly, but they 
all stressed that Better Work is effective in an area that traditional aid programs have 
almost always failed.  This universal support is a strong piece of evidence in support of 
Better Work’s success.  
Multinational Corporations 
Multinationals have always been included on Better Work’s Advisory Council because 
they were so instrumental in ensuring the success of Better Factories Cambodia after the 
end of the MFA.  There are always two representatives from multinationals; one from 
Europe and one from the United States.   
 Better Work distinguishes multinational buyers into two categories: participants 
and partners.  Participants are companies that subscribe to Better Work reports to either 
supplement or substitute for their own internal audits.  Participants are mainly interested 
in Better Work’s assessment activities as a means of protecting their brands and are not 
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that engaged with the advising and training aspects of the program.  Some Better Work 
staff noted that these buyers are frustrated when advising activities do not immediately 
lead to improvements on the CAT. 
Partners have a more formal relationship with Better Work.  Partners not only 
subscribe to reports, they also sign a Partnership Agreement with the ILO and IFC to 
cooperate with Better Work in various ways.  These include encouraging their supply 
chains to participate in Better Work, to stop duplicating audits, and to not punish factories 
that are honest about their problems.  As of late 2015, there were 30 partners. 
Multinationals usually become partners because they have tried programs that rely 
exclusively on monitoring and found that these programs had little effect.  Partners come 
to Better Work because the program offers advising, training, cooperation with domestic 
governments and unions, and a long-term commitment to a country.   
No one could pinpoint exactly why a buyer becomes more sincere about labor 
rights and moves from a participant to a partner.  Some interviewees put the emphasis on 
the buyer’s CEO and senior executives; others believe that there is a broader cultural shift 
in the apparel industry towards improving labor rights.  Also, no one is clear on how 
willing buyers are to enforce labor conditions, especially when doing so interferes with 
cost. But regardless of the lack of precision, the number of partners in Better Work is 
increasing and their commitment to labor rights appears to be getting more serious. 
International Unions 
In keeping with the ILO’s tripartite model, the Global Advisory Committee has two 
representatives from the international trade union movement.  One representative comes 
from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), which is an association for 
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domestic trade unions.  It has 328 members representing 162 countries (ITUC 2014).  
The ITUC’s members should be the peak union association in each country (for example, 
the AFL-CIO in the United States), but since many countries do not have a peak 
association, there are multiple members from many countries.  The ITUC is not open to 
government-controlled unions, so Vietnam’s trade union is not a member. 
 The ITUC’s primary function is advocating for labor rights in international 
arenas.  It is the main voice for unions at the ILO, other UN agencies, and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  It also conducts 
research on labor rights and has various campaigns focused on labor rights abuses, such 
as a campaign focusing on Qatar’s mistreatment of migrant workers in preparations for 
the World Cup. 
The other union representative on the Global Advisory Committee comes from 
IndustriALL.  Founded in 2012, IndustriALL combines three so-called “global union 
federations” (GUF).  GUFs are international associations of unions that are organized by 
industry (rather than by country, as in the ITUC).  One of IndustriALL’s founding 
members was the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers’ Federation, 
which was represented on Better Work’ Advisory Committee until 2012.  The goal of 
IndustriALL and other GUFs is to negotiate international labor agreements that apply to 
workers across an entire industry, regardless of their country.  GUFs also target 
multinational corporations rather than governments.  An example of this is an agreement 
between IndustriALL and Total, the French mining company, which covers all of Total’s 
100,000 workers spread across 130 countries (IndustriALL 2015). 
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 GUFs are a novel solution by the trade union movement to globalization and 
multinational production, but their success remains an open question.  One team of 
scholars concluded that GUFs had been very successful since the 1990s in increasing 
their membership, but far less successful in achieving concrete results (Müller et al 
2010).  To the best of my knowledge, IndustriALL has not concluded a global agreement 
with any multinationals in the textile industry.  And even if an agreement was concluded, 
it is not clear how enforceable it would be.  For example, IndustriALL’s agreement with 
Total has no provisions related to monitoring or enforcement. 
 IndustriALL’s greatest success in apparel has probably been negotiating the 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, one of the responses to the Rana 
Plaza building collapse that killed over 1,100 workers.  The Accord has been signed on to 
by many European apparel companies and several American ones; it requires apparel 
companies to support their Bangladeshi suppliers in achieving fire and building safety.  
The Accord, however, has weaknesses.  Most American apparel companies chose to join 
a different agreement; the Accord only focuses on safety, not wages, freedom of 
association, discrimination, or a host of other important labor issues; lastly, the Accord 
only applies in Bangladesh, falling far short of a global agreement. 
 Representatives from the ITUC and IndustriALL had similar praise and criticism 
for Better Work.  They both like that Better Work gives unions a seat at the table, unlike 
virtually all other programs that monitor apparel.  Both like that Better Work has a wide 
scope.  It does not focus just on safety or child labor, it also includes broad political 
issues such as industrial relations, freedom of association, and the capacity of 
governments and unions.  
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 That said, both critiqued Better Work for not effectively confronting employers 
on issues like wages and freedom of association.  They concede that Better Work staff 
have pushed a lot on these issues, but that Better Work has spent far more energy on 
surface-level issues that employers are happy to talk about: fire safety, the health of 
workers, and child labor are examples of these surface issues.  The interviewees 
emphasized that strong unions and a productive climate for negotiations are the 
foundation for good working conditions and they would like to see Better Work put these 
issues front and center.   
Employers’ Associations 
The Global Advisory Committee has two representatives for employers.  One is from the 
United States Council for International Business (USCIB), which advocates for US 
businesses in international forums like the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
OECD, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.   Their mission statement 
proclaims that the USCIB:  “promotes open markets, competitiveness and innovation, 
sustainable development and corporate responsibility, supported by international 
engagement and regulatory coherence.”  After interviewing staff there and looking at 
some of their documents, one gets the sense that their primary job is to prevent 
international regulations that may be harmful to US multinationals while promoting free 
trade and low taxes.  Within the context of Better Work, the USCIB represents US 
multinational apparel companies. 
 Adam Greene, the former Vice President for Labor Affairs and Corporate 
Responsibility (he now works at the ILO in Geneva in the office that represents 
employers), reported that Better Work does a good job at improving labor conditions, but 
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he was clear to emphasize two points.  First, he believes that multinational brands cannot 
improve working conditions in factories because very few factories work exclusively 
with one brand.  Most factories work with lots of brands at once, and so the pressure that 
an individual brand can exert at any one time is weak.  He believes that in the few cases 
where brands have really pushed factories, the factories have just hidden the problem or 
ignored the brand outright.  His second major point is that the responsibility for good 
working conditions lies with governments, not brands.  He argued that only governments 
have the legitimacy and the capacity to force factories to obey working conditions (he 
was quick to dismiss unions as corrupt). 
 The central role of governments ties into his major critique of Better Work: that 
the program does not do enough to strengthen government capacity in the countries 
where it operates.  In this sense, his critique echoes the critique of the unions, i.e. that 
Better Work should focus less on short-term improvements and more on changing the 
underlying country context.  Of course, the USCIB wants to see governments 
strengthened, not unions.  He had two other critiques: that Better Work is expensive for 
what it does and that it sometimes alienates employers in developing countries. 
 Employers in developing countries are represented on the Advisory Committee by 
the International Organization of Employers (IOE), an association for national 
employers’ associations (for example, the USCIB represents the United States at the 
IOE).  The IOE has 150 members from 143 countries.  Based in Geneva, the IOE is 
heavily focused on advocacy within the ILO, but it also advocates within other 
international organizations.   
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The IOE has a split mission in the apparel industry because its members include 
both multinationals in developed countries and factory owners in developing countries.  
Although technically it should be advocating for both equally, in practice it is much 
closer to factory owners for two reasons.  First, IOE policy is set by a General Council 
where each country has one vote; since there are far more developing countries than 
developed, their voice sets policy.  Second, multinational brands are not actually 
employers in apparel production, they are employers in apparel sales.  Several 
knowledgeable people reported that the IOE has had a difficult time figuring out how 
multinationals fit into their model.  This is another example of an older organization (the 
IOE was founded in 1920) being confused by globalization.  Staff at the IOE says that 
multinationals are now included directly in conferences specifically about the apparel 
industry; on conferences about broader issues, however, multinationals must speak 
through their national representatives. 
 Two staff members at the IOE were both positive about Better Work.  They like 
that the program focuses on practical solutions and is not ideological; they like that Better 
Work includes advising and training alongside monitoring; and they like that Better Work 
tries to make the “business case” for labor compliance.   
They did, however, have some criticisms.  The first criticism is that Better Work 
does too little to transfer lessons to the government.  The second criticism is that Better 
Work is dominated by buyers, the ILO, government, and unions; factory owners have the 
weakest voice, even though they must implement the most changes.  The IOE especially 
points out that Better Work has not altered buyer behavior even though pressure from 
buyers often forces factories to violate labor rights.  The third criticism is that the 
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business case for Better Work does not have a lot of evidence to support it and factories 
do not feel like they are rewarded with contracts from buyers based on their participation.   
The fourth criticism deserves some extra discussion.  The IOE staff reports, 
accurately, that Better Work does not report legal violations committed by unions while 
highlighting violations by factories.  Violations by unions include striking in the middle 
of honest negotiations and threatening violent protests unless they receive pay-offs.  IOE 
staff would like Better Work to be more critical of unions. 
This criticism of Better Work makes some sense, given that trade unions engage 
in criminal activities in many countries.  But on the other hand, employers also collude 
with the government to violently suppress legal union activity.  It is doubtful that unions 
are so powerful in any Better Work country that Better Work should step in to protect 
employers; rather, workers and unions are far more likely to be victimized by employers 
than vice-versa.  
3. Project Advisory Committees 
Every Better Work country program receives input from a Project Advisory Committee 
(PAC).  These PACs replicate the ILO’s tripartite model at the country level, containing 
representatives from the government, unions, and employers (collectively known as 
“social partners” in ILO-lingo).  The PACs are similar to the Global Advisory Committee 
in that they have no formal power over Better Work but still have a great deal of 
influence. 
 The PACs influence is arguably greatest at the very beginning of a Better Work 
program, since it is ILO policy not to begin operating in a country until all three social 
partners agree to support the program.  This has led to situations where employers and 
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unions negotiate very forcefully in the beginning because they know their power will be 
diminished once the program is underway. 
 Receiving and maintaining the PAC’s support is important to Better Work for 
both ideological and practical reasons.  Ideologically, the ILO is committed to the ideal of 
tripartite negotiations, even if the actual negotiations fall far short of the ideal.  As a 
practical matter, Better Work is simply too weak to force its will onto actors in a country.  
The program depends on the support of all three social partners to be able to function, 
even if the support it receives is often lukewarm. 
 Although all the PACs have representatives from government, unions, and 
employers, there is enormous variation between countries’ PACs.  One source of 
variation is economic: the poorest country, Haiti, has per-capita GDP of $820 while the 
wealthiest, Jordan, has a per-capita GDP of $5200.  This difference leads to very different 
levels of education, health, infrastructure, and the capacity of government agencies.   
Another source of variation is political.  For example, Vietnam and Nicaragua 
have similar incomes, but Vietnam is an authoritarian country where the government, 
unions, and employers are all controlled by the Communist Party.  Nicaragua, on the 
other hand, has democratic elections, several strong, independent unions, and an 
independent employers’ association.  This leads to different dynamics within the PAC.   
 The final source of variation is ideological.  Jordan, for example, is a monarchy 
where democratic elections are mostly cosmetic (Freedom House 2015) and the labor 
force in apparel is mainly composed of migrant workers.  However, because the ruling 
family has an ideology of responsible paternalism, the Jordanian labor ministry has 
partnered very closely with Better Work and has made considerable improvements to 
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working conditions in its apparel industry.  On the other hand, Bangladesh, ostensibly a 
democracy, is ruled by elites who seem to have no sense of public duty towards their 
citizens.   
 Given the variation between countries, it is difficult to generalize across Better 
Work countries.  There are, however, some similarities among the three social partners in 
each country which I will discuss below. 
Governments 
The most important of the social partners is the government.  As the sovereign authority 
in a country, their support for a Better Work program is necessary and they could 
technically end a program overnight.   
One reason governments support Better Work is to burnish their international 
reputation.  Governments hope that participating in Better Work will differentiate their 
country from other apparel producers and assure multinationals that they will not be 
caught in a labor scandal.  Better Work programs also signal to trading partners in North 
America and Europe that the country is serious about working conditions.  In some 
interviews, people stressed that no government wants to be put in the same camp as 
Bangladesh.  The Rana Plaza disaster led a lot of governments to take fire and building 
safety seriously to protect their reputations.   
Governments also use Better Work to bolster their legitimacy at home.  Labor 
ministries face two problems: they are underfunded and understaffed, and they are often 
captured by local elites, who in many cases are factory owners.  Better Work offers a 
solution to both.  In newly industrializing countries, the labor ministry is rarely able to 
keep pace with the increasing demands on its resources.  This has eroded the legitimacy 
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of the government in many countries because the government is ostensibly responsible 
for protecting workers but is simply unable to deal with the scope of the industry.  By 
supporting a Better Work program, the government is able to show its population that it is 
serious about protecting workers’ rights.  This touches on a related issue.  Local 
governments are often captured by local industry, so even if the central government takes 
labor rights seriously, it is unable to control the local agencies. Better Work programs 
allow the central government to bypass corrupted local government agencies. 
The relationship between Better Work and domestic governments contradicts 
expectations.  One would assume that governments would view Better Work as a threat 
to their sovereignty and legitimacy and, therefore, would only grudgingly accept Better 
Work due to international pressure.   
The evidence, however, showed something different. To begin with, domestic 
pressures to protect workers and promote the industry usually have more influence on a 
government than international pressure.  Further, it turns out that governments are 
absolutely unconcerned that the ILO will usurp their sovereignty.  They know that the 
United Nations is too small and weak to control events in their own countries.  Finally, 
workers in these countries do not see an ILO program as a sign that their government is 
illegitimate; quite the opposite.  Workers see an ILO program as an indication that their 
government takes the problem of labor rights seriously.  This suggests that the antipathy 
felt in the west (and especially America) towards international organizations is not shared 
by populations in developing countries.  They recognize that their governments lack the 
ability to cope with the challenges of industrialization; therefore, populations take it as a 
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positive sign when the government works with international organizations to address 
social problems. 
Unions 
The role that unions play in the PAC varies between countries because labor movements 
are organized differently around the world.  Ideally, the PAC should include the peak 
association for trade unions in the country.  But most countries do not have a peak 
association, so the PAC will attempt to include the unions with the most representation in 
apparel.  This creates challenges for the PAC because the unions sitting on the PAC may 
be in competition with each other, they may be focused on industries other than apparel, 
or they may be union association that cannot control their members.  When labor 
movements are decentralized and non-hierarchical, it makes it difficult for them to speak 
as one voice and so decisions made by the PAC will not filter down to local unions. 
Contrary to what one would expect, unions tend to be skeptical or hostile towards 
Better Work, at least initially.  Unions approach Better Work with hesitation because they 
view the program as a threat to their position as a representative of workers’ rights.  This 
skepticism is only partly warranted.  Better Work deals in similar issues, but the model is 
clearly designed to not overlap with unions.  Better Work does not organize workers, it 
does not encourage or engage in collective bargaining, and it does not routinely advocate 
for higher minimum wages or other changes labor laws.  Rather, Better Work only 
monitors for labor laws that domestic groups have agreed to.   
Although Better Work does differentiate itself from unions, this distinction is not 
immediately apparent to unions.  Further, some employers have used Better Work as a 
pretext for refusing to meet with unions, claiming that they already discussed labor issues 
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with Better Work staff or saying that unions are redundant.  In cases like these, Better 
Work staff have to intervene and tell the factory managers that meeting with unions is a 
requirement of participating in the program, but the damage to Better Work is already 
done.  Unions are also concerned that Better Work will allow the government or 
international buyers to stop pressuring employers to improve working conditions. 
 Better Work programs are usually able to gain the support of unions once 
operations begin and unions realize that the program can actually support them.  But it 
takes time for unions to realize what Better Work does and learn how to work with it. 
Employers 
Employers’ associations are the third leg of the tripartite model.  Their role on the PAC 
varies across Better Work countries due to several factors: the importance of the apparel 
industry to the economy, the voice of factory owners within the organization, and 
professionalism of the association itself.   
That said, employers’ association tend to emphasize similar things.  They like that 
Better Work goes beyond monitoring and provides training in safety and human 
resources.  They also like that Better Work provides a forum for employers to speak with 
domestic and international stakeholders.  In terms of criticisms, they would like Better 
Work to be less strict in its reports, they would like Better Work to cost less, and they 
want Better Work to relieve some of the pressure they get from buyers.     
4. Other Labor Rights Organizations 
A final category of actors are other organizations in the field of labor rights.  Although 
they are not actually “stakeholders” in Better Work, other organizations can have an 
influence on Better Work in various ways.  They may cooperate with Better Work on 
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various initiatives.  For example, Better Work and the Fair Labor Association have 
discussed harmonizing the audits done by different companies to reduce the burden of 
audits on factories.  Other organizations can also affect Better Work’s reputation by 
either supporting or criticizing the program. Given that Better Work is a complex 
program that is not well known, these reports can powerfully shape public opinion.  The 
following section discusses the relationship between Better Work and several of these 
organizations. 
Apparel Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility Departments 
Virtually all major apparel companies have CSR departments that are tasked with 
ensuring that the company’s supply chain has good labor and environmental standards.  
The CSR departments may also run small initiatives in their supply chain such as 
women’s health, safety training, etc. 
 CSR departments both cooperate and compete with Better Work.  They cooperate 
in that many departments use Better Work monitoring reports, they attend Better Work’s 
Buyer Forums to discuss labor issues, and some companies use Better Work as a platform 
for their own initiatives.   
CSR departments compete with Better Work in that they both monitor factories.  
CSR departments have developed an expertise over the years in monitoring and they are 
loathe to give this up.  Several knowledgeable people reported that CSR departments are 
afraid to stop doing audits themselves because it will undermine their position within the 
company.  Better Work staff have tried for years to get apparel companies to stop 
auditing the factories that participate in Better Work, but few have been willing to stop.  
As a result Better Work has been unable to fulfill one of its promises to factory owners: 
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that factories who join Better Work will be relieved of redundant audits from apparel 
companies. 
The Fair Labor Association 
The FLA is the pre-eminent NGO in international labor rights.  Its main work is in 
apparel, although it has branched into cocoa and electronics.  The FLA and Better Work 
mostly complement each other by approaching the issue of labor rights from different 
points.  The FLA focuses on the behavior of apparel companies, while Better Work 
focuses on the behavior of factories.  There are also informal connections between the 
two organizations because quite a few people have worked at both organizations over the 
years. 
There is some competition between them.  As Better Work tries to have a greater 
influence over buyers, it will begin overlapping with activities conducted by the FLA.  
These include getting buyers to make legal commitments and hosting events where 
buyers meet to discuss pressing issues.  Better Work’s monitoring, advising, and training 
also overlap with the FLA.  There is probably room for both organizations to co-exist, 
given the size of the apparel industry, but the potential for conflict exists as Better Work 
becomes increasingly important. 
The Workers Rights Consortium 
The WRC is another prominent labor rights NGO.  Founded around the same time as the 
FLA, the WRC institutionalized the anti-sweatshop protests happening on college 
campuses in the 1990s by monitoring the working conditions in factories that produce 
apparel for universities.  The WRC’s board is composed of university administrators, 
professors, student associations, and the AFL-CIO.  Aside from monitoring working 
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conditions, the WRC also produces a lot of research on international labor rights and 
advocates for better working conditions.  The WRC’s strength is that it leverages the 
buying power of universities into demanding relatively high standards for suppliers; its 
main weakness, like the FLA, is that is focuses on monitoring rather than remediation and 
training.  The WRC also does not include any voices from the private sector. 
The WRC has always taken a much harder line on labor rights than the FLA.  The 
WRC has historically been very critical of businesses and it prefers to demand high labor 
standards rather than seek compromise and develop pragmatic solutions.  Because of this 
preference, the WRC has been critical of Better Work for not publishing its reports and 
for not putting more pressure on international buyers. 
The WRC has written one report that is highly critical of Better Factories 
Cambodia, titled Monitoring in the Dark (WRC 2013a).  The report’s criticisms fall into 
two broad categories. One category critiques Better Factories Cambodia’s (BFC)** 
model, citing the lack of transparent reporting, the increasing use of subcontractors that 
are not monitored by BFC, BFC’s lack of power over brands,  and BFC’s policy not to 
respond to complaints from individual workers.  The second category lists problems with 
the Cambodian apparel industry that the WRC believes BFC should be more active in 
addressing, such as the failure of pay raises to keep pace with inflation and the lack of a 
strong, independent labor movement. 
The report does mention that almost all the people interviewed in Cambodia 
believe that BFC monitors are fair and independent and that the program has an important 
role to play in the country.  The report also acknowledges the cooperation of BFC with its 
                                                 
** The Better Work program in Cambodia is called Better Factories Cambodia.  It also has a different model 
from the other countries.  The next chapter explains this discrepancy in detail. 
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research project.  The report does, however, use a very critical tone in its assessment of 
the program.  Its first page, for example, reads: 
Cambodia’s longstanding reputation as a “success story” in efforts to end 
sweatshop abuses in export garment production – a reputation which has 
stood, in significant part, on the presence of the ILO’s long running BFC 
factory monitoring program – is wearing thin…. Our research suggests 
that during the eleven years of BFC’s operations in Cambodia, wages and 
basic job security have actually declined for Cambodian garment workers. 
 
 I believe that this report is an excellent piece of advocacy but a flawed piece of 
research.  Its basic flaw is that it ignores the context that BFC operates in.  Cambodia is 
an impoverished country with a corrupt, inefficient government; the labor movement is 
also split into dozens of small unions, many that are controlled by employers or are fronts 
for criminal organizations.  BFC has to satisfy multiple stakeholders with competing 
interests, so its failure to perfectly protect labor rights is understandable. 
 As advocacy, however, the report serves a useful purpose.  The WRC’s 
contribution to the “ecosystem” of international labor rights is that it uncompromisingly 
pushes for higher standards, thus shifting the terms of the debate slightly in favor of 
workers.  This position means that the WRC is excluded from major initiatives with the 
private sector and lessens its scope.  But given that the FLA and Better Work can 
implement pragmatic policies, the WRC can demand a higher standard even if that 
standard is unrealistic. 
 The strengths and limitations of the WRC’s advocacy can be seen by changes to 
BFC following the report’s publication.  One of the report’s key recommendations was a 
return to transparent reporting by BFC.  Shortly after the WRC report was published, 
BFC began posting individual factories’ performance on a subset of issues (the full 
reports are not made public).  Moreover, BFC published a list of “low compliance” 
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factories that had especially poor scores.  A number of Better Work staff reported that 
this policy had been very successful in getting recalcitrant factories to finally comply 
with BFC standards.  Of course, this policy change was not directly attributable to the 
WRC report; it was in discussion for a long time before the report came out.  But the 
WRC report put pressure on Better Work’s major stakeholders and made it harder for 
some groups, like the Cambodian employers’ association, to oppose transparency. 
 The limitations of WRC’s approach is also apparent.  The central issue the report 
emphasizes is the declining real wages of workers (nominal wages were increasing but at 
a slower rate than inflation).  This issue is beyond the purview of BFC, which has no role 
in setting minimum wages, organizing collective bargaining, or controlling inflation.  As 
such, nothing has been done to address this issue.  Several other problems noted in the 
report, such as restrictions on freedom of association, have also not been addressed by 
BFC because the program simply lacks the authority to force a dictatorship to respect 
workers’ political freedom. 
 The WRC has written two other reports, one on Haiti and one on Vietnam, which 
discuss Better Work (Better Work 2013b, Better Work 2013c).  The report on Vietnam’s 
garment industry reported pervasive labor rights abuses and relied heavily on Better 
Work research.  It did not directly evaluate the program, except to say that Better Work 
does not publicly release information about participating factories.  The report on Haiti 
focused more narrowly on “wage theft”, i.e. paying workers below the minimum wage or 
paying them incorrectly for overtime.  The report relied heavily on data from Better 
Work reports.  The report is critical of the way that Better Work interprets rules on 
overtime, but otherwise does not evaluate the program. 
117 
 
 These two reports show how Better Work’s research can be picked up by 
advocacy groups that take very uncompromising positions on labor rights.  Better Work 
cannot take these positions itself without alienating its stakeholders, but the program can 
support advocacy through its public reports.  This will likely increase as Better Work 
implements the Transparency Initiative. 
The Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights 
The Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights (IGLHR) is a small NGO housed in 
Pittsburgh, PA and run by Charles Kernaghan.  The IGLHR has specialized in 
investigating labor rights abuses, linking these abuses to American companies, and 
generating enough media attention to push for change.  For example, Kernaghan was the 
person who found that Kathy Lee Gifford’s clothing brand was being made using child 
labor, effectively ruining the brand. 
 In 2005, Kernaghan wrote a damning report about Jordan’s apparel industry 
(Greenhouse and Barbaro 2006).  This report forced the US and Jordanian governments 
to search for a solution, which they found in Better Work.  In this case, the IGLHR report 
had a very positive effect on labor rights in Jordan.    
In 2010, Kernaghan wrote specifically about Better Work Jordan, saying: “There 
is no reason to doubt that the Better Work Jordan project is well-intentioned.  But there is 
also no hope of Better Work Jordan significantly improving internationally recognized 
labor rights standards for the tens of thousands of foreign guest workers (IGLHR 2010).”  
According to his analysis, the foreign workers that composed most of Jordan’s industry 
are simply too weak to avoid being exploited by factory owners, and a Better Work 
program will be unable to compensate for this power differential.  This report probably 
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attracted very little attention, but a report the following year was picked up my major 
newspapers around the world. 
In 2011, Kernaghan wrote a report titled Sexual Predators and Serial Rapists Run 
Wild at Wal-Mart Supplier in Jordan (Kernaghan 2011).  The report alleged that a 
manager at the Classic factory in Jordan had raped numerous Sri Lankan girls over a 
period of several years and that he had been protected by other managers while the 
authorities turned a blind eye.  The report generated a lot of publicity around the world.  
It also tarnished Better Work’s reputation because the Classic factory participated in 
Better Work. 
 The problem with the report is that none of its allegations were confirmed by 
other organizations.  In the months following the report, investigations were conducted 
by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Employment, the 
Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights, and Better Work Jordan.  Better Work’s 
investigation was very thorough; the staff interviewed managers, the factory nurse, and 
65 randomly selected workers without management presence.  The investigation did not 
find any evidence of sexual assault, although some female workers reported having been 
spoken to in a derogatory fashion (BWJ 2012). Several staff members involved in the 
investigation, all of them genuine labor rights advocates, said that the allegations made 
by Kernaghan were fabricated. 
 Better Work Jordan published the results of these investigations in February 2012 
and there was no response by the IGLHR.  In April 2012, the IGLHR published a report 
calling the investigation by the Jordanian and Sri Lankan governments a “whitewash;” 
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the report does not mention Better Work at all (IGLHR 2012).  I emailed IGLHR for 
comment but did not receive a response. 
The report put Better Work in a tricky situation.  If the program assumed the 
report was accurate, expelled Classic Factory from the program, and urged buyers to stop 
working with Classic, then Better Work would lose credibility with owners and the 
government.  On the other hand, if Better Work presumed that the factory is innocent 
until proven guilty, then NGOs will claim that Better Work is not being responsive and 
international buyers will worry that Better Work is not protecting their brand’s 
reputation. 
Better Work’s response was to conduct a slow, careful investigation.  This 
bolstered its reputation in Jordan but hurt its international reputation because people 
remember the scandal, not the follow-up.  One person interviewed at a major apparel 
company said that Better Work’s greatest failure was not catching the sexual assaults at 
Classic factory; this person was unaware that subsequent investigations did not find any 
evidence to support the scandal.  
It is not easy to judge the contribution of an organization like IGLHR to the 
international labor rights movement.  On the one hand, their firebrand style of reporting 
has led to several internationally covered incidents that raised public awareness of worker 
abuses and led to real change.  On the other hand, IGLHR’s willingness to exaggerate or 
fabricate evidence makes it easier to discredit the labor rights movement, it makes 
international corporations more likely to hide behind their public-relations departments, 
and it makes factory owners even more paranoid of western labor monitors.  Regardless, 
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IGLHR remains very active, especially in Bangladesh, were it will no doubt be reporting 
on Better Work’s activities in the country. 
Conclusion 
Better Work’s stakeholders were all positive about the program.  Granted, every 
stakeholder wanted Better Work to focus more on the issues they care about: e.g. labor 
unions want more focus on freedom of association, factory owners want lower costs, and 
governments want capacity building.  Overall, however, the program has an remarkable 
history of satisfying actors with competing interests.  It is additionally impressive that the 
program can achieve this without turning into an ineffectual talk shop, as so many 
international initiatives do.  The key for Better Work is probably that the program has a 
clearly defined purpose that is easily measured (i.e. improving factories’ scores on the 
CAT).   
 There is a downside to Better Work’s need to satisfy stakeholders - the program 
does not tackle important issues that might alienate actors.  A simple example of an issue 
like this is wages, which is currently outside the mandate of Better Work (it is up to 
governments to set minimum wages and unions to negotiate higher wages, Better Work 
simply monitors for compliance).  The single biggest contribution that Better Work could 
make to the lives of apparel workers is getting them higher wages, but any move in this 
direction would alienate factory owners and multinationals.  This speaks to an important 
aspect of Better Work that is fleshed out in more detail in chapter eight. 
 The next chapter gives a history of Better Work in order to show how the 





Chapter Six: The History of Better Work 
This chapter covers the history of Better Work.  The program has its origins in an 
innovative program that began in 1999 in Cambodia.  In 2007, the program began 
expanding to new countries with a model that corrected for the shortcomings of the 
Cambodia program.  Today, Better Work is operating in eight countries; the different 
country programs are compared in the chapter’s final section.  
1. The US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement 
Better Work has its origins in a program proposed by the US government.  The program 
provided duty-free access to US markets for Cambodian apparel, provided the industry 
allow unfettered access to labor rights monitors.  This program, created in 1999, was 
motivated by several trends unfolding in the 1990s. 
 The first trend was the sudden increase in apparel exports from Cambodia to the 
United States.  Between 1990 and 2000, Cambodia’s apparel exports to the United States 
went from zero to $850 million dollars (OTEXA 2015). This increase was due to 
Cambodia not having been assigned any quotas or tariffs under the MFA as well as its 
proximity to other major apparel producing countries in East Asia. 
 Within the United States, two groups were pushing the US government to 
response to increased imports.  One group, US apparel producers, wanted the government 
to impose tariffs and quotas on Cambodia by including it in the MFA (Polaski 2006).  
Another group, labor rights activists, were concerned about the appalling working 
conditions in Cambodian factories.  Forced overtime, wage theft, physical intimidation, 
and unhealthy conditions were common across the industry (Kolben 2004).  These 
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problems led to a spate of demonstrations and strikes within Cambodia that US activists 
leveraged to pressure their government.   
 The US government responded to demands from its domestic constituents in a 
novel way.  It proposed a scheme to the Cambodian government that would link quota 
access to labor conditions.  Given that the US government could unilaterally restrict 
market access, the Cambodian government had little choice but to acquiesce.  In 1999, 
they signed the US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement. 
 The central challenge to making this agreement work was finding appropriate 
monitors for the Cambodian industry.  The Cambodian labor inspectorate was 
inadequate.  Inspectors made $28 per month, compared to $61 a month for a garment 
worker (Polaski 2006).  Inspectors depended on bribes and second jobs to survive.  
Private actors, both non-profit NGOs and for-profit auditors, were considered but none 
were found that would be acceptable to all major stakeholders.  The US and Cambodian 
governments ultimately turned to the ILO. 
 As discussed in chapter 3, the ILO was not an organization that had ever 
monitored working conditions at the firm level.  The ILO’s expertise was in coordinating 
the creation of international labor standards and then monitoring countries’ translation of 
these standards into domestic law; it had never actually looked at conditions on the 
ground.  As such, the ILO was initially hesitant to accept the US and Cambodian 
governments’ proposal (Polaski 2006). In fact, the ILO’s initial proposal for the program 
called for inspectors to be employed by the Cambodian government with the ILO acting 
as a technical advisor (Kolben 2004). 
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 The ILO went through several rounds of discussions with the US and Cambodian 
governments before creating a proposal in 2000 that was acceptable to all parties.  The 
proposal called for the ILO to monitor labor conditions in factories and issue a public 
report on industry conditions.  If the conditions improved each year, then the US 
government would progressively increase quotas.  The program would cost $1.4 million 
dollars from 1999 to 2001; $1 million would come from the US government, while the 
Cambodian government and Cambodian garment manufacturers put in $200,000 each.  
The new program originally had a long, awkward name that was subsequently changed to 
its pithy current name, Better Factories Cambodia (BFC). 
 According to Sandra Polaski, a long-time observer of Better Work and current 
Deputy-Director General for Policy at the ILO, BFC’s model contained several important 
innovations.  The first innovation was the use of “positive incentives” in a trade treaty.  
Previous US trade deals had incorporated labor conditions, but these treaties simply 
threatened punishments if labor conditions worsened.  The US-Cambodia agreement 
promised to progressively increase market access if labor conditions improved, creating a 
strong incentive for factories to have better working conditions.  The second innovation 
was the use of the ILO as a credible, effective monitor, which became crucial when 
Better Work begins expanding to other countries (Polaski 2006). 
The third innovation, arguably the most important, was transparent reporting of 
each factory’s working conditions.  Because the US quotas were given to the country as a 
whole, factories with poor working conditions threatened the entire industry.  Therefore, 
factories faced pressure from other factories, the employers’ association, and the 
government.  Moreover, multinational brands that sourced from Cambodia also began 
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using the ILO reports in their buying decisions. GAP, for example, required that all the 
factories it sourced from in Cambodia provide an ILO report (Kolben 2006). 
BFC led to significant improvements in working conditions, although there was 
variation between factories and across issue areas.  Between 1999 and 2001, payment of 
wages along with health and safety improved a great deal; compliance with overtime 
improved less dramatically; and freedom of association improved the least. Improving 
freedom of association has always been particularly challenging for Better Work; this 
will be discussed more in chapter 8. 
The presence of ILO monitors also indirectly changed the culture of the industry, 
making it easier for workers to organize and voice their concerns.  To quote one scholar:  
“the incentives in the agreement, the presence of ILO inspectors, and the 
knowledge gained by the workers led some to form unions and demand 
change in working conditions.  The AFL-CIO opened a Solidarity 
Center… and in July 2000, garment workers successfully pressured the 
government to establish Cambodia’s first minimum wage (Elliott and 
Freeman 2003, 118).”   
 
As discussed in the last chapter, the presence of a Better Work program often 
influences the political landscape of country in a way that indirectly leads to 
improvements in labor conditions, and Cambodia was the first example of that. 
2. The MFA’s Expiration Creates Pressure for Change 
The MFA was set to expire in 2005, threatening BFC in two ways.  First, many observers 
feared that the apparel industry would collapse as production moved to China.  In fact, 
many of the countries that had complained about the quota system under the MFA found 
themselves begging the United States to extend the quotas from a fear that China would 
undercut them and become the world’s single apparel producer (Rivoli 2009).  The 
second threat to BFC lay in the end of Cambodia’s preferential treatment.  Observers 
125 
 
wondered why factories would comply with the program after the US had given up its 
ability to restrict market access through the imposition of tariffs.  
The fear of China turned out to be overblown, not just in Cambodia but in all 
producing countries.  Although China’s apparel production did increase after 2005, it did 
not do so at the expense of other significant producers.  Cambodia’s exports to the US 
actually increased from $1.4 billion in 2004 to $2.4 billion in 2008, only dropping in 
2009 because of the financial crisis before increasing again.  
The fear of factories exiting BFC also turned out to be unwarranted as several 
factors contributed to the program’s continuing relevance.  Arguably the most important 
was the collective voice of multinational buyers.  According to Casper Edmonds of the 
ILO, buyers told Cambodia’s economics minister that they would only continue to source 
from Cambodia if BFC continued.  (It is debatable whether brands would have actually 
exited the country; after all, they were sourcing from Bangladesh and other countries with 
terrible conditions.)  Regardless of its credibility, however, the threat was effective 
enough to keep the Cambodian government and employers’ association committed to the 
program.   
Moreover, the brands were probably pushing on an open door.  The Cambodian 
government, despite being a dictatorship, does have to maintain some semblance of 
legitimacy. BFC was well-known and popular among garment workers in 2005; allowing 
it to end would not have looked good.  Furthermore, the Cambodian employers’ 
association understood the value of BFC in burnishing the national industry’s reputation, 
so they were supportive.  
126 
 
To adapt to the post-MFA environment, BFC instituted several reforms.  First, the 
factory assessments would no longer go the US government, they would now be directed 
at buyers.  Second, unions would be included more directly.  Prior to 2005, BFC had only 
superficially engaged with unions; its main partners had been the government and the 
employers’ association.  In the new program, unions were supposed to be treated as an 
equal third partner (unfortunately, unions have not become an equal partner because the 
labor movement is split into hundreds of small unions that compete with each other).  In 
the third reform, BFC was weakened by the end of transparent reporting.  In the original 
program, BFC would publicly name factories with persistently poor labor conditions.  
After 2005, only buyers would have access to these reports, not the government or civil 
society, a policy that would not be reversed until 2012. 
3. The Creation of Better Work 
In 2007, BFC’s director Ros Harvey believed that the program could be replicated in 
other apparel producing countries.  Now that the program was driven by international 
buyers, not the US government, in theory it could be in every country that exported 
garments. 
 The IFC enters the picture here.  Several insiders reported that the ILO had mixed 
feelings about BFC in 2007 and did not immediately support a proposal to expand the 
program.  The IFC, which had been peripherally involved in BFC, saw the program as a 
means to improve the competitiveness of a country’s apparel industry.  As a result, the 
IFC gave BFC a $1 million grant to expand the program and seconded one staff member 
to the ILO.  In exchange, the IFC became an equal partner to the ILO in the new 
program, which would be named Better Work. 
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 Although Better Work was based on BFC, the model was different in several 
important ways.  While BFC emphasized workers’ rights, Better Work expanded the 
focus to include the “business case,” i.e. the argument that Better Work was actually 
good for business.  Better Work marketed itself as good both for workers and for owners 
by claiming that better labor conditions would improve worker productivity, reduce 
conflicts between workers and managers, attract buyers, and reduce the burden of audits 
by brands.   
 The emphasis on the business case was related to another crucial difference 
between BFC and Better Work: the voluntary participation of factories.  In Cambodia, the 
government mandated that factories participate, even after the end of the MFA.  But in 
other Better Work countries, factories participate on a voluntary basis.  This was a 
political and logistical necessity.  Politically, few government wants to anger its 
employers and discourage investment by bringing in ILO monitors.  Logistically, the 
industry is so large in most countries that mandatory participation is unfeasible.  Given 
that the participation is voluntary, the new Better Work programs had to attract factories 
and promoting the business case was a way to do that. 
The voluntary nature of the program presents two challenges.  First, Better Work 
does not have the power to compel factories to change.  It can cajole and persuade, but it 
cannot threaten factories or industries with losing access to US markets.   Second, there is 
the risk that only factories with high standards will join or that factories will outsource 
work that might threaten their reputation, thereby simply shifting the problem to where it 
is hidden.  There are, however, some benefits to a voluntary program.  It ensures that the 
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factories who participate are genuinely committed and it ensures that Better Work is 
responsive to factories’ needs.   
 The third important difference between BFC and Better Work was the strong 
commitment to training factories and helping factories fix problems.  BFC’s model 
emphasized auditing factories and pressuring factories to reform themselves.  This model 
assumed that factories knew how to change but simply lacked the willingness.  After 
years of experience, Ros Harvey and others had discovered that factories often had no 
idea how to improve.  Factory managers were experts in making clothing, but they had 
little experience in human resources, building safety, chemical safety, and industrial 
relations.  Better Work was designed to invest heavily in providing advice and, today, 
most Better Work programs spend more resources on advising than on auditing.   
 A fourth difference, this one included at the insistence of the IFC, was the goal of 
financial sustainability.  BFC had originally been funded by donations from the US 
government, Cambodian government, and Cambodian employers’ association.  Better 
Work, however, would charge factories for services while also charging subscription fees 
to multinational buyers.  Better Work’s financial plan was to rely on money from donors 
in the beginning, but over time increase revenue from the private sector while reducing 
funds from donors until all operational costs were covered by fees. 
 The final difference between BFC and Better Work was the high priority places 
on capacity building for social partners.  BFC had always had a mandate to strength 
Cambodia’s labor inspectorate, but in practice it ended up substituting for it.  The 
Cambodian factory owners and workers treated BFC as the de facto authority in labor 
law, and the Cambodian government saw little reason to reform or invest in its labor 
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inspectorate.  Better Work hoped to avoid this substitution by explicitly planning to 
strengthen labor inspectorates and unions. 
4. Better Work’s Expansion from 2007 to Today 
Better Work divides its history into three “phases.”  Phase I, from 2007 to 2009, laid the 
groundwork.  Staff were hired at the ILO’s headquarters in Geneva, the staff began 
developing assessment and training tools, and a plan for engaging with stakeholders was 
developed.  As discussed in chapter 3, the ILO’s tripartite governance structure includes 
governments, unions, and employers, so most ILO programs replicate this model using 
stakeholders that are relevant for their purposes.   Better Work began putting in place a 
tripartite Advisory Committee that was finalized during Phase II. 
 During Phase I, the program began operating in three countries: Vietnam, Jordan, 
and Haiti.  Vietnam was an ideal candidate because it is Cambodia’s neighbor, it has a 
large and growing industry, and the government supported bringing in Better Work. 
 The inclusion of Jordan and Haiti made less sense and was driven mainly by the 
US government.  The United States and Jordan concluded a Free Trade Agreement in 
2000 that created a garment industry rife with abuses; Better Work was their solution to 
this embarrassing situation.  Haiti’s program was actually created by US legislation, not a 
trade treaty, that ties market access to working conditions. 
 Phase II of Better Work went from 2009 to 2012.  During this phase, the program 
finalized its management.  The program would be overseen by a Management Group, 
which included two senior staff from the ILO and IFC each.  The Management Group 
was given final decision making authority over the program’s long-term direction.  The 
Global Advisory Committee was also created in 2009.  This Committee included 
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representatives from Better Work’s donors, from the international labor movement, from 
the International Employers Organization (which represents factory owners), and from 
multinational buyers.  Although the Committee had no formal power, Better Work is 
quite responsive to its input.  These two oversight bodies were discussed in the last 
chapter. 
 During Phase II, Better Work began adding new donors, the major ones being 
Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.  Better Work also attracted more buyers and 
began asking them to sign a set of Buyers’ Principles.  These principles included working 
with factories on improving; not duplicating Better Work’s monitoring efforts; and 
participating in Better Work conferences.  These principles were voluntary and vaguely 
worded, but they created the groundwork for Better Work to begin addressing the role of 
buyers in labor rights abuses.  Lastly, Better Work recognized the importance of working 
with domestic unions and developed an explicit strategy for union engagement.   
Better Work expanded to Lesotho, Indonesia, and Nicaragua during Phase II.  Its 
expansion to Lesotho and Nicaragua was driven by US foreign policy.  Both countries are 
relatively small producers who survive through preferential trade deals with the United 
States.  Indonesia’s inclusion, on the other hand, made sense for buyers because it has a 
large and growing industry. 
 Phase II was successful, but Better Work’s limitations were also exposed.  One 
limitation was financial sustainability.  Better Work’s original plan had called for 
achieving sustainability within five years.  By 2012, not a single program was on target to 
achieve this goal.  This limitation was linked to another one: the program’s cost.  Better 
Work’s monitoring and advising activities were resource intensive, requiring highly 
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trained staff to spend a lot of time in each factory.  To give a comparison, a private 
monitoring companies have staff spend at most one day in a factory each year - Better 
Work staff spend approximately ten days a year in each factory.  The program also 
cannot implement economies of scale: there is a linear relationship between the number 
of factories that participate and the number of staff, so expanding the program is costly. 
Better Work also did not expand to as many countries as planned or into any new 
industries.  Launching a new Better Work program in a country requires an agreement 
between the ILO’s three domestic social partners, it requires pressure from international 
buyers or the US government, and it requires donors who are willing to support it.  This 
alignment only happened in the three countries mentioned above.  Better Work also did 
not expand into any other industries because the conditions are not right in any other 
industry.  An appropriate industry needs to be labor intensive and geographically 
concentrated, it needs labor-conscious international buyers, and there needs to be a 
marked failure by government or NGOs to enforce working conditions.  No other 
industry perfectly fit these criteria. 
Phase III began in 2012 and will end in 2017. During this phase, the program will 
expand and reform some aspects of its operations, but it is not planning any major 
changes.  The program expanded into one new country, Bangladesh, in late 2014.  
Bangladesh is one of the top five apparel producing countries in the world, and it has 
very poor labor conditions, so Better Work’s expansion there makes a lot of sense.  Better 
Work also expanded into footwear factories in Cambodia and piloted a program in 
Vietnam that focused on environmental standards. 
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 An important part of Phase III is moving the financially sustainable programs out 
from under the ILO umbrella.  In this model, Better Work will have a small staff that are 
still part of the ILO but will outsource its operations to a national entity (the exact type of 
legal entity will vary from country to country).  The Better Work office will be 
responsible for overseeing operations, it will work with national stakeholders, it will 
coordinate with brands, and it will do capacity building and development activities.  The 
national entity, for its part, will do the actual factory inspections and trainings.  This new 
model will allow Better Work to move away from dependence on donors; it will also 
reduce the administrative burden on the operations side.  The ILO is a complex 
bureaucracy that moves very slowly and this has created logistical problems for Better 
Work. 
  Another important reform during Phase III is a shift in the emphasis of operations 
away from monitoring towards more advising and training.  The original BFC model 
focused almost exclusively on monitoring; the Better Work model in 2009 was meant to 
include advising in addition to monitoring.  But over the years, Better Work staff have 
found that monitoring and advising can work counter to each other.  Better Work’s 
monitoring activities are threatening to factories owners and put Better Work staff in the 
position of policing and punishing; this role makes it difficult for Better Work to return to 
a factory and try to be a partner in advising and training.  The model being rolled out 
during Phase III reduces that amount of time spent on monitoring and puts advising front-
and-center. 
 This reform has an important implication for global governance.  Virtually all 
attempts at governance focus on creating rules and then trying to ratchet up the 
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consequences for failure to comply.  What the Better Work model shows is that advising 
and training can be more important that monitoring and enforcing (this is discussed more 
in chapter 9).   
 The final reform to be implemented during Phase III is the Transparency 
Initiative, in which all factories will be included in a public report that shows their 
performance on a series of indicators.  This initiative is intended to put additional 
pressure on factories that have resisted improvements.  It will also allow governments, 
unions, and civil society to take advantage of Better Work’s monitoring efforts. 
5. An Overview of Each Better Work Country Program 
As of 2015, Better Work had programs in eight countries. It is useful to think of each 
country as a separate program because the exact constellation of domestic and 
international stakeholders leads to a different set of challenges, despite the model being 
standardized across countries.  This section briefly discusses each country program and 
highlights relevant differences.   
Table 6.1 contains important information about each Better Work program and is 
a good starting point for discussion.  The third column shows the percent of global 
apparel exports accounted for by each country.  It is clear that countries fall into two 
groups: major and minor producers.  The major producers are Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Cambodia.  These countries are all in Southeast Asia and 
all are expected to increase their share of global apparel production in coming years.  The 
minor producers are Haiti, Jordan, Lesotho, and Nicaragua, all of which account for 
around 0.2 percent of global exports. As compared to the major producers, the future of 
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these countries’ industries is unclear; without preferential trade agreements, it is unlikely 
that their industries will grow or even survive competition with Asian producers.   
 When matched against the last column in the table, we see that all the small 
countries are funded exclusively by the US Department of Labor.  This tells us something 
important: the inclusion of these countries in Better Work is driven more by US foreign 
policy than by the relevance of these countries to the apparel industry.  For these 
countries, the government has been pressured to participate in Better Work has a 
condition, either explicit or implicit, of a trade agreement. 
Table 6.1: Summary of Key Information on Better Work Programs 



























Bangladesh 2014 4.7% 13% Voluntary 94 D/S/N/US 
Cambodia 1999 1.0% 25% Mandatory 563 US 
Haiti 2009 0.2% 9% Mandatory 26 US 
Indonesia 2011 1.8% 1% Voluntary 150 S/N 
Jordan 2008 0.2% 3% Mandatory 70 US 
Lesotho 2011 0.2% 24% Voluntary  15 US 
Nicaragua 2011 0.3% 13% Voluntary 26 US 
Vietnam 2009 3.3% 8% Voluntary 369 S/N/US 
WTO 2014 is the source for data on apparel exports.   
World Databank is the source for GDP data. 
Among donors, D is Denmark, S is Switzerland, N is the Netherlands, and US is the 
United States. 
 
Column 4 shows the percent of national GDP accounted for by apparel exports.  
This shows the importance of the apparel industry to the economy and is a rough estimate 
of the leverage that Better Work and international buyers have.  As we can see, apparel is 
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an important industry in every country except Indonesia.  Bangladesh, Haiti, and 
Cambodia are three countries where external pressure drives the presence of Better Work.  
In Indonesia, domestic stakeholders have been least interested in Better Work.  That said, 
there is not a clear relationship between industry size and support for Better Work.  The 
two countries that have been most receptive to Better Work are Jordan and Vietnam, even 
though their industries are smaller than others. 
Column 5 shows whether the Better Work program is mandatory or voluntary for 
factories.  Cambodia was originally made mandatory before the end of the MFA and has 
remained so due to buyer pressure.  Haiti’s program is made mandatory by the HOPE II 
legislation.  Jordan’s was made mandatory by national law.  After several years of 
operating with relatively low participation, the government decided a mandatory program 
would be good for the industry.   
It is important to point out that mandatory participation in larger industries is not a 
goal of Better Work simply because it would be too expensive.  Indonesia’s exports are 
twice Cambodia’s, but the industry is geographically disbursed across an enormous 
country. Even if Better Work Indonesia could hire enough staff, the transportation cost 
and time between factories would make the program unmanageably expensive. 
Column 6 shows the number of factories that participate in Better Work.  
Cambodia is by far the largest, but Vietnam is increasing quickly and will likely overtake 
Cambodia in several years.  Indonesia is also expanding, but at a slower pace than 
Vietnam.  Better Work Bangladesh has set an ambitious target to add approximately 100 
factories per year over the next five years.  If successful, it will be the largest program.  
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The smaller programs are not expected to increase enrollment significantly and two 
programs, Lesotho and Nicaragua, are being phased out.    
The remainder of this chapter gives a brief discussion of important issues in each 
of the eight countries.   
Bangladesh 
Discussions to enter Bangladesh had been ongoing for several years as Better Work and 
the three social partners struggled to agree on the exact terms.  Insiders to the 
negotiations reported that the labor unions had been resisting the program for fear that the 
government and employers would use Better Work to circumvent or disempower national 
labor unions (a common concern among national unions).  The unions may also have 
been hoping to improve national labor law and get a higher minimum wage before 
agreeing to Better Work’s expansion. 
The Rana Plaza disaster in 2013 that killed over 1000 people created the energy 
necessary to overcome the deadlock.  The international attention on Bangladesh psuhed 
the government to reform national law and the ILO was able to convince unions that 
Better Work did not represent a threat.   
Better Work opened an office in mid-2014 but could not start operations until the 
Bangladeshi legislature approved a new set of labor laws.  The laws were approved by 
early 2015 and 94 factories had enrolled in the program by the end of the year. 
Bangladesh presents a major challenge for Better Work.  The country has a huge 
industry spread across a large area, labor conditions are very poor, and the government 
and employers are probably not participating in good faith.  The program’s ability to 




The Cambodian program predates Better Work and is still called BFC.  It began in 2001, 
the program had 563 participating factories in 2015, and apparel exports count for 25 
percent of GDP.  The program is not expected to grow in size.  National legislation 
makes participation mandatory by all factories.  Its model focuses heavily on monitoring 
rather than advising.  It has been the largest program in Better Work although Vietnam 
will soon be larger. 
 As opposed to other countries, BFC has quasi-governmental authority in 
Cambodia.  It is widely viewed by workers and managers as the country’s true labor 
inspectorate.  Further, the importance of apparel to the country’s economy means that 
BFC and international buyers have a lot of power.  When BFC proposed leaving the ILO 
and becoming a national entity, the government and employers’ association were dead-set 
against BFC leaving the ILO umbrella because they want to ensure that the program 
remains credible. 
Haiti 
The Haiti program began in 2009, it had 26 factories in 2015, and apparel exports 
account for 9 percent of GDP.  The program is not expected to grow.  The program is 
made mandatory by US Congressional legislation called the Hemispheric Opportunity 
though Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE) that gave Haiti various apparel-related 
trade preferences in 2006.  An amendment to the legislation in 2008 included a 
requirement that Haiti’s industry comply with ILO labor law, a provision written 
specifically with Better Work in mind.  This effectively forces Haiti’s apparel industry to 
comply with a Better Work program at the risk of losing its access to US markets. 
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 Constant political upheaval and an earthquake in 2010 have created a country 
virtually without a functioning government.  Labor unions are also very weak and face 
violent opposition from factory owners.  This has left factory owners as a source of 
authority unto themselves, making this one of the more challenging countries for Better 
Work to operate in.  On a positive note, however, Better Work has a great deal of 
authority in this country because factories must comply with the program. 
Indonesia 
Better Work’s Indonesia program is one of its largest and most successful programs.  It 
began in 2001, it had 150 factories in 2015, but apparel exports only account for 1 
percent of GDP.  The program is expanding quickly because international buyers want 
the program and domestic stakeholders are supportive.  The program’s biggest challenge 
is that the apparel industry is shifting within the country.  It has historically been around 
Jakarta, but as the minimum wage increases in Jakarta, producers are moving to different 
provinces, making the industry geographically dispersed and located in areas that are just 
beginning to industrialize. 
Jordan 
The Jordan program began in 2008, it had 70 factories in 2015, and apparel exports 
account 3 percent of GDP.  The program is not growing.  The US-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement is the basis for Better Work’s expansion into the country.  Concluded in 2000, 
the agreement included an Article directly in the text that called for both parties to respect 
domestic and international labor law, it prohibited the relaxing of labor laws to promote 
trade, and it allowed parties to erect trade barriers if the labor parts of the treaty were 
violated (Polaski 2003; TCC 2000; Weiss 2002).   
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This arrangment created a strange enclave economy within Jordan where Chinese 
factory owners hired women from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to sew clothing.  Labor 
abuses were severe and widespread.  After a US NGO brought them to light, the US 
Department of Labor and the Jordanian government supported a Better Work program as 
a facing-saving device for both governments.  Despite the program’s inauspicious start, 
the government has become a strong supporter and mandated participation by all factories 
in 2012. 
Lesotho 
The Lesotho program began in 2011, it had 15 factories in 2015 (down from 30 in 2014), 
and apparel exports account for 24 percent of GDP.  The program is funded entirely by 
the US DOL, which has decided not to continue funding the program after October 2016.  
It covers half the country’s apparel industry and is in all the factories that export to the 
United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a piece of legislation that 
gives many African countries preferential access to US markets. 
Nicaragua 
The Nicaragua program began in 2011, it had 26 factories in 2015, and apparel exports 
accounted for 13 percent of GDP.  The program began as a pilot program for a larger 
CAFTA-wide Better Work program.  In 2009, both the US government and international 
buyers were supportive of an initiative that would cover all CAFTA countries (the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 




 Nicaragua was the best country to pilot program because it already had a 
Tripartite Commission that included government, employers, and unions; all three 
stakeholders were strong supporters of a Better Work program.  The program, 
unfortunately, took several years to begin operating and, once it did, the stakeholders 
were resistant to the program’s findings and policies.   
After several years, the program’s results were disappointing and it was more 
expensive than other Better Work programs.  Further, international brands had lost 
interest in CAFTA because Asian countries were becoming more competitive on price 
and efficiency, while Bangladesh had absorbed most of the brands’ energy on corporate-
social responsibility.  US DOL has decided not to continue funding the program beyond 
October 2016. 
Vietnam 
The Vietnam program began in 2009, it had 359 factories in 2015, and apparel exports 
make up 8 percent of GDP.  The program has been expanding rapidly and will soon be 
the largest program.   
Vietnam was the first country that Better Work expanded into and was an ideal 
candidate for several reasons.  Vietnam has a large and growing industry, so international 
buyers wanted a Better Work program in the country.  The government wanted to 
increase its apparel exports to the US and viewed Better Work as a way to differentiate 
itself from competitors.  The government also hoped Better Work could bolster its 
domestic legitimacy.  The expansion to Vietnam was supported by the ILO and IFC 
because both already had a presence in the region and had seen the value of BFC. 
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 Vietnam is on track to be the largest Better Work program by 2016.  It is one of 
the programs that is closest to achieving financial sustainability and spinning its 
operations off into a national entity.  The main challenge facing the program is its 
expansion into new regions of the country.  The program has been centered around Ho 
Chi Minh City, where apparel production is concentrated and factories are relatively 
sophisticated.  As the program moves into more rural regions with less experienced 
factories, the program may find it more challenging to raise standards. 
Conclusion  
This history of Better Work contains two interesting lessons about how public policies 
are created and evolved.  The first lesson is that Better Work was not conceived and 
implemented in a top-down fashion by policymakers with extraordinary foresight – the 
program’s creation and development has been far more haphazard.  For example, the 
inclusion of the ILO as a monitor was not part of the original plan by the US and 
Cambodian governments.  The ILO was only considered after other options were 
discarded, and even then the ILO resisted taking on this new role.  Then, in 2005, the ILO 
resisted expanding the program to new countries.  The expansion only occurred because 
the IFC provided funding, which was an unusual choice for an institution that loans 
money at interest to private firms.  It is ironic that Better Work is now one of the ILO’s 
flagship programs given how much the institution resisted supporting the program in its 
early years. 
 A second lesson is the importance of individuals.  Ros Harvey, the director of 
BFC in 2005, was a main driver behind the program’s expansion about of Cambodia.  
Without her energy, Better Work might not exist today.  Another important individual is 
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Sandra Polaski, who supported the program within the USDOL despite other officials’ 
reluctance.  Finally, within the eight Better Work countries, individuals in positions of 
power have often been champions of the program and their support has been key to 
getting Better Work off the ground. 
 The next chapter goes into detail about Better Work programs in two countries, 
Indonesia and Vietnam.  The chapter fleshes out how Better Work cooperates with 
stakeholders in the countries where it operates; it also discusses how the constellation of 

































Chapter Seven: Comparing Better Work in Indonesia and Vietnam 
The international politics of Better Work is this dissertation’s focus, but the analysis 
would be incomplete if it did not also investigate how the program interacts with the 
domestic politics of the countries where Better Work operates.   
This chapter discusses the politics and practical implementation of Better Work in 
Indonesia and Vietnam, two countries with very different histories and political systems.  
Its central conclusion is that domestic politics do not have much of an effect on Better 
Work’s ability to perform its functions inside the factory gates.  However, domestic 
politics strongly determine Better Work’s ability to have an influence outside the factory. 
1. Why Compare Indonesia and Vietnam  
I chose to compare Indonesia and Vietnam because their industries have many similar 
characteristics but their political systems are different.  By holding constant a number of 
characteristics, a comparison between the two has the potential to yield interesting 
insights about the effect of the political systems on Better Work. 
Similarities between Indonesia and Vietnam 
Indonesia and Vietnam have a number of similarities.  Both countries have large apparel 
industries that are expected to grow in the coming years (in 2012, Vietnam was the 
world’s sixth largest exporter of apparel and Indonesia was eighth).  Both countries also 
have diversified industrial economies that are not wholly dependent on apparel.  This 
means that domestic politics cannot be held hostage to the mandates of foreign actors, be 
they international buyers or governments in importing countries, so Better Work needs to 
be responsive to domestic stakeholders.   
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 Another important feature of the program in both countries is that participation by 
factories is voluntary.  In fact, both countries have such large industries that Better Work 
does not strive for universal participation because that would require an enormous staff 
and bureaucracy.  The voluntary nature of these programs is significant because it forces 
Better Work to prove its relevance to domestic stakeholders. 
 In the same vein, neither country’s participation in Better Work is a product of US 
foreign policy.  As discussed in the previous chapter, several countries belong to Better 
Work primarily because they were pressured to join by the US government in exchange 
for trade preferences.  In Indonesia and Vietnam, however, both governments wanted 
Better Work.  Comparing two countries that are free from pressure by the United States 
ensures that politics of Better Work more accurately reflect domestic politics. 
The Main Difference between Indonesia and Vietnam 
Indonesia and Vietnam differ in one significant aspect: their domestic political systems.  
Since the fall of Suharto in the 1998, Indonesia has been a chaotic, multi-party 
democracy.  Vietnam, on the other hand, has had one ruling party since 1975 and this 
party exercises control of the government, the economy, and quite literally every social 
organization down to recreational soccer leagues (Hayton 2010).  The comparison allows 
us to determine how differences in political systems shape Better Work’s 
implementation. This section gives a brief history of each country that focuses on how 
the current political system came to be. 
Indonesia’s History 
Indonesia, as a modern state, is a product of European colonialism.  From the 1500s until 
independence in 1949, the archipelago that makes up Indonesia was controlled by the 
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Netherlands.  The Dutch took thousands of islands that contained hundreds of ethnic 
groups, languages, and religions and bound them into one administrative unit for the 
purpose of colonialism.  Without the intervention of the Dutch, it is hard to imagine 
Indonesia existing today as a country. 
 The creation of Indonesia is so counterintuitive that it inspired Benedict 
Anderson’s wonderful book Imagined Communities (Anderson 2006).  In this book, 
Anderson makes the case that “Indonesians” in the 19th and early 20th centuries only 
became aware of themselves as Indonesian through their connection with the Dutch 
administrative apparatus.  This gave the Indonesians at independence a shaky sense of 
nationalism and identity, which has been compensated for by a chauvinist nationalism 
and xenophobia towards foreigners. 
 At independence in 1949, Indonesian elites had three challenges: forming political 
institutions, growing the economy, and generating a national identity among millions of 
people with little in common. 
 Politically, Indonesia became a parliamentary democracy at independence with 
Sukarno, a former independence fighter, as President.  The first decade after the country’s 
independence was marked by political instability within Parliament and a variety of 
independence movements, leading Sukarno to adopt a more authoritarian system.  This 
system was inherited by his successor Suharto in 1966.  Suharto was a military general 
who further centralized power by killing hundreds of thousands of his political opponents 
in the Communist Party and elevating his military allies and family members into 
positions of power (MacDonald 2014, 39).  Suharto remained tightly in the control of the 
country until 1998. 
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 Indonesia’s planned industrialization, which began under Sukarno and continued 
under Suharto, was fairly successful.  An influential report by the World Bank, The East 
Asian Miracle, cited Indonesia as one of Asia’s eight “high performing economies” that 
successfully blended state intervention with market mechanisms (World Bank 1993).  
The true success of Indonesia’s planned industrialization is debatable, given the 
economy’s collapse after the Asian Financial Crisis, but it did create a strong industrial 
base.   
The project of nation building was also fairly successful during Indonesia’s 
authoritarian years.  Indonesian nationalism was built around a blend of traditional 
Javanese mysticism, Islam, and pride in the country’s ancient civilizations.  This national 
story managed to include most of the population, but it also pushed many of Indonesians’ 
citizens into the category of “other,” exacerbating ethnic tensions and encouraging 
periodic independence movements in various parts of the country.  Furthermore, it was 
predicated on a suspicion of foreigners that has made cooperation with international 
organizations problematic.   
 The Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 hit Indonesia especially hard and created a 
disjunction between the present and the past.  During the crisis the economy collapsed, 
the currency lost almost all its value, and many banks closed and lost depositors’ life 
savings.  Politically, Suharto and his family were forced to abandon power, the military’s 
political power was greatly diminished, and the country took a rocky road back to 
democracy.  Over the last two decades, Indonesia has firmly consolidated elections and a 
democratic transition, and a return to military authoritarianism seems very remote.  
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However, the country’s parliament has not created stable parties and successive 
governments’ performances have been disappointing (MacDonald 2014 227).   
 Two political changes occurred after the Asian Financial Crisis that are relevant 
for the apparel industry.  First, a new trade union law was enacted that allowed 10 people 
to create an independent union, in contrast to the illegality of independent trade unions 
under Suharto.  The new law has led to a proliferation of unions across the garment 
industry.  There are literally thousands of factory-level unions that may or may not 
belong to one of a hundred union confederations, which may then belong to one of eight 
national unions.  This decentralized union movement has created challenges for Better 
Work that are discussed below. 
 The second relevant reform after the fall of Suharto was the decentralization of 
public services.  Suharto had centralized control over most state institutions, placing an 
enormous financial burden on the central government and leading to policies that were 
out of touch with local conditions.  Decentralization was supposed to alleviate financial 
pressure on the national government while putting local governments in charge of their 
own policies.  This has affected Better Work because the decentralized labor 
inspectorates gives the Labor Ministry in Jakarta very little authority over labor 
inspectorates at the provincial and district level.  
Vietnam’s History 
Vietnam presents a different picture.  Long before French colonization, the modern 
country of Vietnam was populated by an ethnically and linguistically homogenous 
civilization.  Therefore, even though today’s Vietnam is a modern construct, it has been 
able to base its national narrative on sturdier ground than Indonesia.  This has 
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paradoxically led to less xenophobia and paranoia towards foreigners and has made the 
Vietnamese more welcoming to foreign direct investment and to advice from 
international organizations.  The only exception to this openness is the Vietnamese’s 
intense suspicion of China. 
 Contemporary Vietnam began at the end of its civil war in 1975.  The Communist 
elites based in Hanoi defeated the western-allied, Catholic elites in Saigon, unifying the 
country under their control.  What followed was a half-hearted attempt at Soviet-style 
communism, with a centrally planned economy and the near eradication of independent 
social organizations.  But Vietnam had come to the party a little too late.  By the 1980s, 
both China and Russia were abandoning communism and, after a few economically 
disastrous years, very few people in Vietnam believed in it either. 
 In 1986, after just a decade of communism, the party began instituting Doi Moi, a 
series of policies designed to move Vietnam towards an industrialized, market economy 
that would be integrated into the larger world economy.  Doi Moi would also bring 
Vietnam closer to the United States and Europe, thus providing the country with some 
protection from its historic enemy China. 
 Doi Moi has been a spectacular economic success, with per capita GDP shooting 
from $98 in 1990 to $2,052 in 2014 (World DataBank 2015).  All this has been achieved 
without the Communist Party facing any serious challenges to its control.  The Party 
controls all the top positions in government; it also exercises firm control over private 
enterprise and what passes for civil society.   
In fact, the main political challenge of the Communist Party today is how the 
central government can exercise control over provincial and district governments (Hayton 
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2010).  Vietnam’s rapid industrialization and economic expansion have created a 
simultaneous rise in demands on the government to protect workers, protect the 
environment, invest in public goods and infrastructure, and redistribute wealth.  These are 
all functions that the government is not capable of performing, a problem exacerbated by 
the increasing opportunities for corruption on the part of local government officials.  As 
Vietnam liberalizes, local governments are increasingly being captured by local elites, 
discrediting the entire Communist Party in the eyes of the public.  If the Party is going to 
retain broad support, then it must be perceived by Vietnamese people as acting in the 
public interest. 
 This is precisely where Better Work comes in.  The central government’s strong 
support for the program can be seen as an attempt by the central labor ministry’s to push 
its agenda into districts where the local inspectors are unable or unwilling to protect 
workers’ rights.  This is discussed in more detail below. 
2. Comparing Better Work in Indonesia and Vietnam 
This section compares Better Work’s interactions with the three “social partners” in 
Indonesia and Vietnam (government, unions, and employers’ associations).  It will tease 
out how different political systems have determined Better Work’s ability to carry out its 
activities.  Its main finding is that the political system has not affected Better Work’s 
activities within factories, but it has strongly determined Better Work’s ability to 
influence the sector and economy more broadly. 
 A lot of the information presented in this section is the result of interviews 
conducted in both countries.  In Indonesia, I accompanied an ILO research team through 
an intense three days of interviews with Better Work staff.  I was able to speak with the 
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project’s senior staff and front-line factory inspectors.  I was also able to accompany two 
EAs on a visit to an apparel factory.  In Vietnam, I spoke with the project’s director as 
well as several senior staff.  I also met with representatives from the three social partners, 
although these meeting were not very useful given the Vietnamese tendency to never air 
disagreements. 
 Since most of the information is from interviews, it is subjective and biased by the 
person giving the information.  To compensate for this, information is only present 
information as fact if it comes from multiple sources.  In cases where there is 
disagreement or ambiguity, it has been noted  
The remaining pages of this section give a detailed comparison of the social 
partners in Indonesia and Vietnam and show how they affect Better Work’s ability to 
have an influence outside factory gates.  In order to impose structure on a lot of disparate 
information, each social partner is discussed from three angles.  First, this section 
explains what the social partner is; then, it explains why it cooperates with Better Work; 
finally, the section explains how each partner’s institutional make-up conditions its 
relationship with Better Work.   
Governments  
The government is Better Work’s most important social partner.  Because of sovereignty, 
the government’s acquiescence to the program is required and active support from the 
government is helpful in getting other actors in the country to participate.  In both 
Indonesia and Vietnam, Better Work’s main partner in government is the labor ministry. 
These two ministries are structured quite differently.  This has had a strong impact 
on Better Work.  Indonesia’s Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration (MOMT) in 
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Jakarta is an avid supporter of Better Work and has been a strong partner.  The MOMT, 
however, does not carry out actual inspections.  The decentralization law after the Asian 
Financial Crisis devolved responsibility for inspections to districts, which is one level 
below provinces (comparable to counties in the United States).  The district-level 
inspectors report directly to the mayors in their district, not to the MOMT.  Surprisingly, 
they are not accountable to the MOMT in any way.  Furthermore, labor inspectors are not 
on a fixed career path within the inspectorate; most of them will be rotated into other 
agencies after several years at the whim of the mayor.  This means that inspectors have 
no incentive to perform their work properly and no ability to stand up to local elites. 
The MOMT was initially skeptical of Better Work and it took a year for the Better 
Work staff to earn their trust.  The MOMT initially thought that Better Work would 
replicate the role of Indonesian labor inspectors, which raised alarm bells because of 
Indonesians’ perpetual fear of foreign influence.  The MOMT was persuaded to work 
with Better Work because of pressure from international brands, a realization that Better 
Work offered advising and training to factories, and Better Work’s recruitment of 
excellent staff.  The Chief Inspector at the MOMT also thought that Better Work could 
help implement one of his flagship programs that focused on getting factories to self-
report.  Today, the MOMT and Better Work collaborate very closely, but cooperation 
with district inspectorates is much weaker. 
The decentralization of the labor inspectorate means that Better Work and the 
MOMT often act as partners in trying to improve the performance of district inspectors 
(see Amengual and Chirot 2015 for some detailed examples).  These inspectors, 
unfortunately, are usually not interested in being trained and know that their jobs are 
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controlled by local elites that do not place a high priority on labor rights.  This means that 
Better Work has not had much of an effect at the front-lines of the inspectorate.  
Additionally, when Better Work moves into a new district, it must build a relationship 
from scratch with the local inspectors and cannot rely on the MOMT to give a directive. 
 In Vietnam, the labor inspectorate is centralized.  The central ministry is the 
Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA). Beneath MOLISA are 
provincial and district-level inspectorates that follow MOLISA’s policy directives.  
Inspectors are on a proper career path within the inspectorate, receive relatively good 
training, and will not be transferred to other agencies.  Corruption is an issue, but it is 
perceived to be less pervasive than in other developing countries.   
 MOLISA has cooperated closely with Better Work from the start.  In 2009, when 
Better Work wanted to expand from Cambodia, Vietnam’s Senior Labor Inspector invited 
Better Work into the country for several reasons.  He recognized that the capacity of his 
ministry was far too low to adequately meet the needs of an industrializing economy, he 
thought the Better Work model would be effective, and he wanted help implementing a 
program for factories to self-diagnose problems.   This collaboration has been perceived 
as a great success by the government.  In my interview with a senior official at MOLISA, 
he said they were so happy with Better Work that they would like the program to expand 
to other labor-intensive industries. 
All of this makes cooperation with inspectors very fluid for Better Work in 
Vietnam.  The program is able to conduct information sharing, coordinate priorities, and 
conduct capacity building with ease.  And when Better Work moves into a new district, 
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the local labor inspectors receive a directive from headquarters to cooperate with the 
program. 
Unions 
Labor unions are also an important social partner for Better Work.  Unions have 
knowledge of local working conditions, they can apply pressure on factory owners and 
the government, and they generally ensure that workers’ rights and interests are upheld.   
 The labor union movement is structured differently in Indonesia and Vietnam.   In 
Indonesia, the labor movement is decentralized and chaotic (Caraway 2008).  Under the 
post-Suharto trade union law, just 10 people can get together and form an independent 
union.  This means that one factory may can have a host of different unions that negotiate 
separately with management and compete among themselves for members and influence.  
The managers may also put up a union that they control behind the scenes (i.e. a “yellow 
union”).  Managers may also try to prevent the formation of independent unions.  At the 
factory level, unions are generally weak and unable to effectively negotiate with 
management on equal footing, a situation that is exacerbated by the country’s economic 
problems and the general unwillingness of the state to defend unions (Suryomenggolo 
2008; Tjandra 2008). 
Factory unions often join union federations, which organize unions along regional 
or industry lines.  There are roughly 100 federations, 10 of which are specifically for the 
garment industry.  The federations can further organize into national confederations, of 
which there are eight (the ILO, however, only works with four national confederations).  
These national confederations are focused on national political struggles and are each 
allied with different political parties, which often means they are in competition.  Further, 
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the national confederations are vertically decentralized, meaning that the national 
confederation leaders cannot tell their constituents what to do.  Therefore, if Better Work 
comes to an agreement with national leaders of a confederation in Jakarta, there is no 
guarantee that the confederation’s members in a specific factory will honor that 
agreement. 
Better Work staff report that the unions in Indonesia do not have a long term 
agenda on how to work with the program; instead, they tend to want ad-hoc cooperation 
on single events.  The unions are also not in agreement amongst themselves about how to 
approach Better Work.  One union kept asking Better Work staff to organize factory 
employees into their union (which Better Work does not do).  Another union refused to 
cooperate with Better Work in any way until early 2015, fearing that Better Work wanted 
to replace them.  On a more positive note, one garment-sector federation, Garteks, has 
cooperated extensively with Better Work by organizing working in participating factories 
and by having its members get trained by Better Work.  
The labor movement’s lack of structure and long term vision makes it challenging 
for Better Work to cooperate with unions, both at the national level and at the factory 
level.  At the national level, when Better Work wants to meet with union representatives, 
it must organize a meeting with all four confederations and try to get consensus among 
them.  This can be logistically and politically difficult. 
Indonesia’s union structure also creates challenges within each factory.  The 
factory may have one union, but it may be manager controlled.  A factory may have 
multiple unions, but they may be allied with different national political parties and thus 
be antagonistic towards each other, or they may not be allied with any federations. This 
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makes it difficult for Better Work staff to know how to approach and cooperate with 
unions. 
 Vietnam is a different story.  To begin with, there is only one union, the VGCL, 
and independent trade unions are illegal.  VGCL staff are government employees and the 
head of the VGCL is always a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.  
This gives the VGCL considerable authority within the Communist Party, at least at the 
highest level of setting policy and law.   
 The VGCL contradicts basic western political theory.  According to the narrative 
in the west, government-controlled unions are political puppets that serve the interests of 
elites and, therefore, only independent unions can adequately protect workers.  We can 
see this today in demands made by US trade unions that Vietnam allow independent 
unions as price of their admission to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (AFL-CIO 2015).  In 
reality, however, the VGCL has been an effective advocate for workers’ rights within the 
Communist system (Tran 2011).  According to several interviews, the VGCL has been 
adapting reasonably well to the pressures that come with industrialization.   
 The VGCL is a hierarchy with four levels.  These four levels are: national, 
provincial, district, and enterprise (which refers to individual businesses).   At the 
provincial and district levels, the unions are called Federations of Labor (FOL).  The 
VGCL sets long-term policies that are then carried about by the subordinate FOLs.  The 
capacity and resources of the VGCL decrease through the levels, and the VGCL is 
notoriously weak at the factory-level.  In fact, many union representatives are 
management-appointed and controlled.   
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 The VGCL’s weakness at the factory level is one of the main reasons that it 
switched from an initial opponent of Better Work to a strong supporter.  When Better 
Work first entered the country, the VGCL feared that the program would create a parallel 
structure for organizing workers that would duplicate its mission.  But instead, Better 
Work has indirectly encouraged more workers to join the union, it has strengthened union 
independence at the factory level, and it has raised the union’s capacity by increasing its 
organization and by training individual members.   
 Better Work indirectly supports the union through the PICCs (the bipartite 
committees that Better Work sets up in each factory during “advising” visits, discussed in 
section 1 of chapter 4).  In these PICCs, worker representatives are directly elected by 
workers.  They do not need to be VGCL members to get elected, but they join the union 
after their election.  This is not a formal rule of Better Work or the VGCL, but one gets 
the sense that there is strong social pressure to join, which is tantamount to a rule in a 
country like Vietnam that puts such an emphasis on conformity. 
 Having all the worker members of the PICC join the VGCL has given the union a 
huge boost where it was weakest – within each factory.  Not only has it increased union 
membership, the PICCs have also guaranteed that the VGCL members are organized and 
have a structured relationship with management.  Moreover, as PICC members, they are 
able to take advantage of Better Work trainings.   
 All this has made the VGCL a strong supporter of Better Work.  The union 
routinely meets with Better Work, it paves the way for the program to enter new districts, 
and it supports having its members receive trainings.  Better Work is also the platform for 




The employers’ associations are the third social partner for Better Work.  These 
associations are the collective voice for the factory owners in a country and the best way 
for factories to voice concerns (or complaints) to Better Work.  In Indonesia and 
Vietnam, the employers’ association is the weakest partner at the national level even 
though factory owners are often very powerful at the local level.   
 In Indonesia, the employers’ association does not seem to contribute very much.  
Better Work staff did not mention any coordination between the employers and Better 
Work.  This is partly because Indonesia’s economy is large and diverse, so apparel is not 
a high priority for the association.  It may also be that employers’ association 
discriminates against its non-Indonesian members, which would be relevant here because 
almost all Better Work participating factories are Korean owned.  In fact, Better Work in 
Indonesia has often had to work with the Korean Garment Association and the Korean 
embassy to get the collective voice of employers. 
 In Vietnam, the employers’ association is more active.  It organizes a Factory 
Focus Group of participating factories to discuss Better Work and give the program 
feedback.  The employers’ association also coordinates with Better Work to approach the 
government when there is confusion about the law.  The employers’ association 
representative reported that factories are generally happy with Better Work, although they 
feel that reporting is too strict and the cost of training is too high (as one might expect).  
Further, the current director of Better Work used to be a senior staffer at the association, 




3. Lessons from Comparison 
When comparing the improvements in compliance rates between Indonesia and Vietnam, 
there is not a significant difference.  Table 7.1 shows non-compliance rates among 
factories at the beginning of each country’s program (the table is placed at the end of the 
chapter).  Starting conditions were similar in both countries; the correlation between the 
two is 0.62.  The biggest differences come from Vietnam having high non-compliance in 
freedom of association and Indonesia having high non-compliance in its employment 
contracts.   
Table 7.2 shows changes in non-compliance for both countries over time.  
Vietnam shows significant improvements in the first two years, especially with respect to 
occupational health and safety and freedom of association.  Better Work in Indonesia got 
off to a difficult start as the business environment worsened, but by the second and third 
years there were significant improvements.  Taken together, these tables show that Better 
Work is able to improve conditions in factories in both countries in roughly the same 
degree (the next chapter contains a detailed discussion of this data).  
 Outside the factory gates, however, Better Work is having a much stronger effect 
in Vietnam.  The program is able to set a long-term agenda with its social partners and 
then see this agenda through.  Better Work in Vietnam has worked closely with the 
inspectorate and the unions to improve all parties’ capacities to carry out their missions.  
Better Work has also been able to participate in national discussions about the apparel 
industry as a whole.  
 In fact, one of Better Work’s greatest successes worldwide came through the 
VGCL.  In 2012, the VGCL completed a study of Better Work’s PICCs and concluded 
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that they were very successful at improving working conditions.  The VGCL then used 
this research to push for reforms to Vietnam’s labor law that required all large enterprises 
to institute bipartite committees modelled on the PICC (Better Work Case Study 2013a).   
 Nothing comparable has happened in Indonesia.  Better Work in Indonesia has 
not been able to cooperate with any social partner as effectively as the program in 
Vietnam.  The Indonesian program is close the central Labor Ministry and one union, but 
it rarely works with local inspectors or with other unions.  Better Work has also not 
contributed to wider discussions about the apparel industry, in part because such 
discussions are simply not happening in a country with no dominant political authority. 
  At first glance, this comparison seems to the support the idea that authoritarian 
governments are inherently better at development than democracies – but this conclusion 
would make little sense.  After all, for every successful dictatorship like Vietnam there 
are ten failures like Mubarak’s Egypt. Vietnam’s success can be attributed to a host of 
factors.  One is the threat from China, which has disciplined Vietnam’s elites into 
growing the economy and strengthening the country.  Without their fear of China, 
Vietnamese elites would likely be far more corrupt.  Another factor is ethnic 
homogeneity.  Almost all citizens of Vietnam are of the Viet ethnicity, they speak the 
same language, and are mostly Theravada Buddhists.  This homogeneity creates a sense 
of solidarity that does not exist in many developing countries.  The lingering Communist 
ideology is another factor.  Despite Doi Moi, Vietnamese are still indoctrinated with 
Communist thought that emphasizes the common good.   
The final source of Vietnam’s success is the independence of state institutions, 
especially the labor inspectorate and the national union.  The Communist Party in 
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Vietnam created state institutions with the intention of penetrating society during and 
after the American invasion, and so these institutions are capable of acting autonomously 
and effectively when they get clear directions from the top. 
The problem with Indonesia is not democracy per se, the problem is that Suharto 
centralized all power in the country under his control and so his abdication led to a 
vacuum that has yet to be filled.  The labor movement is fractured, state institutions are 
weak, and no political party has risen to dominance, so there simply no one setting a 
national agenda.  On top of this, Indonesia is ethnically heterogeneous and geographically 
dispersed, making cooperation difficult, and the country has no threatening neighbors that 
would force different groups to cooperate. 
Conclusion 
The main lesson drawn from this comparison for Better Work, the United Nations, and 
development agencies broadly is that domestic politics are not necessarily important for a 
program’s implementation.  A development program can do its work quite well with or 
without active support from domestic stakeholders.  However, if a program wants to have 
a broader impact on the country, then domestic actors must pick up the baton themselves.   




                                                 
†† The data for tables 7.1 and 7.2 come from the publicly-available Compliance Synthesis Reports, which 
can be found at www.betterwork.org.  These reports show the findings from Better Work’s compliance 
assessment tool, which is discussed in detail in chapter 6.  Compliance on each of the 38 issues in the tables 
is based on a series of yes-or-no questions.  Non-compliance on just one of these questions leads to 





Child Labourers 0 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 6
Documentation and Protection 0 22
Race and Origin 0 0
Religion and Political Opinion 0 0
Gender 35 22
Other Grounds 20 100
Coercion 0 0
Bonded Labour 0 3
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 0
Prison Labour 0 0
Union Operations 25 100
Freedom to Associate NA NA
Interference and Discrimination 5 97
Collective Bargaining 30 66
Strikes 5 9
Minimum wages 10 12
Overtime wages 50 9
Premium Pay NA 3
Method of Payment 5 3
Wage Information, Use, Deduction 25 25
Paid Leave 15 78
Social Security and Other Benefits 50 3
Employment Contracts 75 25
Contracting Procedures 45 19
Termination 5 12
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 80 44
OSH Management Systems 100 90
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 95 100
Worker Protection 100 100
Working Environment 100 22
Health Services and First Aid 100 81
Welfare Facilities 100 100
Worker Accommodation 5 9
Emergency Preparedness 100 72






Table 7.1: Initial Non-Compliance Rates
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7 Changes in compliance are calculated for factories that have been in the program for more than one year.  Changes 
are based on a factory’s score from the previous year, not since the beginning of the program. The data shows the 
change in average compliance, so a positive 10 indicates that 10 percent of total factories assessed improved on that 
issue.  A cell with P means that changes to compliance on that issue were driven by changes to domestic law or 
changes to Better Work’s policy, not changes in factories. 
2013 2014 2015 2012 (Mar) 2012 (Oct) 2013 2014 2015
11 23 71 52 77 87 121 111
Child Labourers 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 0 3 0 -5 3 5 4
Documentation and Protection -9 4 6 12 2 -2 7 9
Race and Origin 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Religion and Political Opinion -9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gender 18 30 3 2 4 2 6 3
Other Grounds 9 0 13 0 0 0 P P
Coercion 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -2 2
Bonded Labour 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0
Prison Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union Operations 0 -4 4 0 0 P -4 45
Freedom to Associate 18 4 6 NA NA P NA NA
Interference and Discrimination 0 -4 6 P 31 P -2 13
Collective Bargaining 0 0 3 23 10 P 13 -11
Strikes 0 0 0 6 4 P -1 1
Minimum wages -45 0 14 4 6 0 11 -6
Overtime wages -45 -4 17 0 4 -6 -13 -5
Premium Pay NA NA NA 2 3 0 -2 -1
Method of Payment 0 9 6 0 0 1 -2 1
Wage Information, Use, Deduction -27 9 11 -11 -3 1 7 7
Paid Leave -27 9 17 P -8 2 21 4
Social Security and Other Benefits 18 0 -7 -2 -7 -7 -7 3
Employment Contracts 0 22 8 P 5 13 -2 10
Contracting Procedures x -22 17 P 0 16 14 6
Termination 0 -17 -15 2 7 -3 -22 -9
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 0 0 18 19 13 9 -2 P
OSH Management Systems 9 9 3 44 27 P 11 P
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 0 13 10 10 8 9 26 5
Worker Protection 9 4 10 25 20 -3 7 -6
Working Environment 27 9 18 10 11 6 -2 8
Health Services and First Aid 0 13 3 P 0 6 26 P
Welfare Facilities 9 17 13 2 0 1 6 P
Worker Accommodation 0 0 3 0 0 2 -2 1
Emergency Preparedness 0 17 -3 31 22 0 P 5
Regular Hours -36 -4 19 5 P -8 5 9
Overtime -9 -4 7 -4 -5 -3 2 4
Leave -27 -48 28 15 P P 1 11
-117 70 242 201 152 37 107 114Total
Year of Publication
Number of Factories






Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining
Compensation
Table 7.2: Changes in Compliance for Factories in the Program for More than One Year
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Chapter Eight: Evaluating Better Work 
This chapter will evaluate Better Work.  The first three sections judge the program’s success 
against three specific benchmarks.  The first section looks at changes in compliance rates on the 
CAT.  It shows that compliance has improved on all issues in all countries, albeit unevenly.  The 
second section examines the modest evidence that Better Work has gathered in support of the 
business case for compliance.  The third section looks at the influence the program has had on 
national apparel industries and shows that Better Work has been able to shape entire industries 
through partnerships with domestic stakeholders.   
The fourth and final section does not judge Better Work against any specific criteria.  
Rather, it discusses three of the program’s core characteristics that shape its ability to be 
effective.  These characteristics are: a focus on “win-win” solutions, the buyer-driven nature of 
the program, and a history of emphasizing monitoring problems instead of solving them. 
1. Improvements to the Compliance Assessment Tool 
The simplest way to evaluate Better Work is to look at whether or not factories have improved 
their performance on the specific issues measured by the CAT.  This section will begin by 
summarizing data from the CAT that has been collected in six Better Work countries over the 
last several years (monitoring had not begun in Bangladesh at the time of analysis and 
Cambodia’s assessment tool is not compatible with the countries that came later).   The section 
will then discuss the underlying characteristics that drive compliance. 
Changes to Compliance Rates 
Table 8.1 shows non-compliance rates during the first round of Better Work evaluations in each 
country.  These numbers illustrate working conditions in these factories at the moment Better 




Non-compliance rates are measured as a percentage of total factories.  The rows shows 
the CAT’s eight “compliance clusters;” the first four clusters are the ILO’s core labor rights, the 
second four relate to domestic law.  Better Work’s public reports divide these clusters are into 38 
“compliance points” which are measured by several yes-or-no questions.  The specific questions 
are not shown on public reports, although certain high non-compliance questions are highlighted 
in annual reports.  If a factory is non-compliant on just one of these yes-or-no questions, then it is 
labeled non-compliant on the entire compliance point.  The source for this data is Better Work’s 
compliance synthesis reports, which can be found online at www.betterwork.org.  
Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
21 20 15 10 20 32
Child Labourers 0 5 0 0 0 0 1
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 0 7 0 0 6 2
Documentation and Protection 0 0 0 0 0 22 4
Race and Origin 29 0 20 0 0 0 8
Religion and Political Opinion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gender 38 35 0 0 15 22 18
Other Grounds 0 20 0 10 95 100 37
Coercion 10 0 74 0 0 0 14
Bonded Labour 0 0 0 0 0 3 1
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 0 0 10 0 0 2
Prison Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union Operations 42 25 100 10 0 100 46
Freedom to Associate NA NA NA NA 0 NA 0
Interference and Discrimination 5 5 0 20 5 97 22
Collective Bargaining 0 30 0 0 40 66 23
Strikes 0 5 0 0 0 9 2
Minimum wages NA 10 20 10 0 12 9
Overtime wages NA 50 33 30 5 9 21
Premium Pay 0 NA NA 0 NA 3 1
Method of Payment 5 5 27 10 20 3 12
Wage Information, Use, Deduction 56 25 74 30 60 25 45
Paid Leave 61 15 33 0 35 78 37
Social Security and Other Benefits 75 50 7 10 50 3 33
Employment Contracts 46 75 53 50 90 25 56
Contracting Procedures 10 45 47 20 10 19 25
Termination 19 5 NA 10 60 12 18
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 28 80 53 80 50 44 56
OSH Management Systems 85 100 33 70 95 90 79
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 100 95 27 80 90 100 82
Worker Protection 100 100 100 100 90 100 98
Working Environment 46 100 40 90 65 22 60
Health Services and First Aid 91 100 86 70 90 81 86
Welfare Facilities 91 100 100 80 90 100 93
Worker Accommodation 0 5 86 30 5 9 23
Emergency Preparedness 85 100 93 90 90 72 88
Regular Hours 100 30 40 50 40 47 51
Overtime 85 80 20 20 45 97 58
Leave 5 10 20 20 75 12 24
Average 




















Table 8.1 contains a few key lessons.  Child labor and forced labor have almost no 
violations.   There are also few cases of discrimination.  These tend to be instances of factories 
only hiring women or not hiring the legal quota of disabled people.   
Freedom of association (FOA) and collective bargaining is more mixed.  Some countries 
have very high non-compliance rates, other have virtually no non-compliance.  However, it is 
likely that the data here understates the extent of FOA violations in these countries because FOA 
is by far the most difficult of the eight compliance clusters to measure. Factory owners rarely 
oppose FOA outright in ways that are easy to observe.  Instead, they attempt a variety of tricks to 
prevent workers from organizing and bargaining collectively.   
These tricks include forming a management-controlled union, not allowing workers to 
take breaks to attend meetings, firing union members on pretexts, promoting union leaders to 
positions with high salaries, spying on union meetings, and generally pressuring workers not to 
attend.  Managers also coach workers on how to speak with Better Work EAs to give the 
appearance that the factory respects FOA.  Finally, managers may not understand the law so may 
violate FOA without realizing it.  All of these violate Better Work’s CAT and usually also break 
domestic law, but these issues can be difficult to for EAs to find.   
Compensation issues have a moderately high rate of non-compliance across all countries.  
Non-compliance on these issues usually relate to informing workers about their salaries and 
deductions as well as properly paying workers for wages beyond their base salary.  These other 
wages include overtime pay, paid leave, bonuses, and payments into national social security 
programs.  
Contracts have a fairly high rate of non-compliance.  Non-compliance in this cluster 
tends to be driven by factories improperly using short-term contracts, terminating employees 
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illegally and denying them severance pay, and lacking any mechanism for grievances and dispute 
resolution. 
Occupational safety and health (OSH) has by far the highest non-compliance rates among 
the eight clusters.  For several compliance points, the average non-compliance across countries 
exceeds 90 percent.  These high non-compliance rates are driven partly by poor safety records in 
factories, partly by the ease with which these issues can be measured, and partly by the 
frequency with which improvements on these issues can backslide. 
Working hours also has a moderately high rate of non-compliance.  In many cases, 
factories simply exceed the domestic legal limit on working hours per week.  Non-compliance 
can also be driven by more factories keeping two sets of books, not providing workers with sick 
leave or allowing new mothers to take breastfeeding breaks, and having security personnel and 
other support staff work excessively long hours. 
Table 8.2 captures changes in non-compliance rates over time.  Each column in table 8.2 
shows the average change in non-compliance across all countries during a given year of Better 
Work operating in that country.  For example, the first column of numbers shows the average 
change in compliance among the six countries after the program had been in operation for one 
year (the columns cannot be divided by calendar year because different Better Work country 
programs started at different times).  The next column shows changes during the program’s 





This table summarizes an enormous amount data and the significant variation between 
countries has been lost.  This chapter’s Annex has tables that show changes for each country in 
each time period and contains technical details about how the numbers were found, sorted, and 
analyzed. 
One Two Three Four Five
Child Labourers 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hazardous Work 2 -1 2 2 2 7
Documentation and Protection 1 2 2 2 2 9
Race and Origin 6 3 -11 0 -1 -4
Religion and Political Opinion 1 3 -1 2 0 5
Gender 8 8 -1 5 3 23
Other Grounds 3 0 4 15 16 38
Coercion 4 8 8 2 2 24
Bonded Labour -4 -2 7 4 1 5
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 2 0 2 -1 4
Prison Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union Operations 2 0 1 -1 13 16
Freedom to Associate 3 6 2 0 -2 9
Interference and Discrimination 2 7 2 -2 6 14
Collective Bargaining 0 4 3 4 -19 -8
Strikes 0 2 0 -1 1 2
Minimum wages -2 2 4 1 -1 4
Overtime wages -12 12 2 1 -16 -13
Premium Pay 1 3 -1 -6 -3 -6
Method of Payment -3 9 9 2 2 18
Wage Information, Use, Deduction 3 4 6 6 0 20
Paid Leave -2 9 10 6 1 24
Social Security and Other Benefits -3 11 -1 -1 -10 -4
Employment Contracts 9 21 17 -5 2 45
Contracting Procedures 8 1 11 -2 3 20
Termination 6 5 -5 -7 2 1
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 16 13 2 2 10 44
OSH Management Systems 23 20 5 1 19 68
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 0 12 10 8 6 36
Worker Protection 4 8 5 5 -3 19
Working Environment 0 12 12 -10 10 24
Health Services and First Aid -9 13 9 14 1 28
Welfare Facilities 6 20 1 5 1 33
Worker Accommodation -2 5 1 0 -1 3
Emergency Preparedness 5 11 3 -4 5 20
Regular Hours -5 18 6 9 -8 19
Overtime 6 -4 10 8 -5 14
Leave 6 1 23 7 2 39




Freedom of Association 
and Collective Bargaining
Table 8.2: Average Changes in Compliance During Each Year of the Program
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 There are some limitations to the data presented in this table.  The 38 compliance points 
are measured by several specific questions; non-compliance on a single question leads to non-
compliance on the entire point.  As such, factories may be improving on individual questions 
without showing improvement on the compliance point.  Also, the change in compliance in a 
given year is calculated by Better Work to include all factories that have been assessed more than 
once.  Therefor, data from factories that have participated for many years are combined with 
factories with only one year in the program.  This weakens the inferences that can be made about 
how factories improve over time.  A final limitation to this data is that changes in compliance 
may be driven by factories being more transparent or by EAs getting better at finding violations 
(changes in compliance due to legal reforms or alteration to Better Work policy were omitted). 
 The upshot of these limitations is that table 8.2 probably understates the improvements 
made by Better Work.  Improvements on specific questions do not necessarily lead to 
improvements on the compliance point; the improvements in factories during their early years 
are mixed up with factories that have been in for longer, after the rate of improvement has 
slowed; and increases in non-compliance may be due to better measurement rather than 
worsening conditions. 
 Despite these limitations, there are some useful inferences that can be drawn from this 
table.  First, there has been a lot of improvement in all countries on all compliance clusters.  The 
total change in average compliance is positive for all but five of the 38 compliance points.  
Increased compliance is highest in the areas with the highest initial non-compliance rates.  These 
are OSH, contracts and human resources, and compensation.   
Second, the rate of improvement is modest after one year, becomes very high in the 
second and third years, and then slows down during the fourth and fifth years.  The table’s 
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bottom row adds the average changes to compliance for each year and shows that the total was 
80 for year one, 249 for year two, 157 for year three, 75 for year four, and 41 for year five.  
Improvements are slow the first year of a program for a few reasons: factories are still 
learning about the criteria for compliance, Better Work staff are learning how to use the 
assessment tool, and some changes take time to implement.  The escalation of improvements in 
years two and three, followed by a slower rate of improvement in later years, indicates that 
factories can address the easiest issues within the first three years.  By the fourth year, remaining 
improvements will be more challenging. 
 In looking at each compliance cluster, we see little improvement in child labor or forced 
labor, which is to be expected given the very low rates of non-compliance to begin with.  In the 
discrimination cluster there is modest improvement in gender, indicating that factories are no 
longer exclusively hiring women for production roles (also, they are not exclusively hiring men 
for security, maintenance, and transportation).  Discrimination against people with disabilities 
(captured in the “other grounds” point) improved moderately as well because factories in 
Indonesia and Jordan began complying with local laws mandating that a small percentage of 
employees must be disabled. 
 The FOA cluster shows a few compliance points with small and modest improvements; 
there is one point with a decrease in compliance driven by Jordan and Vietnam in their fifth year.  
As discussed above, FOA is hard to measure and so the CAT probably paints an inaccurate 
picture.  To better understand FOA, it is necessary to supplement CAT data with qualitative data 
from interviews and reports.  When qualitative information is taken into account, three countries 
have had improvements in FOA: Haiti, Jordan, and Vietnam. 
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 Shortly after Better Work began operating in Haiti, EAs began finding extensive FOA 
violations and not a single factory in Haiti had union representation.  Better Work spent several 
years working with factories, training unions, and organizing tripartite discussions.  By 2014, 
FOA violations had fallen significantly and 70 percent of the factories in Better Work had unions 
(Better Work Haiti 2015).  In Jordan, FOA has improved since Better Work’s inception through 
the sector-wide CBA.  This CBA gave migrant workers more rights and legalized a national 
union (Better Work Case Study 2013b).  Vietnam is the one country where FOA has improved 
noticeably in the CAT because of a concerted effort by Better Work, the labor ministry, and the 
national trade union to increase workers’ representation in the garment sector. 
 The compensation cluster shows modest improvements during the second and third years 
followed by a flattening-out of improvements during the fourth and fifth years.  Improvements 
occur across almost all categories of issues, including paying the minimum wage, correctly 
calculating bonuses, making payments to social security, and implementing transparent reporting 
of wage information.  Overtime pay is the main issue where compliance declined because the 
law in most countries gives workers double their regular salary for overtime work.  Factory 
owners employ a variety of tricks to avoid paying this rate, especially in conditions where 
overtime is prevalent and workers are ill-informed about their rights. 
  The contracts and human resources cluster show significant increases in the first three 
years followed by few improvements in later years.  The improvements in early years occur 
across all issues.  By the fourth year, two central issues remain high in non-compliance.  One is 
the improper use of probationary contracts under which workers have lower salaries, less 
benefits, and fewer rights.  The second major issue is employers not informing workers about the 
exact terms of their contracts, their rights under national law, and the provisions of relevant 
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CBAs.  Weak unions contribute to this problem because they may not be informing their 
members either. 
 Occupational safety and health, the cluster with the highest rates of initial non-
compliance, has seen the greatest improvements.  By far the greatest improvement has come in 
OSH management systems.  Chemicals and hazardous substances, along with worker facilities 
have also seen significant improvements.  Despite these improvements, however, overall non-
compliance remains stubbornly high across all the issues covered by OSH. 
 The working time cluster also shows improvements.  The “leave” compliance point 
shows significant improvement, mostly because factories are allowing workers to take legally 
mandated breaks.  The compliance points that look at regular and overtime hours show more 
modest improvements even though overall non-compliance on these issues remains quite high. 
Characteristics that Drive Changes in Compliance 
The previous section shows that factories in the Better Work program have improved their 
compliance across almost all issues measured by the CAT.  The degree of improvements, 
however, varies over time and over issue area.  This section of the paper looks at the underlying 
characteristics of issues that drive the degree to which they improve. 
 The conclusions presented here are based on a few sources of information.  The first is 
the CAT data discussed above.  Second, a dataset provided by Better Work that contains 
information on each of the CAT’s yes-or-no questions.  Third, an internal report conducted by 
Better Work’s research team in Geneva.  Fourth, and by far the most important, is interviews 
with Better Work staff in Geneva and in field offices.  
 The five characteristics that determine the rate of improvement are: the cost of 
implementation, the benefit to factory owners, whether the issue looks at policies instead of 
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conditions on the ground, the extent to which an issue challenges cultural norms, and how much 
an improvement might alter the balance of power in a factory. 
 Unsurprisingly, one of the strongest drivers of changes in compliance is the cost of 
remediating the issue.  Better Work has had a lot of success in improving compliance with issues 
that are inexpensive to address but has struggled to get factories to invest in expensive 
improvements.  To give a telling example, the “welfare facilities” compliance point in the OSH 
cluster asks one question about handwashing facilities and another question about toilets.  When 
looking at detailed data for each question, there is rapid improvement in the question on 
handwashing, but little improvement in the question on toilets.  This disparity can be explained 
by the simple fact that installing sinks with soap dispensers is a lot cheaper than installing 
gender-separated toilets. 
 Another telling comparison is between two issues that are workers’ top priorities: safety 
and temperature.  When looking at detailed questions from the CAT about training workers to be 
safe, there is rapid improvement in all countries.  On questions about heat levels, however, there 
is very little improvement over time.  Even in Cambodia, where the program has been operating 
for over a decade, 69 percent of factories are too hot (Better Factories Cambodia 2015).  Like in 
the issue above, this disparity is driven by the high cost of infrastructure improvements in 
factories compared to the low cost of training workers.  Given the industry’s low profit margins 
and pressure from buyers, factory owners are unwilling to invest in these improvements, 
especially if they are renting the facilities from landlords or, in the case of some countries, 
government agencies in industrial zones.   
 One exception to cost is the extent to which the improvement will benefit owners.  When 
looking at questions related to fire detection and fire-fighting equipment, the rate of 
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improvement is moderate to high across countries.  Although these investments can be 
expensive, they protect the owners’ property and so are implemented while investments that 
solely benefit workers are omitted.    
 The next important driver of change is whether or not a compliance question looks at a 
factory’s policy versus the factory’s actual conditions.  For example, the compliance point on 
OSH management systems has shown by far the highest improvement of all points in table 8.2.  
Despite this, actual OSH conditions in factories continue to be the greatest source of non-
compliance.  Another example comes from the compensation cluster.  The highest improvement 
has been on the “wage information, use, and deduction” compliance point.  This point looks at 
whether or not factories have properly informed workers about how their pay was calculated.  
Despite the improvement on this point, there has been an overall decrease in compliance with 
respect to overtime pay, indicating that workers are being paid incorrectly even though they are 
receiving more information about their wages.  A final example is employment notices that 
discriminate on the basis of gender by only requesting female applicants.  This once-common 
practice has been almost completely eliminated, but this does not mean that gender 
discrimination does not continue in less obvious ways.   
 These examples show that factories are willing to quickly change their policies in order to 
be compliant, but that these policy changes do not necessarily lead to improvements in actual 
working conditions.  These policies may signal a sincere effort by management to address 
problems, but they may also be an attempt to raise compliance scores without having to commit 
to real change.  The evidence on whether or not changes to policy lead to changes on the ground 
is inconclusive.  The only study that looks at this question found that OSH policies loosely 
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correlate with actual improvements to OSH conditions over time, but the direction of causality is 
unclear (Eisenbraun et. al. 2015).   
 A third driver of change is the extent to which non-compliance is driven by cultural 
norms.  A central component of Better Work, the PICC, is a good example.  PICCs are a 
requirement for all participating factories in Better Work, they are mandated by domestic law in 
several countries, they are inexpensive to implement, and they have clear benefits for factory 
owners.  Despite this, Better Work EAs in Vietnam and Indonesia reported that many factories 
struggle to implement this reform because factory managers are not used to communicating 
openly with workers and workers are not used to voicing their concerns.  The Vietnamese 
employers’ association representative reported that factories often become strong supporters of 
PICCs, but only after several years and a leap of faith on the part of both managers and workers.  
Other examples of issues that challenge cultural norms are bipartite OSH committees, sexual 
harassment, and verbal abuse. 
 A final driver of change is whether or not reforms alter the balance of power between 
managers and workers.  This characteristic is most directly related to the FOA and collective 
bargaining cluster. Other issues, however, also play a role in determining power structures.  
These include contracting procedures, promotion opportunities, and payment schedules. 
At present, the balance of power in factories lies with employers.  Unemployment is high 
in most countries with a Better Work program; unions are weak and workers are intimidated 
when they attempt to organize; employers cooperate and often have allies in the government; and 
multinational brands are not concerned with FOA violations in their supply chain.  This uneven 
balance of power makes it possible for factory owners to ignore improvements in working 
conditions and cheat workers in a variety of ways.  If workers could easily organize and bargain 
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collectively, they could ensure that their rights are protected.  For obvious reasons, factory 
owners tend to resist improvements on FOA issues. 
When looking at Better Work countries, FOA improvements have occurred in Haiti, 
Jordan, and Vietnam. These improvements came about because a powerful authority was able to 
put pressure on factories to comply.  In the case of Haiti, it was the US Department of Labor, 
which can revoke the country’s privileged access to the United States and which independently 
uncovered FOA abuses in the country’s garment sector.  In Jordan, it was the Jordanian 
government responding to pressure from the US government under their bilateral free trade 
agreement.  In Vietnam, the labor ministry and the national union made a concerted effort to 
improve worker representation.  Better Work played an important facilitating role in all three 
countries, but the program was not able to overcome owners’ resistance to FOA by itself.   
Indonesia is a useful comparison.  The Indonesian labor ministry does not effectively 
enforce FOA and the country’s labor movement is decentralized and disorganized, so the Better 
Work program in this country does not have a lot support in its efforts to improve FOA.   
In interviews conducted in Indonesia, staff and EAs indicated an uncertainty about how 
to approach FOA.  During assessment visits, EAs often do not have the time to investigate FOA 
violations thoroughly enough to prove them.  Moreover, EAs may overlook FOA problems 
during their assessment visits in order to not alienate managers and make future cooperation 
more difficult.  EAs would rather focus on OSH and fire safety problems during the assessment 
visit and address FOA issues during advising visits.  All of this leads to underreporting of FOA 
violations and no clear strategy about how to improve FOA violations. 
It is possible that similar circumstances have led to underreporting in Lesotho and 
Nicaragua, where the CAT shows very little non-compliance on FOA.  A study in Lesotho, for 
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example, found that eight of 17 focus groups with workers in Lesotho mentioned FOA violations 
(Pike and Godfrey 2012).  Another report by the ITUC found “a large and fast-rising number of 
petitions, complaints and reports filed against practices of textiles employers” (ITUC 2009, 6).  
Nicaragua has stronger unions and a more leftist government than Lesotho, but Freedom House 
gives the country a score of six out of 12 on Associational and Organizational Rights, writing:  
“Employees have reportedly been dismissed for union activities, and citizens have no effective 
recourse when those in power violate labor laws (Freedom House 2015b).”   Given these reports, 
one would expect to see higher FOA violations on the CAT in these countries. 
When looking across the countries with Better Work programs, it appears that the 
program can address FOA issues most effectively when a powerful authority stands behind it.  
When acting on its own, Better Work’s main source of authority is multinational buyers, and 
their priorities are child labor, fire safety, and OSH, not FOA.   
That said, the Better Work program does take FOA issues very seriously.  One staff 
member in Geneva works solely on this issue and one person in each country office coordinates 
industrial relations policy (there are no other issues that receive such dedicated attention).  The 
program conducts a lot of trainings on FOA and has implemented various initiatives in different 
countries to improve FOA.  The scope of the problem, however, is so vast that an international 
program has limited ability to address it without strong local support; previous initiatives in labor 
standards have also struggled with FOA (see Anner 2012 on the FLA; see Locke, Amengual, and 
Mangla 2009 on corporate codes). 
When looking across the characteristics that drive change, we can see that Better Work 
has been able to significantly improve compliance on issues that are inexpensive, easy to 
implement, benefit owners, and do not challenge cultural norms or power relations.  As issues 
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become more expensive, difficult, and challenging, the rate of improvement declines.  This 
unsurprisingly conclusion says something important about how Better Work is structured: the 
program is not an “authority” that can compel factories to alter their behavior.  Rather, the 
program must rely on persuasion most of time and can only rely on other sources of authority in 
narrow instances. 
Section four of this chapter extensively discusses Better Work’s structure.  But before 
turning to that, the next two sections of this chapter evaluate Better Work’s effectiveness on two 
other criteria: proving the business case for compliance and improving a country’s apparel 
industry as a whole. 
2. Proving the Business Case 
One of Better Work’s goals is to demonstrate that good labor practices benefit businesses 
themselves.  This is subtly different from the dominant argument in support of labor rights; i.e. 
that labor rights are good for an economy as a whole despite the challenges they impose on 
businesses (chapter 8 of the World Bank’s 2013 World Development Report on Jobs summarizes 
this debate). 
 Demonstrating the business case for compliance with labor codes is partly a way for 
Better Work to fulfill its core mission and partly a way for the program to influence larger 
debates about economic policy.  These efforts support Better Work’s core mission by convincing 
factories to join the program and improve their labor conditions without constant pressure from 
buyers, unions, labor rights groups, and Better Work staff.  Two decades of sustained labor right 
advocacy in this industry, coupled with some pressure from international buyers, has proven that 
labor conditions will not improve significantly unless management and owners buy into the 
process.  Convincing them that labor rights are in their self-interest is key to the program. 
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 Better Work maintains that factories will receive a number of benefits by participating in 
the program and improving compliance.  One claim is that factories will improve their 
relationships with international buyers.  Another is that happier, healthier workers are more 
productive and less likely to quit.  A final claim is that innovations in human resources and 
organization of production will improve efficiency.  Over its years of operation, Better Work has 
compiled modest evidence in support of these claims. 
 A series of studies conducted by independent academics and supported by Better Work 
have found a few positive links between labor rights compliance and improved positions in the 
apparel supply chain.  One finding is that good compliance scores are a prerequisite for factories 
to work with “reputation-conscious” buyers.  These buyers usually build longer relationships 
with factories and their orders have a higher profit margin, so factories aspire to work with these 
buyers (Better Work 2011a; Oka 2012; Robertson 2011).  Good compliance on labor rights, 
naturally, is not a sufficient condition; factories still must deliver on price, quality, and 
timeliness, but this finding does show that better buyers demand better labor conditions.   
One survey of 14 international buyers found that almost all of them check a factory’s 
labor conditions before placing an order.  But once the order has been placed, it is virtually 
unheard of for a buyer to cancel the order due to labor compliance issues, indicating a modest 
commitment to labor rights (Better Work 2011b). 
 Several studies have found a correlation between labor rights and worker productivity.  
One study using a survey of workers found a positive correlation between workers’ perceptions 
of working conditions, factory profits, and speed of production (Brown et al 2015).  Other 
studies found that factories had lower profits when they had higher reported incidents of verbal 
abuse (Rourke 2014) and sexual harassment (Lin et al 2014).  
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These two studies found that the link between harassment and profitability is partly due 
to factories paying hourly wages rather than paying worker per piece.  This leads to problems 
because workers have no financial incentive to hurry, while managers experience pressure to 
speed up production.  As a result, managers feel that they have to harass workers to motivate 
them.  This particular finding could hopefully be used to convince factories across the industry to 
adopt pay-by-piece wage systems. 
Better Work’s final claim is that improved labor rights lead to more efficient 
management systems that can improve productivity independent of worker effort.  There is a 
good deal of evidence to suggest that apparel factories are not running at maximum efficiency.  
In a famous experiment, economists from Stanford University hired a team of top-tier 
international consultants to advise apparel factories around Mumbai on management and 
production systems.  The factories subsequently had a 17 percent increase in productivity in the 
first year after being advised (Bloom et al 2013). 
One reason that factories are not efficient is because managers rarely communicate 
clearly and openly with workers.  Better Work has found a lot of evidence to support the theory 
that managers are not aware of what workers truly value.  Assuming that managers are willing to 
improve working conditions, they would presumably want to maximize workers’ happiness at 
minimum cost.  This would require knowing precisely which issues workers care about.  In a 
series of surveys of both workers and management, researchers found that managers’ perceptions 
of workers’ interests are not aligned with what workers actually want (Domat et al 2013).  
Workers’ most important issues, by a significant margin, were temperature and air quality; 
management assumed that this issue was unimportant for workers.   Other issues, such as safety 
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and proper grievance procedures, were far more important to workers than managers realized 
(Better Work 2013; Pike and Godfrey 2012).   
 One piece of evidence to support the idea that Better Work improves management 
systems is that factories with improved scores are likely to stay in business longer (Brown et al 
2011).  Another study that looked specifically at BFC found that labor conditions did not 
deteriorate after the program stopped publicly reporting factories’ scores.  The authors argue that 
the absence of backsliding indicates that improvements benefited owners by increasing 
productivity (Robertson et al 2011; Brown et al 2012).   
 Taken together, Better Work has amassed a substantial amount evidence that improved 
compliance is good for business.  This evidence, however, is not strong enough for the program 
to convince skeptical factory owners.  Representatives from the IOE praised Better Work’s focus 
on the business case but reported that their constituencies remained unconvinced that compliance 
was good for their bottom line.  The ultimate driver of factory participation in Better Work 
remains pressure from MNCs, not a belief in the business case. 
A major test of whether or not Better Work can convince factory owners of the business 
case will come as country programs become independent of donor funding and begin to rely 
solely on fees from factories and buyers.  If Better Work’s activities are truly good for business, 
then these businesses should be willing to pay the full cost. 
3. Improving a Country’s Entire Apparel Industry 
In most countries where Better Work operates, the apparel industry is far too large for the 
program to ever cover all factories.  In these countries, the program strives to improve the entire 
sector through two pathways.  One path is through a “modeling effect” in which non-
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participating factories imitate the best practices of participating factories.  The other path is by 
working with social partners. 
Regarding the modeling effect, there has not been any evidence outside of Cambodia that 
Better Work is affecting factories that do not participate in the program.  In most Better Work 
countries, compliance rates remain low among factories during their first year of participation.  If 
the program were influencing the entire industry, then compliance rates among new participants 
would be higher.  Further, a study commissioned by the World Bank in Vietnam examined 
factories that were not in Better Work.  They compared factories in areas with high participation 
in Better Work to factories in areas with low participation.  They did not find differences in 
working conditions, indicating that a modeling effect is not taking place (Kotikula 2015, 84). 
The only country with evidence of a modeling effect is Cambodia, where compliance 
rates among new participants have improved significantly over the life of the program (Better 
Factories Cambodia 2015, 5).  But Cambodia is a special case among Better Work countries.  
Participation is universal and mandatory, the program covers the entire industry, and the program 
has been in the country for a decade and a half.  This suggests that Better Work has the ability to 
improve an entire industry, but the program must be on a scale sufficient to achieve change and it 
must stay for a long time.  Given this, one could expect industry-wide gains in countries like 
Haiti and Lesotho over the next decade.  Unfortunately, such a change is unlikely in Indonesia 
and Vietnam, much less Bangladesh, absent a significant increase in the program’s capacity.  
On a more positive note, there are many instances of Better Work influencing an entire 
industry through partnerships with governments, employers, and unions.  Examples of these 
partnerships include: capacity building for the national union in Vietnam; training labor rights 
experts in Indonesia; supporting a collective bargaining agreement in Jordan; organizing 
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tripartite discussions in Haiti; and requiring Bangladeshi labor law to comply with international 
law as a condition of the program beginning operations (see section II of chapter six for more 
details about each example).  
By working with social partners, Better Work is able to have an effect on the wider 
industry.  This pathway has limitations, of course, given that it is highly dependent on domestic 
actors.  The upshot here is that Better Work can have influence on an entire sector via domestic 
actors, but it is unlikely that factories that do not participate in Better Work will start modeling 
the behavior of participating factories. 
4. A General Analysis of Better Work 
The previous sections judged Better Work’s effectiveness.  This section highlights three core 
characteristics of Better Work that lead to the program’s strengths and weaknesses. First, Better 
Work maintains the support of its diverse stakeholders by focusing on “win-win” solutions and 
avoiding “zero-sum” conflicts.  Second, Better Work is “buyer-driven,” which gives it some 
power over factory owners but no power over buyers themselves.  Third, Better Work is 
struggling against an older labor rights model that focuses on monitoring and is moving into new 
terrain with its emphasis on remediation. 
Leveraging Small Commitments for Win-Win Solutions 
Better Work’s most interesting feature is the diversity of its stakeholders.  No other actor in the 
field of international labor rights pulls together governments, factories, multinationals, labor 
unions, and international organizations.  This is a strength for the program because it can draw 
on support from so many quarters, but it also puts Better Work in a precarious position because 
any policy that is strongly advocated by one stakeholder may raise opposition in another.   
Moreover, many of these actors have only a minimal commitment to improving labor rights. 
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 Two questions that motivated this research project were how Better Work could satisfy 
these stakeholders and how the program can induce the private sector to take concrete steps to 
improve labor rights.  The answer to both of these questions is that Better Work focuses on 
problems with “win-win” solutions; i.e. solutions that benefit all stakeholders or at least do not 
harm the interests of any stakeholder.  By focusing on win-win solutions, Better Work is able to 
avoid alienating any of its stakeholders while still achieving significant, concrete results. 
Examples of win-win solutions include: improving fire safety, which benefits workers 
and owners; teaching managers to motivate workers through positive relationships rather than 
threats, which raises productivity and improves the workplace culture; developing PICCs to 
improve workplace communication without altering power relations; and organizing Buyers’ 
Forums to improve communication between buyers and other stakeholders. 
 This strategy of focusing on win-win solutions has allowed Better Work to achieve 
considerable success, but it also exposes the program central weakness.  
Better Work is generally unable to address “zero-sum” problems in which one party’s gain 
comes at another’s loss.  If the program pushes too hard on any zero-sum problem, it risks losing 
the support of a key stakeholder, which the program cannot afford to do. 
This explains why some issues on the CAT have not improved at all (e.g. light and 
temperature control, health facilities, toilets, breastfeeding breaks).  Remediating these issues 
would provide a lot of benefit to workers but would be disadvantageous for owners, making 
them classic zero-sum problems.  Many factories have been non-compliant with respect to these 
issues for years and Better Work has not insisted that they comply because such a demand could 
cause factories to exit the program. 
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 Consider another issue, that of the distribution of profits across the apparel industry.  The 
apparel supply chain, which is compared to a totem-pole in chapter two, provides the greatest 
benefits to those at the top of the pole: consumers in wealthy countries and shareholders in 
multinational companies.  Those at the bottom of the pole, workers, have the least ability to 
extract a share of the profits from the supply chain.  In this situation, young women making 
$1500 a year work 60 hours a week so that American and European consumers can change their 
wardrobes seasonally.  Only the most narrow minded free-market economist can look at such a 
system and feel that it is moral. 
 In a more just world, workers in the apparel industry would have their incomes doubled 
and western consumers would have to pay five percent more for their clothing.  Arguably, the 
best thing that Better Work could do to improve workers’ lives would be to push for higher 
wages.  The program, however, does not have the authority to address payments to factories or 
salaries to workers (it only monitors if factories are paying the legal minimum wages and 
complying with CBAs). And if Better Work did launch an initiative to encourage higher salaries 
for workers, multinationals and factories would likely exit the program.  In fact, real wages in 
Cambodia have actually decreased over the life of Better Factories Cambodia because of 
competition from other countries (Robertson 2011). 
 Another simple example of a zero-sum issue that Better Work avoids is the unionization 
of workers.  Better Work and the ILO claim that their role is not to directly organize workers.  
Rather, unions in each country are responsible for organizing workers and engaging in collective 
bargaining; Better Work’s role in this process is simply to monitor whether or not factories are 
negotiating in good faith and following the CBAs they have signed. 
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 This stance of neutrality between unions and employers makes sense for the ILO in 
developed countries with strong labor unions, but it hardly makes sense in countries like 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, or Haiti, where employers and government officials collude to suppress 
unions, often violently.  In countries like these, an ideal program to improve workers’ rights 
would be more active in organizing workers, supporting unions, and protecting union leaders 
from violence.  But Better Work is unable to actively take the side of unions in the countries 
where it operates without alienating employers and, in some cases, governments.  Avoiding of 
this zero-sum problem is necessary for the program to maintain the support of all domestic 
stakeholders, but it means that workers are constantly losing battles that are distributional in 
nature. 
This analysis does not lead to a prescription that Better Work should start immediately 
addressing zero-sum conflicts.  If it did so, the program would lose its support from key 
stakeholders and cease to be effective at all.  The point here is that many labor rights issues in the 
apparel industry are inherently zero-sum and that Better Work is not designed to address these 
issues.  The program has been able to resolve some zero-sum conflicts around pay, health and 
safety, and FOA, but in these cases Better Work had a powerful authority supporting it (e.g. 
multinationals, the domestic government, or the US government).  The upshot here is that Better 
Work is most effective in contexts where another actor has the authority to resolve zero-sum 
problems, leaving Better Work in the position to address problems with win-win solutions 
through its expertise on advising and training. 
This emphasis on the win-win also extends to the relationship between factories and 
international buyers.  In its work with buyers, Better Work focuses on issues that benefit both 
parties and does not address the zero-sum issues that lead to labor rights problems, such as 
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payments to factories.  This is the second key characteristic of the Better Work, which the next 
section discusses in detail. 
Better Work is Buyer-Driven 
One frequently hears the term that Better Work is a “buyer-driven” program, meaning that 
pressure from international buyers, rather than western governments, is now the deciding factor 
in influencing factories in developing countries to join the program.  Buyers are also Better 
Work’s main source of authority because factories are often more responsive to buyers than to 
their own governments.   
The obvious corollary of Better Work’s dependence on buyers is that the program has no 
leverage through which it can get buyers to change their policies that lead to labor rights abuses.  
International buyers have indirectly exacerbated labor abuses over the years by consistently 
driving down prices, playing factories off against each other, charging factories penalties for late 
delivery or quality problems, and never making long-term commitments to factories.  These 
business practices put enormous stress on factory owners who then push that pressure down onto 
their workers. 
Better Work staff have discussed problematic business practices with buyers and have 
included a provision in the Partnership Agreement that asks buyers to look at their business 
practices and take steps to alter policies that worsen labor conditions.  The provision that 
discusses this, however, is vaguely worded, unenforceable, and is not being measured or 
monitored by Better Work.  Further, most of the apparel companies that participate in Better 
Work have not signed the Partnership Agreement; they are subscribers to Better Work’s reports 
and have varying degrees of commitment to the program.  
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Another area where buyers’ practices have fallen short is with respect to supporting 
Better Work.  Ana Aslan, the US Department of Labor's point-person for Better Work, said that 
buyers could do more to encourage their entire supply chain to join Better Work; they could also 
do more to reward factories with higher compliance rates and pressure factories that persistently 
resist addressing their problems.  Even if buyers do not change their business practices, they 
could significantly improve labor rights by more explicitly linking their orders with compliance 
on the CAT.   
Going forward, it seems likely that Better Work will get increasing support from buyers.  
It is in the buyers’ self-interest to continue pushing their supply chains into Better Work and 
reduce duplicating audits and remediation plans.  However, it seems unlikely that buyers will 
significantly alter purchasing practices that lead to labor rights abuses.  These buying practices 
are driven by competition between buyers and there is no reason to expect these competitive 
pressures to subside.  The best that can be achieved is a gradual raising of standards through 
persuasion, education, and changes in the apparel industry’s culture.  There are, fortunately, 
indications that this is happening and that Better Work is a key player, but the ultimate effect of 
this pressure remains indeterminate. 
Moving from Monitoring to Training 
A final key characteristic of Better Work is its origins in a time when international labor rights 
initiatives focused almost exclusively on monitoring factories.  As such, the first program, BFC, 
heavily emphasized monitoring problems instead of addressing them.  Later Better Work 
programs put more of a focus on training and advising, but monitoring has still taken up most of 
each program’s resources (there is variation across countries, with a few countries now devoting 
more resources to advising and training than monitoring). 
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 One of Better Work’s key contributions to labor rights is its demonstration that 
monitoring is less effective than advising and training.  This point was emphasized in numerous 
interviews with international and domestic stakeholders.  Better Work’s PICC was especially 
lauded, even though successful PICCs do not automatically lead to improved scores on the CAT.  
An internal evaluation of Better Work’s trainings found that almost all participants thought 
trainings were relevant and high quality (Better Work 2015).  And while Better Work is more 
expensive than pure monitoring programs, it is cost effective.  The program only costs several 
dollars per worker per year (the cost varies quite a lot across countries, so a single number is not 
available). 
Despite the clear advantages of a focus on remediation, Better Work programs still must 
devote a lot of resources to monitoring.  One reason is that advising is not a substitute for 
monitoring – it is a complement.   Someone must monitor factories and apply incentives for 
factory owners to change.  The problem for Better Work is that it must be both monitor and 
adviser; to put it another way, the program has to be both a policeman and a friend.  This dual 
(and conflicting) role complicates working with factory owners because it creates a relationship 
that is partly adversarial and partly cooperative.  Ideally, the government in these countries 
should monitor and police factories, freeing up Better Work to focus solely on advice.  
Unfortunately, few countries have the resources to properly monitor factories, so the program 
must continue in this dual role. 
Another reason Better Work must continue to focus on monitoring is that its stakeholders 
want the program to provide constant reports.  International buyers, in particular, are very 
attached to the reports they get from Better Work.  These reports, rather than concrete 
improvements in their supply chains’ working conditions, is the actual reason that most buyers 
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participate in the program.  The reports provide them with assurance that their factories are 
obeying basic labor laws and protect them in the event of a scandal.  The US government is also 
still committed to the monitoring paradigm.  The legislation behind Better Work Haiti, for 
example, calls for biannual monitoring reports which are so resource-intensive that the program 
cannot devote enough energy to advising and monitoring.  Unions and labor rights advocates 
also want Better Work to monitor more intensely and make these reports public so that these 
groups can make use of them to pressure factories.  The paradigm of remediation and 
cooperation with factories still runs counter to their thinking. 
The final obstacle to Better Work increasing its commitment to advising and training is 
that the program is not exactly sure about the way to proceed.  No other program has done this 
before, so there is not a set of best practices that Better Work can draw on.  No one knows 
exactly which types of trainings are most effective nor does anyone know the best way to set up 
a successful PICC.  Better Work’s EAs are often learning by doing on these issues and the global 
program is unclear about how to set policy.  As such, there is a good chance that the program 
will make some mistakes or false starts before learning what does and does not work. 
In mid-2015, Better Work rolled out a new model that focuses less on monitoring and 
more on advising.  It will be interesting to see how successful this model is in using the 
program’s limited resources and satisfying stakeholders.  Hopefully, this new model will point 
towards a way that other labor rights initiatives and global governance programs can effect 
change. 
Conclusion 
Better Work has done more to improve labor rights than any other existing international labor 
rights program.  It operates in a challenging environment where numerous pressures run against 
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labor rights and has still managed to achieve significant, concrete, sustainable results on almost 
all the issues it monitors.  Better Work has also been able to work with domestic social partners 
to improve the entire apparel industry in many countries through capacity building programs and 
progress in social dialogue.  Moreover, the program only costs several dollars per worker per 
year, making it well worth the investment for donors and subscribers. 
That said, the program is not a substitute for a functioning state and a well-organized labor 
movement.  Many problems related to labor rights are inherently zero-sum and can only be 
addressed by domestic institutions.  In an ideal world, Better Work would operate in tandem with 
labor ministries and labor unions, with each actor focusing on its advantages.  Labor ministries 
would monitor factories and punish non-compliance, unions would push for workers’ interests, 















Annex: Technical Notes for the Tables 
The raw data for the tables presented in this chapter come from the Compliance Synthesis 
Reports published by Better Work.  These reports are available at the program’s website: 
www.betterwork.org.    
 Tables 8.3 to 8.7 show compliance data for each country.  The year of the data was 
published is included, but the countries are organized by the number of years they have been in 
operation rather than calendar year to account for different start dates.  The cells are color-coded 
along these lines: 
 
Cells that contain the letters NA indicate that the country does not collect data for that 
compliance point.  Cells with the letter P indicate the changes in compliance that year were 
driven by changes to domestic laws or Better Work’s policies.  Dropping these measurement-
driven changes was important because they often led to enormous fluctuations that overwhelmed 
actual changes in working conditions. Haiti’s biannual reports were out of sync with annual 
reports from other countries, so the changes to compliance were added together from the two 
reports in 2013 and 2014 to get the numbers in tables 8.5 and 8.6.  Vietnam third synthesis report 
was the first to contain changes in compliance, but it was omitted because so many of the 
changes were policy related.  Vietnam’s fourth synthesis report is the source of the data for 
Vietnam in table 8.3.   
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Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
2011 2013 2011 2013 2015 2012 (Mar)
15 11 10 9 20 52
Child Labourers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 0 10 0 0 0 2
Documentation and Protection 3 -9 0 0 0 12 1
Race and Origin 4 0 30 0 0 0 6
Religion and Political Opinion 17 -9 0 0 0 0 1
Gender 22 18 0 0 5 2 8
Other Grounds NA 9 -10 11 P 0 3
Coercion 4 0 20 0 0 0 4
Bonded Labour 0 0 -30 0 0 4 -4
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Prison Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union Operations 0 0 0 11 0 0 2
Freedom to Associate NA 18 0 0 NA NA 3
Interference and Discrimination 0 0 0 0 10 P 2
Collective Bargaining 0 0 -10 -11 0 23 0
Strikes -4 0 0 0 0 6 0
Minimum wages P -45 20 11 0 4 -2
Overtime wages 0 -45 -20 -11 5 0 -12
Premium Pay 0 NA NA 0 NA 2 1
Method of Payment 0 0 -20 0 0 0 -3
Wage Information, Use, Deduction 35 -27 10 0 10 -11 3
Paid Leave P -27 20 -11 10 P -2
Social Security and Other Benefits P 18 10 -33 -10 -2 -3
Employment Contracts 13 0 -10 22 20 P 9
Contracting Procedures 0 x 20 11 0 P 8
Termination 30 0 -10 11 5 2 6
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 4 0 40 22 10 19 16
OSH Management Systems 26 9 0 33 25 44 23
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 0 0 -20 -11 20 10 0
Worker Protection -4 9 0 0 -5 25 4
Working Environment -26 27 0 0 -10 10 0
Health Services and First Aid 0 0 -20 -33 10 P -9
Welfare Facilities 4 9 10 0 10 2 6
Worker Accommodation 0 0 0 -11 0 0 -2
Emergency Preparedness -13 0 0 0 10 31 5
Regular Hours 9 -36 10 0 -20 5 -5
Overtime 57 -9 20 -11 -20 -4 6















Table 8.3: Change in Compliance After One Year of Monitoring and Advising
Country Average 





Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
2012 2014 2012 (Mar) 2014 . 2012 (Oct)
22 23 16 13 . 77
Child Labourers 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 0 0 0 . -5 -1
Documentation and Protection 5 4 0 0 . 2 2
Race and Origin 0 4 12 0 . 0 3
Religion and Political Opinion 0 4 12 0 . 0 3
Gender 20 30 -6 -8 . 4 8
Other Grounds NA 0 0 0 . 0 0
Coercion 5 0 33 0 . 0 8
Bonded Labour 0 0 -14 0 . 3 -2
Forced Labour and Overtime 10 0 0 0 . 0 2
Prison Labour 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
Union Operations 5 -4 0 0 . 0 0
Freedom to Associate NA 4 NA 8 . NA 6
Interference and Discrimination 0 -4 0 8 . 31 7
Collective Bargaining 0 0 12 0 . 10 4
Strikes 10 0 -6 0 . 4 2
Minimum wages -5 0 0 8 . 6 2
Overtime wages 10 -4 28 23 . 4 12
Premium Pay 5 NA NA 0 . 3 3
Method of Payment 0 9 28 8 . 0 9
Wage Information, Use, Deduction 0 9 8 8 . -3 4
Paid Leave 5 9 17 15 . -8 6
Social Security and Other Benefits 37 0 12 15 . -7 11
Employment Contracts 22 22 39 15 . 5 21
Contracting Procedures 0 -22 29 0 . 0 1
Termination 26 -17 0 8 . 7 5
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 6 0 17 31 . 13 13
OSH Management Systems 27 9 P 15 . 27 20
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances -11 13 35 15 . 8 12
Worker Protection 5 4 13 0 . 20 8
Working Environment -11 9 22 31 . 11 12
Health Services and First Aid 0 13 50 0 . 0 13
Welfare Facilities 9 17 38 38 . 0 20
Worker Accommodation 0 0 0 23 . 0 5
Emergency Preparedness 9 17 7 0 . 22 11
Regular Hours 32 -4 11 31 . P 18
Overtime 0 -4 -19 8 . -5 -4

















ChangeYear Data was PublishedNumber of Factories




Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
2013 2015 2012 (Nov) 2015 . 2013
23 71 29 . . 87
Child Labourers 0 0 0 . . -1 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 0 0 . . 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 3 3 . . 3 2
Documentation and Protection -1 6 3 . . -2 2
Race and Origin 0 0 -45 . . 0 -11
Religion and Political Opinion -4 0 0 . . 0 -1
Gender -9 3 P . . 2 -1
Other Grounds NA 13 P . . 0 7
Coercion 0 0 31 . . -1 8
Bonded Labour 0 0 28 . . 0 7
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 1 0 . . 0 0
Prison Labour 0 0 0 . . 0 0
Union Operations 0 4 0 . . P 1
Freedom to Associate 0 6 NA . . P 2
Interference and Discrimination 0 6 0 . . P 2
Collective Bargaining 0 3 7 . . P 3
Strikes 4 0 -3 . . P 0
Minimum wages -1 14 3 . . 0 4
Overtime wages -5 17 0 . . -6 2
Premium Pay -4 NA NA . . 0 -1
Method of Payment 0 6 28 . . 1 9
Wage Information, Use, Deduction -5 11 17 . . 1 6
Paid Leave -1 17 21 . . 2 10
Social Security and Other Benefits 9 -7 3 . . -7 -1
Employment Contracts 27 8 21 . . 13 17
Contracting Procedures 0 17 P . . 16 11
Termination 9 -15 -10 . . -3 -5
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes -18 18 0 . . 9 2
OSH Management Systems 13 3 0 . . P 5
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 5 10 17 . . 9 10
Worker Protection 0 10 14 . . -3 5
Working Environment 1 18 21 . . 6 12
Health Services and First Aid 0 3 28 . . 6 9
Welfare Facilities -18 13 7 . . 1 1
Worker Accommodation 0 3 0 . . 2 1
Emergency Preparedness 1 -3 14 . . 0 3
Regular Hours 14 19 0 . . -8 6
Overtime 32 7 3 . . -3 10














Table 8.5: Change in Compliance After Three Years of Monitoring and Advising
Country Average 





Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
2014 . 2013 (Dec) . . 2014
25 . 47 . . 121
Child Labourers 0 . 0 . . 1 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 . 0 . . 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 . 0 . . 5 2
Documentation and Protection 0 . 0 . . 7 2
Race and Origin 0 . P . . 0 0
Religion and Political Opinion 5 . 0 . . 0 2
Gender 4 . P . . 6 5
Other Grounds NA . 15 . . P 15
Coercion 0 . 9 . . -2 2
Bonded Labour 0 . 13 . . 0 4
Forced Labour and Overtime 5 . 0 . . 1 2
Prison Labour 0 . 0 . . 0 0
Union Operations 0 . 2 . . -4 -1
Freedom to Associate 0 . 0 . . NA 0
Interference and Discrimination 0 . -4 . . -2 -2
Collective Bargaining 0 . -2 . . 13 4
Strikes 0 . -2 . . -1 -1
Minimum wages -13 . 4 . . 11 1
Overtime wages 1 . 15 . . -13 1
Premium Pay -9 . NA . . -2 -6
Method of Payment 8 . 0 . . -2 2
Wage Information, Use, Deduction -3 . 15 . . 7 6
Paid Leave -9 . 6 . . 21 6
Social Security and Other Benefits 10 . -6 . . -7 -1
Employment Contracts 1 . -13 . . -2 -5
Contracting Procedures 0 . -21 . . 14 -2
Termination -17 . 17 . . -22 -7
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 5 . 4 . . -2 2
OSH Management Systems -17 . 9 . . 11 1
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances -2 . 0 . . 26 8
Worker Protection 10 . -2 . . 7 5
Working Environment -13 . -15 . . -2 -10
Health Services and First Aid 1 . P . . 26 14
Welfare Facilities 1 . 9 . . 6 5
Worker Accommodation 0 . 2 . . -2 0
Emergency Preparedness -3 . -4 . . P -4
Regular Hours 18 . 4 . . 5 9
Overtime 19 . 2 . . 2 8













Table 8.6: Change in Compliance After Four Years of Monitoring and Advising
Country Average 



















Haiti Indonesia Jordan Lesotho Nicaragua Vietnam
2015 . 2015 . . 2015
26 . 55 . . 111
Child Labourers 0 . 0 . . 1 0
Unconditional Worst Forms 0 . 0 . . 0 0
Hazardous Work 0 . 2 . . 4 2
Documentation and Protection -4 . 2 . . 9 2
Race and Origin 0 . -4 . . 0 -1
Religion and Political Opinion 0 . 0 . . 0 0
Gender 4 . 2 . . 3 3
Other Grounds NA . 16 . . P 16
Coercion 0 . 5 . . 2 2
Bonded Labour 0 . 2 . . 0 1
Forced Labour and Overtime 0 . -2 . . 0 -1
Prison Labour 0 . 0 . . 0 0
Union Operations 0 . -5 . . 45 13
Freedom to Associate -4 . 0 . . NA -2
Interference and Discrimination 4 . 0 . . 13 6
Collective Bargaining 0 . -45 . . -11 -19
Strikes 0 . 2 . . 1 1
Minimum wages 4 . 0 . . -6 -1
Overtime wages -31 . -13 . . -5 -16
Premium Pay -4 . NA . . -1 -3
Method of Payment 0 . 4 . . 1 2
Wage Information, Use, Deduction -4 . -2 . . 7 0
Paid Leave -4 . 2 . . 4 1
Social Security and Other Benefits -4 . -29 . . 3 -10
Employment Contracts -7 . 4 . . 10 2
Contracting Procedures 0 . 2 . . 6 3
Termination 11 . 5 . . -9 2
Dialogue, Discipline, Disputes 12 . 7 . . P 10
OSH Management Systems 19 . P . . P 19
Chemicals, Hazardous Substances 15 . -2 . . 5 6
Worker Protection 0 . -4 . . -6 -3
Working Environment 23 . 0 . . 8 10
Health Services and First Aid 4 . 0 . . P 1
Welfare Facilities 0 . 2 . . P 1
Worker Accommodation 0 . -4 . . 1 -1
Emergency Preparedness 4 . 5 . . 5 5
Regular Hours -30 . -4 . . 9 -8
Overtime -23 . 4 . . 4 -5




Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining
Compensation
Contracts and Human Resources
Occupational Safety and Health
Working Time
Table 8.7: Change in Compliance After Five Years of Monitoring and Advising
Country Average 
Change Year Data was PublishedNumber of Factories
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Chapter Nine: Lessons for Academia and Public Policy 
This chapter unfolds in two parts.  The first part evaluates the constructivist theory of IOs as 
outlined in Who Governs the Globe?, by Avant, Finnemore, and Sell.  Some modifications to the 
theory are suggested, but on the whole the theory proves very useful for understandings Better 
Work.  The second part of this chapter addresses the global governance literature that seeks to 
prescribe how world politics should work.  This section extracts some of the main lessons from 
Better Work that are relevant for other multistakeholder initiatives.  
1. Testing an Academic Theory 
This section uses Better Work as a detailed case study to determine the usefulness of the theory 
laid out in Who Governs the Globe? The section will begin by applying to Better Work the 
theory’s arguments about sources of IO authority.  Then, the section will discuss how this 
authority is used.  Finally, it will assess the theory’s utility and point out some areas that could be 
clarified. 
Sources of Better Work’s Authority 
The theory provides a comprehensive explanation of the sources of Better Work’s authority.  
Three sources are particularly relevant: delegated, expert, and capacity-based.  Three actors 
delegate authority to Better Work: MNCs, the US government, and domestic governments, 
although the importance of each actor varies across countries.  In all countries, MNCs are 
important because they pressure factories to join Better Work and they give the program the 
power to evaluate these factories on their behalf.  To some extent, factory owners believe that 
their business relationships with MNCs depend on cooperating with Better Work.  In Haiti, 
Better Work is delegated power by the US government because the industry could lose its 
preferential trade access if it does not comply with the program.  Better Work programs in 
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Jordan, Lesotho, and Nicaragua are also delegated authority from the US government, although 
the connection is much weaker than in Haiti.  These countries have trade agreements with the 
United States and so they must maintain a semblance of respect for labor rights, but there are no 
consequences for individual factories nor are there clear consequences for a country.  Finally, 
Better Work is delegated authority from domestic governments to varying degrees.  At one 
extreme, in Cambodia the Better Work program effectively substitutes for the labor inspectorate 
in the apparel industry.  In another case of strong delegation, the Jordanian government made 
participation in Better Work mandatory for apparel factories.  The program does not have the 
ability to impose sanctions, but it does work very closely with the labor inspectorate.  In other 
countries where participation is voluntary, Better Work’s close cooperation with the labor 
inspectorate makes it harder for factories to ignore it. 
Expertise is another important source of authority.  The program hires staff with years of 
monitoring experience and then trains them extensively.  It also organizes joint trainings and 
information sharing with government agencies to ensure that its monitoring is of the highest 
quality.  Better Work also has unique expertise in training and improving factories performance.  
No other labor rights initiative in the apparel industry comes close to Better Work’s focus on 
improvements.  This expertise gives Better Work authority that MNCs, governments, unions, and 
even factory owners respect. 
Related to this is Better Work’s capacity-based authority, in which the program’s history 
of effectiveness leads to more power from actors.  Better Work has proven itself to be 
competent: donors are all happy with it, MNCs consider it effective, factory owners report that 
the trainings are of high quality, governments have seen the value, and labor unions often 
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become supporters.  This has led to donors giving the program continued funding, more MNCs 
want to participate, and domestic stakeholders support it. 
 The theory discusses two sources of authority that are not particularly relevant for Better 
Work: institutional authority and principled authority.  According to the concept of institutional 
authority, Better Work could receive authority from being part of the ILO and IFC.  But the ILO 
does not have very much authority to begin with, and the IFC does not use its main lever of 
authority (i.e. access to finance) to drive compliance with Better Work.  As such, the program 
cannot claim institutional authority.  Principled authority is similarly weak for Better Work.  The 
program prefers to adopt a pragmatic, consensus-building approach to problems that frames 
labor standards as a technical problem requiring a technical solution, not a moral problem 
requiring a crusade.  Other actors in labor rights, such as the WRC or the AFL-CIO, rely far 
more on principled authority.   
How Better Work’s Authority Is Used 
The theory in Who Governs the Globe? puts forth a number of ways in which IOs use authority.  
Three uses stand out for Better Work: setting agendas, implementing rules, and evaluating 
compliance.  Two uses of authority, rulemaking and enforcement, are only slightly applicable. 
The concept of IOs setting agendas and creating issues is relevant for Better Work.  For 
example, program staff began promoting the idea of transparent reporting in 2014.  Until this 
point, Better Work did not publicly report any data on the factories it covered (except the factory 
names).  Under the proposed plan, Better Work would publish certain compliance information 
about factories on a publicly accessible website.  Better Work staff, particularly the director Dan 
Rees, promoted this idea among the Management Group and Advisory Committee; he was 
eventually able to convince all stakeholders that it was a good idea.  Another example of agenda-
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setting is that, in its new 2015 model, the program emphasized advising and training over 
monitoring.  This is in contrast to other labor rights programs that focus heavily on monitoring.  
This focus on advising has the potential to shift the long-term discussion on labor standards 
across the apparel industry.  A final example is Better Work meeting with MNCs and discussing 
how MNC buying practices can worsen labor conditions.  Raising this issue has not led to 
demonstrable changes in MNC behavior, but it is significant that Better Work has raised the 
issue. 
Better Work’s authority is also clearly used to implement and evaluate rules.  The 
program is very active in helping factories implement the rules that they are supposed to comply 
with.  The program educates factories about regulations, advises them how precisely how to 
comply, and assists them with putting in place the management systems that will lead to 
improvements in compliance.  And with respect to evaluating, monitoring factories’ compliance 
with rules is one the program’s core operations. 
Better Work’s authority in rulemaking is far less clear.  Half of the CAT is determined by 
the ILO’s four core labor rights, while the other half of the CAT is based on domestic law and 
the details of these questions are negotiated with the local government.  As such, the program has 
imperfect authority over what it monitors (although it has discretion over how it monitors).   
Better Work is also not able to directly enforce rules.  The program publishes its findings 
in a report that MNCs subscribe to, but there is no guarantee that MNCs will take any action.  
Moreover, Better Work does not share non-compliance findings with governments, so it cannot 
rely on labor inspectors’ enforcement power.  The exception to this is rules that fall under the 
Zero Tolerance Protocol.  In these cases, Better Work informs MNCs and labor inspectors when 
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violations are found.  This gives Better Work enforcement power over this narrow range of 
issues.  On other issues, however, Better Work ability to enforce compliance is indeterminate.   
Evaluating the Theory 
Overall, the theory put forth by Avent, Finnemore, and Sell provides a useful framework for 
analyzing Better Work.  This research, however, did find three areas in which the theory could 
be improved through more clarity.  The first is the concept of principled authority; the second is 
a stronger emphasis on relationships; and the third is a number of ways in which IOs exercise 
authority.   
 The concept of principled authority needs clarification.  The authors define this as 
follows: “principled authority is legitimated by service to some widely accepted set of principles, 
morals, or values (Avant et al, 13).”  This definition is problematic because it assumes that there 
are “widely accepted” principles in global politics.  There is good reason to believe that this is 
never the case.  Even in an extreme case like genocide, at least one important actor (i.e. the 
perpetrators), will have some principled justification for their action, however thin. 
With labor rights, claims to morality and principled authority are highly contested.  All 
actors, from unions to factory owners to MNC to importing and exporting governments, make 
valid claims to be on the side of morality.  Moreover, hypocrisy is rife.  Consumers want good 
labor rights and cheap prices; MNCs have one office that pressures factories to improve working 
conditions and another office that demands cheaper, faster production; government elites care 
more about exports and foreign exchange than about their citizens; and so on.   
Given this, it makes little sense to ask if IOs have principled authority – since they all 
claim it.  It seems far more valuable to ask which other actors agree with the IO’s claim and how 
this effects the IO’s authority.  A full answer to this question requires more research, but it is 
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likely that the power of the other actors is key.  Powerful actors in global politics are necessary 
for an IO to get funding, but most IOs do their important work in developing countries where 
governments, businesses, and civil society are weak actors on the global stage.  Therefore, the 
actors who control the IO are often not the ones that must defer to the IO’s authority.  It is 
instead weak actors are expected to defer to the IO.  This leads to three possible scenarios. 
If an IO’s moral claims are accepted by powerful actors but not accepted by weaker ones, 
then weaker actors will simply evade or ignore the IO (e.g. the International Monetary Fund).  If 
an IO is accepted by weaker actors but not by powerful ones, then it will underfunded or 
replaced by an alternative (e.g. the ILO).  But if an IO can have its claims supported by both 
powerful and weaker actors, then it will have strong support and the cooperation of actors on the 
ground (e.g. UNICEF). 
 The second modification to the theory suggested by this dissertation is a stronger focus 
on relationships.  Avant, Finnermore, and Sell do write that “an [IO’s] ability to affect outcomes 
almost inevitably depends on her interactions with others (Avant et al, 22).”  The theory, 
however, focuses a lot on “global governors” and their autonomous use of authority.  In the case 
of Better Work, the program almost never exercises autonomous authority.  The program can 
certainly be viewed as an autonomous actor with its own authority, but its authority mostly gets 
it a “seat at the table” and sometimes the head of the table – its authority is very rarely sufficient 
for it to act alone. 
Rulemaking for the CAT is a good example.  Half of the rules are based on the ILO’s 
four core labor standards, which were agreed on by the ILO’s Governing Body.  Better Work has 
authority over how to translate these core standards into specific questions, but it does not have 
the autonomy to ignore these standards or add different standards.  The other half of the CAT is 
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based on domestic law in each country and the labor ministry has a say in how the questions are 
designed.  This means that the CAT is a negotiated process between Better Work and domestic 
stakeholders, not a process in which Better Work has autonomy. 
Enforcement is another example.  Better Work cannot force factories to do anything, but 
it would be inaccurate to say that the program has no enforcement power.  Through its 
connections to other actors such as governments and MNCs, Better Work staff can put pressure 
on factories to improve compliance and the factories respond.  However, the factories are not 
sure how much they need to respond and Better Work staff are not clear how much pressure they 
can really apply.  This adds up to more than nothing but less than clear enforcement power.  
Setting agendas is final example.  Better Work staff can propose issues and try to steer 
the agenda, but the program’s ultimate agenda is set through discussions and negotiations with a 
host of other actors at the global and national levels.  Donors have a say in the program through 
their control over funding; MNCs have a say because they can exit the program; and domestic 
governments have sovereignty over their territories and can shape the program too.  The analogy 
of having a seat at the table is very apt with respect to setting agendas.  Better Work cannot 
autonomously set agendas but it can direct the conversation. 
 This critique of the theory points to a larger epistemological problem in social sciences.  
It is hard enough to classify actors – and it is even harder to classify relationships between actors.  
Relationships are fluid, dynamic, contextual, and just plain slippery as actors change, new actors 
emerge, old actors fall away, and the conditions in the world outside the IO change.  One could 
end with the familiar call for more research, but it is likely that the nature of relationships will be 
impossible to capture except in the broadest terms.  Despite this challenge, however, students of 
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world politics should focus on the relationships between actors as much as they focus on the 
actors themselves.  
 Finally, there are also some uses of IO authority by Better Work that are not captured by 
the theory.  The first is conducting and supporting research on labor conditions in the apparel 
industry.  This is an area where research is logistically challenging and Better Work has an 
excellent vantage point to conduct unique and impactful research.  From this position, the 
program can shape the research agenda of the entire field of labor rights by emphasizing certain 
issues over others.  It can also use its research and knowledge to promote certain “best 
practices,” standards, and norms.  This suggests that IOs can shape broad debates on their issues 
if they are proactive in using their authority to support and guide research. 
 A second important role played by Better Work is creating and empowering other actors.  
The PICCs set up by the program are an example of empowering workers and actually creating a 
new actor in the field of labor rights.  In some countries, Better Work also enhances the power of 
unions by informing workers about rights, monitoring the implementation of collective 
bargaining agreements, and flagging violations of FOA. 
 The third use of authority by Better Work is creating channels of communication 
between different actors.  These channels include connecting MNCs with labor inspectorates, 
unions with employers’ associations, and the ILO or IFC with individual factories.  These actors 
are effected by similar issues but rarely communicated with each other before Better Work.  The 
program’s institutionalization of communication through meeting like the Buyers Forum and the 
Project Advisory Committee creates path for communication that did not exist before.  Although 
Better Work does not control these channels, by facilitating them the program gains a degree of 
authority over how they are structured and which issues are discussed. 
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 Altogether, this case study strongly supports the value of the constructivist theory from 
Who Governs the Globe?  The important sources of Better Work’s authority are accounted for 
and most of the ways in which Better Work uses its authority are covered.  The theory also takes 
into consideration the importance of relationships, albeit to a lesser degree than is warranted.   
 Finally, it worth briefly discussing why the rationalist approach to IOs falls apart rather 
quickly when studying Better Work.  First, actors in Better Work do not have fixed interests.  
Instead, they define their interests over time through interaction with others.  Factory owners, for 
example, do not have a clear set of preferences with respect to labor rights.  Instead, their 
interests change over time as they interact with others.  Domestic labor unions are another 
example.  Many oppose Better Work at first because they fear duplication or replacement, but 
almost all eventually change their minds as they learn more about the program.  MNCs are a 
final example.  Everyone agrees that MNCs have an interest in labor rights to some degree, but 
no one, including employees of MNCs, can say how important labor rights are compared to 
business issues.  Their interest in labor rights changes over time, is always contested by different 
departments with the MNC, and is subject to pressure from external actors.  This refutes the core 
rationalist assumption that world politics is driven by actors negotiating their pre-determined 
interests.   
The lack of a fixed interest points to the second weakness of rationalism: actors often do 
not have very good information.  Rationalism assumes that actors understand what the outcomes 
of agreements will be.  But in the case of Better Work no one knows what the impact of various 
agreements will be.  The transparent reporting policy is an example.  All the actors on the 
Advisory Committee eventually agreed that the policy should be implemented, but it is 
questionable what effect this will have on labor rights and business conditions. 
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Finally, the assumption that IOs are agents of states does not hold up.  It is true that 
donors have a lot of influence over Better Work, but there is little evidence to support the classic 
principle-agent model.  To begin with, there are four major donors, so which one is the 
principle?  Further, donor agencies within governments need to justify themselves to their 
superiors by supporting successful projects.  Better Work is a successful project that agencies 
want to support, and so Better Work helps agencies in their achieving their goals, switching the 
principle-agent model on its head. 
Advocates of rationalism want to view global politics as precise and tidy so that scholars 
can uncover patterns and make predictions.  Personally, this author would be happy if the world 
worked that way too.  But a fine-grained analysis of Better Work and, frankly, every other issue 
in global politics quickly reveals a world that is too messy for neat theorizing.  The constructivist 
approach takes a less scientific view of the world, which may disappoint some scholars, but it 
provides a more useful frame for thinking about global politics than theories that grasp for an 
ever-elusive precision. 
2. Lessons for Global Governance Studies 
The second purpose of this dissertation is to address the growing literature of GGS, which looks 
at how power is exercised in the world and makes recommendations for how the world should 
be.  Better Work is an excellent example of Abbott and Snidal’s call for IOs to act as 
“orchestrators” and of Ruggie’s model of “polycentric” governance.  The section above 
discussed what Better Work does and how it does it.  This section will address the lessons that 
can be learned from Better Work for how multistakeholder initiatives (MI) should be designed.  




Non-coercive Methods Can Yield Significant Results for Certain Problems 
A starting point for much of the GGS literature is that IOs rarely have the power to coerce other 
actors into compliance, and this is certainly true for Better Work.  As a result, Better Work must 
focus on solutions that are beneficial for all actors (or at least not harmful for any actors) rather 
than on solutions that are distributional in nature (i.e. in which one actor’s gain comes at 
another’s loss).  Despite this limitation, however, Better Work has been able to achieve some 
significant improvements for workers. 
 This is an important insight because many people automatically assume that standards 
can only be improved through coercion.  According to this line of thinking, substantive results 
can only come about through the MI having coercive power over another (Haack and Scherer 
2014 call this the “strict father” model of governance).  The evidence from Better Work shows 
that this is not automatically true - there is no reason to assume that solutions requiring coercion 
will lead to more meaningful improvements than solutions requiring cooperation.  Instead, the 
underlying structure of the problem being addressed by the MI determines whether coercion or 
cooperation is most appropriate. 
 In the context of apparel, problems like fire safety, worker health, and management 
practices can be improved through cooperation because their improvement is beneficial for 
workers, managers, and MNCs.  Problems like wages or paid leave, on the other hand, are 
clearly distributional in nature and require a more coercive approach (either from unions or from 
governments). 
 We can speculate on other domains as well.  Deforestation of the rainforest, for example, 
is a problem that can be solved through cooperation because protecting forests is in the interest 
of people in wealthy countries as well as people living next to the forest who benefit very little 
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for deforestation.  The key here is finding solutions that benefit the people who are cutting down 
trees just to survive.  Conflict diamonds, on the other hand, requires a coercive approach because 
the people who own diamond mines in conflict zones will clearly lose if these diamonds cannot 
enter international markets.  This explains why the success of the Kimberley Process, an MI 
designed to eliminate conflict diamonds, is contingent upon the ability to states to use their 
coercive force (Global Witness 2013). 
This comes back to Tim Bartely’s point that MIs are a site of political contestation, not a 
technocratic response to a problem (Bartely 2003).  In the case of problems that require a 
coercive response, actors that wish to protect their interests may push for an MI that focuses on 
cooperative solutions with the understanding that such an MI will not be able to harm them.  In 
these cases, we should be skeptical that an MI will be effective.  On the other hand, when we see 
an MI addressing a problem with solutions that are mutually beneficial, we should be optimistic 
that the MI can be successful as long as it has sufficient capacity and can train actors in how to 
implement beneficial solutions.   
These two points speak directly to the next two lessons from Better Work for GGS: that 
the state remains a crucial actor because it has coercive power and that training is an important 
complement to incentives. 
The Enduring Importance of the State 
An important lesson from studying Better Work is that the state remains a central actor in 
governing global problems.  While it is true that inter-state cooperation may no longer be 
sufficient to solve many global problems, state participation remains a necessary component of 
almost any MI.  States have knowledge of local conditions and access to local actors – but more 
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importantly, states have the power and legitimacy to apply coercion to a degree that foreign 
actors (e.g. states in developed countries, MNCs, and international NGOs) rarely have. 
 In the history of Better Work, individual programs have been most successful in countries 
where the state has used its authority as a complement to Better Work.  In Cambodia, the 
government mandates participation.  In Jordan, the government also mandated participation after 
several years, its labor inspectors work closely with Better Work EAs, and the state helped 
sponsor a sector-wide CBA.  And in Vietnam, the labor ministry and national union have always 
been strong advocates of Better Work.  In countries where the state is less supportive – for 
example, Lesotho and Nicaragua – the program has not been as effective.  
Training is a Key Complement to Incentives 
Another central lesson that comes from Better Work is the importance of providing information 
and training to factory managers and workers.  In countless interviews with Better Work 
personnel and observers of the program, these trainings were emphasized as a key complement 
to monitoring. 
 This is striking because the literature on MIs and regulation focus almost exclusively on 
incentives.  The literature divides MI tasks into three categories: rulemaking, in which the 
regulations are negotiated and formalized.  Monitoring, in which the MI accesses the activities of 
the regulated actors through various means that include self-reporting, monitoring by the MI, or 
third-party monitors.  Finally, enforcing, in which rewards and punishments are applied by the 
MI to incentivize behavior (Abbott and Snidal 2009 and Bartely 2011 both provide very 
insightful recommendations but do not mention training). 
 Theories that focus exclusively on incentives implicitly assume that regulated actors are 
omniscient about alternatives to current practices and non-compliance is only caused by a lack of 
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willingness to comply or by a rational calculation that the cost of compliance exceeds the 
benefits.  Better Work staff report that factories may not comply with regulations for a variety of 
other reasons. 
 Factories may not comply because they simply do not know the law.  In developing 
countries where laws change quickly, there are few lawyers and government agencies do not 
educate businesses.  It is perfectly possible for factories to violate the law for many years without 
realizing it.  Another reason factories may not comply is because they simply do not know how 
to do so.  Factory managers may represent generations of experience in producing textiles and 
apparel, but they may know nothing about modern fire safety, electrical equipment, or human 
resource practices.  Factory owners may wish to improve, but they do not know how to improve 
or know where to go for assistance.  A final reason that factories resist change is an emotional 
attachment to existing patterns of behavior.  This is often overlooked in the literature, but 
research from psychology suggests that it is powerful (World Bank 2014).   
 Training can help the regulated overcome these obstacles and come into compliance with 
rules.  In the absence of a clear path to compliance, regulated actors are likely to cheat, hide 
problems, or make surface changes that appeal to monitors but do little to change actual 
conditions.  This indicates that MIs should include training as a key task in between monitoring 
and enforcing. 
 There is a tension here that should be noted.  When an MI engages in both training and 
enforcing, it must adopt two conflicting roles.  Training requires cooperation and transparency 
on the part of the regulated.  Enforcing is inherently confrontational and encourages obfuscation 
from the regulated.  Ideally, the training and enforcing arms of an MI should be separated or, 
even better, a single problem should be addressed by two MIs, one to enforce and one to train. 
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The Value of an Anchor 
Returning to Tim Bartely’s point that MIs are a site of political contestation, it should be noted 
that this contestation does not end once the MI has been created – it continues on as stakeholders 
jockey for influence over the direction of the MI.  This is highly salient problem for MIs because 
stakeholders often have wildly different degrees of power.  MNCs with billions of dollars in 
revenue may share a table with NGOs on the verge on insolvency, while powerful countries like 
the United States may be negotiating with impoverished nations like Botswana.  The Kimberley 
Process to prevent conflict diamonds faces this problem.  The program was initially successful, 
but it is falling apart because of inertia by massive diamond suppliers and diamond producing 
states.  The small NGOs trying to reinvigorate the process are not able to pressure these other 
actors (Global Witness 2013). 
 One of the lessons from Better Work has been the value of the ILO and IFC in allowing 
Better Work to maintain its neutrality.  This is in stark contrast to other MIs in the apparel 
industry in which certain stakeholders, usually multinational corporations, have gained control.  
The ILO and IFC have acted as “anchors” for Better Work by providing political independence 
from stakeholders.  These IOs also provide practical, logistical benefits.  They provide office 
space, computers, logistical support, human resource departments, financial oversight, and 
connections to domestic actors in countries where programs operate.  All of these practical issues 
would be difficult for a start-up NGO to put together as quickly as an IO. 
 The lesson here for other MIs is that they should also have an anchor, at least for the first 
few years.  IOs are well positioned to act as anchors, but other actors could do it as well provided 
they could act as neutral brokers between stakeholder (e.g. domestic state agencies, large 
foundations, etc).  The main downside of having IOs as an anchor is that their internal 
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bureaucratic processes can be cumbersome for an MI that is trying to adapt quickly to novel 
situations.  Also, some IOs may be less effective than others.  The OECD, for example, does not 
have universal membership, so it would be less impartial in a global initiative than a UN agency. 
Multinational Corporations can be Responsible Partners but not Leaders 
There is a perception among the general public that MNCs only join MIs like Better Work out of 
a cynical, grudging desire to protect their reputations.  I did not get this sense after interviewing 
several individuals from MNCs.  Similarly, Better Work staff who liaise with MNCs did not 
report getting this impression.  The attitude of MNCs towards labor rights in their supply chains 
could be more accurately summarized as one of a desire to do something, without knowing 
exactly what to do, while also running a business and protecting their reputations. 
 MNCs’ support for Better Work does demonstrate their commitment to labor rights, 
especially in countries with voluntary programs.  MNCs request that factories in their supply 
chains join Better Work even though these MNCs are not under public pressure to go beyond 
their already-existing internal codes of conduct.  If MNCs had no desire to improve working 
conditions, then they would likely ignore Better Work and stick with their internal efforts.  Better 
Work staff also report that some MNCs put pressure on factories to improve their compliance 
over time. 
 That said, MNCs are obviously not primarily interested in improving labor rights – they 
are businesses that want to make money.  Adam Greene, formerly the US Council on 
International Business’s representative to the Better Work Advisory Committee, reported that 
MNCs do not want to be responsible for conditions in their supply chains.  They would much 
rather governments take responsibility so they can focus on their business.  Better Work is useful 
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in this context because it does alleviate MNCs from the pressure to be solely responsible for their 
supply chains. 
 The evidence from the apparel industry suggests that MNCs can be responsible partners 
in MIs that controlled by other actors, as they have been with Better Work.  But it also suggests 
that MIs which are controlled by MNCs, like WRAP or SAI, are unlikely to achieve results 
because they depend on the MNCs to provide the impetus for change. The International Council 
on Mining and Metals Sustainable Development Framework and the United Nations Global 
Compact are other examples of corporate-controlled MIs that have failed to achieve any 
noticeable results (see Sethi and Schepters 2013 and Sethi 2014).   
Domestic Stakeholders are Indispensable  
The final lesson from Better Work for MIs is the valuable role that local actors play in translating 
a global initiative into policy on the ground.  In the context of Better Work, these local actors 
include various government agencies, employers’ association, and labor unions.  These domestic 
stakeholders contribute to MIs in four ways. 
 First, they have knowledge about local conditions.  MIs with global scope must act in 
countries with very different contexts and situations, and it is simply impossible for the people 
headquarters in Genevan, Washington, or Brussels to understand these conditions.  Even in an 
industry like apparel with some homogeneity among producers, the differences between 
countries and between regions within countries are stark.  Without input from local actors, MIs 
run the risk of committing the bureaucratic universalism that plagues international organizations. 
 Second, local actors can help translate an MI’s policies into practices that make sense in 
the local context.  For example, Better Work cooperates with labor inspectors to develop its 
monitoring tool in each country to ensure that both actors interpret the law the same way.   
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 Third, MIs can leverage the power of local actors to improve compliance with their goals.  
MIs rarely have coercive power; by enlisting state agencies in their goals, MIs can gain some 
measure of coercive support.  In apparel, labor unions are also important in putting pressure on 
factories to comply. 
 Fourth, local actors spread the lessons of the MI beyond the scope and timespan of the 
program.  Better Work has been able to effect the entire apparel industry in countries where it 
operates through working with local partners by advising on labor law, training union members, 
informing workers about their rights, and working with government labor inspectors.  These 
local actors can also cement improvements in place, making sure that they will persist beyond 
the life of the MI. 
 This lesson is not new – “local ownership” has been a trope in development discourse for 
quite a while.  But global MIs often give local partners an ancillary role or simply play lip 
service to local actors.  Better Work’s experience suggests that domestic stakeholders should 
play a central role because many of the program’s greatest successes have come through 
collaboration with local partners.  These include changes to Vietnam’s labor law, negotiating 
Jordan’s collective bargaining agreement, and organizing tripartite discussion in Haiti. 
 This lesson also indicates that the ILO’s tripartite model can be valuable for newly-
industrializing countries.  The ILO’s model was created almost 100 years ago in Europe, and 
some have questioned whether or not it is applicable to other regions.  The experience of Better 
Work suggests that the tripartite model is not just applicable to emerging economies, it is 





Topics for Further Research 
The lessons discussed above are based on a single case study and need more research to be fully 
fleshed out.  Two topics that are worth researching in more depth are discussed in this final 
section. 
 The difference between issues requiring coercion and those requiring cooperation needs 
clarification.  While some issues clearly fall into one category or the other, many issues blend the 
two.  The abolition of child labor is an example.  On the one hand, it is in the interest of an entire 
society to protect its children and educate them so they can be more productive adults, so this 
problem seems to require cooperation.  But certain actors will be harmed, notably employers of 
children and, occasionally, the children themselves.  In a fascinating study on the abolition of 
child labor in Bolivia, the authors found that child laborers opposed abolishing their employment 
because may depended on an income to support their families (Fontana and Grugel 2015).  This 
indicates that even a problem a straightforward as child labor could require some coercion. 
 The possibility also exists for coercive problems to be convincingly reframed as 
cooperative problems and vice-versa.  For example, Better Work tries to frame freedom of 
association issues as cooperative.  It argued that a strong union movement is good for employers 
because workers will be happier and more productive, and there will be fewer strikes.  I do not 
believe that they have convinced employers of this reframing, but the point is that problems can 
be interpreted differently.  In another example, early negotiations on climate change approached 
the problem as one requiring coercion; but more recent discussions have emphasized the 
cooperative nature of the problem. 
 This indicates that an MI should incorporate both coercive and cooperative elements, but 
the ideal mix will be determined by the problem at hand.  The problem may also require 
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cooperation among one set of actors but coercion with respect to a different set of actors.  
Finally, the MI may need the ability to reframe problems. 
 A second issue that needs more research is the relationship between monitoring and 
educating.  In monitoring, an MI sets up incentives for compliance and then monitors other 
actors.  In training, the MI sets aspirational goals and then helps actors achieve those goals.  It is 
hard for an MI to do both well.  A look at other MIs would be very instructive to see if there are 
best practices available for overcoming this challenge.   
Conclusion 
The Better Work program is a highly effective MI.  It is able to maintain the support of a diverse 
set of stakeholder and still achieve concrete improvements to labor standards.  Moreover, it is 
able to do this in an industry where so much pressure runs against good working conditions.  
Better Work provides numerous lessons for other MIs in other areas.  It also provides some hope 
that existing international institutions, if they are creative enough, can address the myriad global 
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